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Abstract
GUILTY STEREOTYPES: THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF RACE AND SUSPICION IN
POLICE INTERVIEWS AND INTERROGATIONS
by
SARA C APPLEBY
Adviser: Maria Hartwig
Over 300 people have been exonerated by post conviction DNA testing, unequivocally
proving their innocence. Nearly 70% of these post conviction DNA exonerees are members of
minority groups, and approximately 69% of those convicted as a result of false confessions are
racial/ethnic minorities (www.innocenceproject.org). To date, there is little research on the role
of race in police interviews and interrogations. The present research had two goals. First, we
examined Black and White participants’ experiences during a mock crime interview. Second,
using the interviews from Study 1, we evaluated the role suspect race plays in police officers’
veracity judgments. Using a sample of community members, Black and White suspects in Study
1 reported similar levels of anxiety and exhibited similar rates of nonverbal behaviors commonly
believed to be cues to deception. Similarly, Black and White suspects cooperated with the
investigation at similar rates. Police officers in Study 2 exhibited chance levels of accuracy in
their culpability decisions. However, police officers were significantly more likely to misjudge
innocent Black suspects as guilty than innocent White suspects, while showing no difference in
their accuracy rates for guilty suspects. Additionally, police officers judged Black suspects to be
less cooperative and less forthcoming than White suspects. These results suggest that being
questioned about a crime is stressful regardless of a suspect’s race or ethnicity. They also
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suggest that innocent Black suspects are at a greater risk of being erroneously judged as guilty
during police interviews and interrogations. Implications and directions for future research are
discussed.
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CHAPTER 1: THE ROLE OF RACE IN WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
English jurist William Blackstone argued that it is better to let ten guilty men go free than
to send one innocent person to jail (Blackstone, 1826). This premise has been one of the building
blocks of our adversarial justice system (Volokh, 1997). Yet, to date, 321 people have been
exonerated

by

post-conviction

DNA

testing,

unequivocally

proving

their

innocence

(www.innocenceproject.org). Nearly 70% of these post-conviction DNA exonerees are racialethnic minorities. Racial-ethnic minorities are over-represented in the criminal justice system as a
whole (McCarter, 2009; The Sentencing Project, 1995) and scholars have cited both socioeconomic reasons (e.g. higher poverty rates) and discriminatory practices (e.g. drug sentencing
policies) as explanations for this over-representation (McCarter, 2009; The Sentencing Project,
1995).

The over-representation of racial and ethnic minorities among the DNA exoneree

population, however, has largely been ignored. Although socio-economic reasons are likely to
play a role in the high racial-ethnic minority presence in the DNA exoneree population though
mechanisms such as being less likely to afford quality legal assistance, there are a number of
social-cognitive reasons that may also contribute to the high rate of racial and ethnic minorities in
the criminal justice system. Some examples of social cognitive biases that have been known to
influence decision-making in other areas of the legal system include in-group/out-group biases,
stereotyping, and prejudice on the part of the players in the legal system, sometimes operating
unconsciously (e.g., Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-Vaughns, & Johnson, 2006; Sommers & Ellsworth,
2001).
The Innocence Project identifies six major contributing factors to wrongful convictions,
but in only one of the contributing factors - eyewitness identifications - has there been ample
research on how suspect race can affect legal decision-making. Eyewitness misidentification is
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the major cause of wrongful convictions; a contributing factor in over 75% of DNA exonerations
(www.innocenceproject.org). A review of Innocence Project (a non-profit organization dedicated
to exonerating the wrongfully convicted through DNA testing of evidence) cases shows that 50%
of these mistaken eyewitness identifications were cross-race identifications, usually in the form of
a Black suspect and a White witness (Innocence Project, 2009). There have been a number of
eyewitness studies dedicated to discerning how race affects eyewitness identifications. Metaanalytic findings show that racial attitudes do not predict cross race identification accuracy, and
suggests that social-cognitive mechanisms (e.g. amount of interracial contact) influence cross race
identification accuracy (Meissner & Brigham, 2001). These findings suggest that, in addition to
socio-economic factors, social-cognitive factors play a role in the overrepresentation of minorities
among the wrongfully convicted.
Very little research, however, has been conducted on how race affects another leading
cause of wrongful conviction, false confessions. False confessions, a narrative admission to a
criminal act that one did not commit, have been a contributing factor in approximately 25% of the
DNA exoneration cases. The true rate of false confessions is not known, but the number of DNA
exonerees represents the tip of the iceberg as many false confession cases are likely invisible. For
example, cases where no DNA evidence is present, confessions are disproved prior to trial,
confessions from juveniles in files that remain sealed, and confessions to minor crimes that do not
receive post conviction scrutiny are rarely included in counts of false confession cases (Kassin et
al., 2010). A review of Innocence Project case files reveals that approximately 69% of false
confession exonerees are racial-ethnic minorities (www.innocenceproject.org). The evidence is
clear that false confessions, and thus a considerable number of convictions of innocent people,
have their origin in the interrogation room - a proposition that has received ample support from
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field and laboratory research (Baldwin, 1993; Bull & Milne, 2004; Gudjonsson, 2003; Hartwig,
Granhag, & Vrij, 2005; Huff, Rattner, & Sagarin, 1996; Kassin, 2005; Kassin, Drizin, Grisso,
Gudjonsson, Leo, & Redlich, 2010; Victory, 2002). Further, as will be detailed below, the
evidence is overwhelming that these misclassifications of innocent suspects are due largely to
police misinterpretations of behaviors when discerning deception and guilt (Kassin, 2008; Vrij,
2004). Given the large number of minorities who have been wrongfully convicted as a result of
false confessions, the present research seeks to investigate the effects of suspect race on police
officers’ credibility judgments.
When interviewing suspects, police officers are often trained to evaluate suspects’
nonverbal behaviors, such as gaze aversion and fidgeting, to detect deception (e.g. Inbau, Reid,
Buckley, & Jayne, 2013).

Research shows, however, that these behaviors are not cues to

deception (DePaulo et al., 2003). Instead, they are typical signs of discomfort and anxiety.
During police-citizen interactions, there are a number of reasons other than deception why a
suspect may be anxious during questioning. Some examples include the discomfort of being
accused of a crime or the fear of potentially being mistakenly judged as guilty (deTurk & Miller,
1985; Winkel, Koppeleaar, &Vrij, 1988, Bond & Fahey, 1987). Black suspects in particular may
be prone to stress and anxiety due the appraisal of the possibility that they fit the stereotype of a
criminal. Indeed, the stereotypical association of African-Americans with criminality is widespread (Eberhardt, et al., 2004) and surveys of African-Americans show that they are acutely
aware of this stereotype (Sigelman & Tuch, 1997). The research on stereotype threat, concern
about being negatively evaluated based on one’s membership in a group, shows that being
stereotyped is an anxiety provoking process (Abdou & Fingerhut, 2014; Lee, Kim, & Vohs, 2011;
Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999).
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In this dissertation, I propose that police reliance on cues to anxiety to assess credibility
will make innocent Black suspects especially vulnerable targets for misclassifications as guilty
suspects. Specifically, I predict that Black suspects' appraisal of the stereotype threat in a police
interrogation situation may function as a self-fulfilling prophecy: awareness of the risk of being
judged as guilty on the basis of one's race may give rise to anxiety, which in turn is interpreted as
signs of guilt by an interviewer (Strömwall, Granhag, & Hartwig, 2004; Vrij, 2008).
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND ON POLICE INTERVIEWING AND
INTERROGATIONS
The standard American police interrogation is typically a two-step process (Inbau et al.,
2013). First, police officers conduct a pre-interrogation interview, a non-confrontational process,
to determine whether suspects are innocent or guilty. In the pre-interrogation interview, police are
advised to look for behavioral cues to deception. The purpose of the pre-interrogation interview is
to eliminate the innocent and identify the guilty. This interaction is a critical moment that
determines whether the interviewee will be subjected to further interrogation (Kassin &
Gudjonsson, 2004). As will be discussed in detail below, police officers often make mistakes
when detecting deception in the pre-interrogation interview (Vrij, 2008; Vrij, Granhag, & Porter,
2011), putting innocent suspects at risk for being exposed to psychologically manipulative and
coercive interrogation techniques aimed at eliciting confessions.
Once a suspect has been identified as deceptive and, thus, guilty, the interrogation begins.
The interrogation is an accusatorial process where investigators try to elicit a confession from
suspects they already believe to be guilty (Gudjonsson, 2003; Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004). This
presumption of guilt can set into motion a process of behavioral confirmation, whereby the
interrogator presumes guilt and treats the suspect as so; the suspect then begins to act in a manner
that the interrogator interprets as guilt, confirming his initial beliefs (Kassin, Goldstein, &
Savitsky, 2003). Moreover, interrogators primed with guilty expectations, regardless of suspects’
actual guilt, ask more guilt presumptive questions, use more techniques, and exert more pressure
on the suspect to confess than interrogators who presume innocence. Ironically, this pressure is
increased when a guilt presumptive interrogator is paired with an innocent suspect (Kassin et al.,
2003). Kassin et al. (2003) had observers listen to taped sessions where the interrogator was
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primed with expectations of innocence or guilt. Observers listening to the guilty expectations
condition rated suspects as more defensive than observers listening to suspects in the innocent
expectations condition - regardless of the suspect’s actual guilt. The interrogator’s expectations
about the suspect’s culpability ultimately created a behavioral confirmation loop whereby his
expectations affected the suspect’s behavior, increasing the likelihood that the suspect would be
judged in line with the interrogator’s initial expectations: guilty. A false confession is thus the
result of incorrect veracity assessments in step one of the interrogation and the subsequent
exposure of innocent suspects to manipulative and coercive interrogation techniques in step two
(Leo, 2001; Kassin, 2008).
The effectiveness of commonly employed interrogation techniques in accomplishing the
goal of eliciting confessions is undisputed.

Unfortunately, the problem of psychologically

coercive and manipulative interrogation tactics is that even innocent people may offer confessions
as a result of being exposed to such procedures (Kassin, 2005, Kassin et al., 2010). A number of
laboratory studies on the effectiveness of these techniques have shown this to be case (e.g.
Horselenberg, Merkelbach, & Josephs, 2003; Kassin & Kiechel, 1996; Perillo & Kassin, 2010,
Redlich & Goodman 2003, Russano, Meissner, Narchet & Kassin, 2005).

Although some

laboratory studies have failed to produce false confessions from participants (e.g. Levine,
Shulman, Carpenter, DeAndrea, & Blair, 2013), the lack of false confessions is typically due to
methodological flaws rather than the diagnosticity of these interrogation tactics (e.g. Levin et al.
make no mention of consequences – such as having to remain in the lab for an indefinite amount
of time - for maintaining one’s innocence). In sum, police interrogation methods are coercive and
can elicit confessions from innocent suspects through a number of channels. The proponents of
these coercive interrogation defend the use of coercive and manipulative interrogation tactics by
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claiming that only guilty suspects are subjected to these techniques, and that innocent suspects are
identified and released after the interview stage (e.g. Inbau et al., 2001). As will be described in
detail below, this suggestion is flawed and has been disproved by a large body of empirical
research (Meissner & Kassin, 2002; Vrij, 2008).

The evidence is overwhelming that

misclassifications of innocent suspects occur, largely due to police misinterpretations of behaviors
that are unrelated to deception and guilt (Kassin, 2008; Vrij, 2004).
Importantly, even though police-suspect interactions play a critical role in miscarriages of
justice (Gudjonsson, 2003), and minority groups are overrepresented in such cases of convictions
of innocents (www.innocenceproject.org), to date there has been little empirical research on the
effects of race in police interviews and interrogations of suspects. However, an examination of the
methods in which police are trained to detect deception and the interracial interaction and
stereotype threat literatures suggest that there may be an increased risk of innocent Black suspects
being misjudged as guilty. Specifically, police officers often rely on nonverbal behavior to detect
deception and the willingness of suspects to cooperate with police to ascertain guilt (e.g. Inbau et
al., 2013), but research has shown that these strategies are flawed, resulting in accuracy levels in
line with the level of chance (Meissner & Kassin, 2002; Vrij, 2004). Instead, such behaviors are
typical indicators of anxiety. Although guilty people may be anxious and uncooperative when
being questioned by police, guilt is not the only reason for these behaviors (deTurk & Miller,
1985; Winkel et al., 1988). The fear of being mistakenly judged as guilty can also evoke anxiety
and nervous behaviors in suspects (Bond & Fahey, 1987). Another possible reason suspects may
be anxious or uncooperative when talking to the police is their race. African-Americans are
stereotyped as criminals (Eberhardt, et al., 2004), and, importantly, being stereotyped has been
shown to increase anxiety levels (Abdou et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2011; Spencer et al., 1999).
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Furthermore, Black suspects may be less likely to cooperate with police investigations than White
suspects due to a lack of trust in police (Kennard & Kassin, 2011). Thus, one potential cause of
misclassifications of innocent suspects in the pre-interrogation interview may be suspect race. The
following sections discusses how police reliance on incorrect cues to deception may interact with
the experience of being stereotyped as a criminal to disproportionately put innocent Black suspects
at risk of being judged guilty in a pre-interrogation interview.
Police Beliefs about Deceptive Behavior
The ability to detect deception in legal settings is crucial, and the consequences of a
misjudgment are serious. Police do not want to wrongfully accuse an innocent person, yet they
also do not want to let a guilty person get away. Hence, many police interrogation training
programs spend a great deal of time training police in deception detection (e.g. John Reid and
Associates). Consequently, most criminal investigators are confident in their ability to detect
deception. A survey of police officers showed that, on average, the officers estimated that they
were 77% accurate in distinguishing between truth and lies (Kassin et al., 2007). The large body
of research on deception detection shows that police officers’ confidence in their ability to classify
truthful and false denials of crime is inflated (Vrij, 2003). Lay people achieve hit rates around or
slightly above chance level when faced with the task of distinguishing between truthful and
deceptive statements (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Although exhibiting higher confidence levels,
police officers have, similar to lay people, been found to obtain near chance hit rates (e.g.,
Meissner & Kassin, 2002; Vrij, 2004). Not only have police officers been found to be unable to
correctly classify truthful and deceptive statements on the basis of video-taped material, but highly
experienced criminal investigators obtain chance-level hit rates even when allowed to question a
guilty or innocent mock suspect according to the approach of their own choice (e.g. Hartwig,
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Granhag, Strömwall, & Vrij, 2004; Luke et al., 2014). In sum, police officers’ lie detection skills
are limited.
Police Rely on Cues to Anxiety to Detect Deception
Two main reasons have been put forth for why people are poor lie detectors. For many
years, research focused on the notion that lie catching is flawed due to incorrect beliefs about the
cognitive, emotional, and behavioral patterns of liars and truth tellers. Put simply, research
examined the notion that people are bad at detecting deception because they are relying on the
wrong cues.

For example, people expect those who deceptively deny guilt regarding a

transgression to experience nervousness, anxiety, and arousal, and that such experiences will leave
visible traces in demeanor (Strömwall et al., 2004). This stereotypical assumption about liars has
been shown to be invalid by ample research on liars and truth tellers, showing that demeanor cues
are largely non-diagnostic as they can be indicative of other states and processes as well as
deception (DePaulo et al., 2003). The second posited reason why people may be poor lie detectors
is that there are few differences in the behaviors of liars and truth tellers. A recent meta-analysis
examining cues to deception, and how perceivers use these cues, suggests that the latter reason
bests explains why people are poor at detecting deception (Hartwig & Bond, 2011).
When examining reasons for deception detection success and failure within law
enforcement contexts, however, there is an added level of complexity to consider – the training
law enforcement officials receive.

There is no shortage of in-service and private police

interviewing and interrogation training programs. In contrast to the decades of empirical research
on cues to deception, one of the most widely used training programs, The Reid Technique (a.k.a
John Reid and Associates), trains police officers that 70% of a message is communicated thought
nonverbal channels and instruct police officers to focus on nonverbal cues such as gaze aversion,
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fidgeting, posture shifts, hand gestures, and grooming behavior (Inbau et al., 2013). Supporters of
these methods argue that although guilty suspects will be nervous and concerned about how the
police perceive them, innocent suspects will have nothing to hide and thus will not be nervous
when talking to the police (e.g. Inbau et al., 2013).

Thus, they argue that guilty suspects’

increased emotion and anxiety caused by lying will lead to nonverbal behaviors indicative of
deception, namely the above-mentioned behaviors. Importantly, none of the nonverbal behaviors
cited as cues to anxiety and deception in Inbau et al.’s Criminal Interrogation & Confessions have
been shown to be indicative of deception (DePaulo et al., 2003).
Another reason traditional law enforcement training in deception detection is flawed is that
it over emphasizes the differences between the behaviors of liars and truth tellers. As previously
noted, Hartwig and Bond (2011) showed that lie detection accuracy is limited primarily because of
weak behavioral cues to deception. Police training manuals, however, often show photos of
suspects demonstrating truthful and deceptive behaviors, postures, and positioning giving the
impression that one can easily identify and use nonverbal behaviors to detect deception (Vrij et al.,
2010). Importantly, the few small reliable differences in the nonverbal behavior of liars and truth
tellers that have been noted in in the literature (e.g., the finding that liars show less leg movement)
are not cues to anxiety (DePaulo et al., 2003). Moreover, research shows evidence of individual
differences in nonverbal behaviors, none of which are related to veracity (Vrij, Akehurst, &
Morris, 1997).
Surveys of police officers have found that the majority of police officers do endorse these
nonverbal behaviors as reliable indicators of deception. These findings are robust, as they have
been replicated across a number of police forces in a number of different countries throughout the
last decade (Akehurst, Köhnken, Vrij, & Bull, 1996; Strömwall & Granhag, 2003; Vrij, Akehurst,
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& Knight, 2006; Vrij & Semin, 1996). It seems the belief that liars are fidgety and gaze aversive
is a global cultural myth. A worldwide investigation into people’s beliefs about deception found
that these beliefs were expressed with striking consistency across a number of cultures (Global
Deception Research Team, 2006; see Gilovich, 1991 for a discussion on false beliefs).
In addition to training people to rely on global myths about deceptive behavior, John Reid
and Associates argue that people trained in the use of their Behavioral Analysis Interview (BAI)
are 85% accurate in distinguishing between truth and lies (Horvath, Jayne, & Buckley, 1994). The
BAI is a series of 16 questions designed by Reid and Associates to elicit different nonverbal and
verbal responses from liars and truth-tellers. The evidence Reid and Associates cite for these hit
rates is flawed (Kassin, 2008). In fact, experimental investigations have found that only three of
the fifteen items on the BAI are actually associated with veracity (Blair & Kooi, 2004) and the
behavioral patterns of liars and truth tellers elicited by the interview are directly opposite of the
predictions of the BAI (Blair & Kooi, 2004; Vrij, Mann, & Fisher, 2006). Additionally, one study
demonstrated that the BAI is simply a constellation of commonly held, but inaccurate, notions
about deceptive behavior (Masip, Herrero, Garrido, & Barba, 2010). Some evidence indicates that
the Reid method of lie detection is even counterproductive for detecting deception. For example,
one study of police officers asked to judge the veracity of suspects in a real-life high-stakes
interview found that the more police officers endorse Reid cues, the worse they performed (Mann,
Vrij, & Bull, 2004). Furthermore, participants trained to attend to Reid cues to deception have
been shown to achieve lower accuracy rates in detecting true and false denials than naïve
participants, yet they are more confident in their accuracy judgments (Kassin & Fong, 1999).
Anxiety is Not a Cue to Deception
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As the research reviewed above shows, law enforcement is trained in the stereotypical
notion that liars are nervous about getting caught and will show signs of such nervousness
(Anderson, DePaulo, Ansfield, Tickle, & Green, 1999). In reality, innocent and guilty suspects
can be plagued by similar negative experiences, which could stem from several sources (deTurck
& Miller, 1985; Winkel et al., 1988). One source of anxiety and arousal for both innocent and
guilty people suspected of a transgression may be the unpleasant and threatening nature of the
accusation. An accusation of guilt, whether related to a social transgression (e.g., cheating on a
partner) or a criminal transgression, represents a threat proportional to the severity of the offense.
In the case of the criminal transgression, an ultimate assessment of guilt carries potentially severe
and life-altering consequences.

Being falsely accused, and the concern that the attempt to

convince the police of their innocence may be unsuccessful, may cause truth tellers to show
similar patterns of anxiety and behavior that are indistinguishable from liars (Bond & Fahey,
1987). Thus, being suspected of a crime is likely to elicit anxiety in both guilty and innocent
suspects. Supporting these claims, meta-analytic findings on the accuracy of deception judgments
show that people who are motivated to be believed are more likely to be judged as deceptive,
regardless of whether or not they are lying. This finding suggests that any perceived anxiety or
distress on the part of the suspect is not a consequence of deception, but a consequence of being
motivated to be believed (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; National Research Council, 2003; Vrij, 2008).
Police Believe Truth Tellers Cooperate
Police do not rely solely on nonverbal behavior when making judgments about deception.
Vrij et al. (2006) found that police believe liars are less likely to cooperate with them than truth
tellers. Additionally, Reid and Associates teach that truthful suspects are more cooperative with
the investigation than guilty suspects. Some common “indicators” of cooperation are willingness

12

to waive Miranda rights, willingness to take a polygraph test, and willingness to keep talking as
long as necessary to resolve the situation (Inbau et al., 2013). Although research has shown that
innocent people are more likely to waive their Miranda rights (Kassin & Norwick, 2004), and
more willing to submit to a polygraph (Jordan, Hartwig, Wallace, Dawson, & Xhahani, 2012), it
does not mean that these are unequivocal indicators of innocence. For example, individuals who
have had prior experience with the legal system are less likely to waive their rights (Leo, 1996).
Other studies have found no relationship between veracity and cooperation when cooperation was
operationally defined as the willingness to repeat their statement (Vrij, 2005) or willingness to
keep talking without a lawyer present (Jordan et al., 2012).

Furthermore, guilty suspects

sometimes report “being nice and pleasant” as a strategy for appearing credible to questioners
(Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007). Moreover, factors unrelated to veracity have been shown
to affect suspects’ willingness to cooperate, including evidence strength, crime seriousness
(Gudjonsson, 2003; Vrij, 2003), and suspect personality (Vrij, 2005). Thus, research suggests that
police officers’ reliance on the suspect’s level of cooperating as a diagnostic indicator of deception
is likely to lead to misclassifications (Vrij, 2005).
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CHAPTER 3: HOW POLICE STRATEGIES MAY DISPROPORTIONATELY
JEOPARDIZE BLACK SUSPECTS
In addition to individual differences in nonverbal behavior, there are cultural differences in
nonverbal behavior. One reason for these differences is that there are context- and culturedependent rules, called display rules, which regulate aspects of communication and nonverbal
behavior (Matsumoto, Yoo, & Nakagawa, 2008). While much of the cross-cultural research has
compared Eastern and Western cultures, a smaller subset of cross-cultural research has focused on
nonverbal communication differences between the racial and ethnic groups within the United
States itself.
Evidence of racial differences in nonverbal behavior in naturally occurring settings is
mixed (Ikes, 1984; La France and Mayo, 1976; Smith, 1983). There is, however, evidence of
context-dependent racial differences in nonverbal behavior.

During employment interviews,

Black applicants have been found to be more gaze aversive and to have more speech hesitations
than White applicants (Fugita, Wexley, & Hillery, 1974). There is also evidence of a selffulfilling prophecy in interracial interactions: Word, Cooper, and Zanna (1974) found that Black
job interviewees were treated with less immediacy than White interviewees. That is, compared to
White interviewees, interviewers spent less time with the Black interviewees, made more speech
errors when talking with Black interviewees, and placed themselves further away from the Black
interviewees. Consequently, this type of treatment was shown to cause Black interviewees to
make more speech errors, and be viewed as less calm, composed and friendly compared to White
interviewees (Word et al., 1974).

As previously noted, people who appear nervous, as the

participants in the Word et al. study did, are often judged to be deceptive by both police officers
and lay people.
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Police-citizen interactions are another context in which racial differences in nonverbal
behaviors have been evident. In a naturalistic observation study, videotapes from the TV show
COPS were analyzed for racial differences in nonverbal behavior. Results showed that Black
suspects exhibited more gaze aversion, used more hand gestures, and smiled more often than
White suspects (Johnson, 2006).

Importantly, these are all behaviors which police officers and

lay people rely on when attempting to establish the veracity of a suspect’s statement (Strömwall et
al., 2004). A systematic examination of nonverbal behavior patterns in simulated police-citizen
interactions in the Netherlands also found differences in the nonverbal behavior of Black and
White suspects.

Specifically, Black suspects had more speech disturbances, made less eye

contact, smiled more often, and moved more than White suspects (Vrij, 1991; Vrij et al., 1988;
Vrij & Winkel, 1990, 1991). Using these different patterns of behavior, Vrij and colleagues then
had actors portray either racially typical behavior or racially atypical behavior in the context of a
police interview and measured police officers’ perceptions of the suspect. Interestingly, in these
actor portrayals, regardless of the actors actual race, the “typical Black” suspect nonverbal
behavior was judged more negatively and as more suspicious than “typical White” suspect
nonverbal behavior (Vrij, Koppelaar, & Dragt, 1991; Vrij, Peters, & Winkel, 1991; c.f. Vrij &
Winkel, 1992). These findings suggest that the higher suspiciousness ratings are not due to
prejudice against Black suspects, but instead due to the stereotypically deceptive behaviors
exhibited by the suspect. It is important to note that the most consistent finding regarding contextdependent racial differences in nonverbal behavior is that African-Americans are more gaze
aversive. As discussed earlier, although gaze aversion is not reliably linked to deception, it is by
far the most prominent subjective (i.e., believed) indicator of deception for professionals and lay
people.
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The Role of Stereotypes
The stereotype of African-Americans as criminals is robust (Eberhardt et al., 2004), and
the consequences of this stereotype are pervasive. For example, the criminal stereotype can make
people see criminality when it is not present. In a series of simulated videogames, participants
saw Black and White people holding either weapons or harmless and were instructed to shoot the
armed target. Participants mistakenly shot more unarmed Black targets, than unarmed White
targets (Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002). The link between Black and crime appears to
be automatic and not directly related to explicit racial attitudes (Payne, 2001). Moreover, the link
appears to be bi-directional. That is, not only does priming participants with a Black face increase
the speed at which they identify a handgun in a degraded image, but priming participants with
crime increases the speed at which they identify Black faces (Eberhardt, et al., 2004; Payne, 2001).
These findings suggest that not only are Blacks stereotyped as criminals, but also crime is strongly
associated with Black people (Eberhardt et al., 2004).
Surveys of African-Americans show that they are aware of the stereotypes about their
group (Sigelman & Tuch, 1997). Furthermore, these meta-stereotypes have been shown to affect
the in-group’s expectations of how the out-group will treat them (Brown & Dobbins, 2004;
Sigelman & Tuch, 1997; Vorauer, Hunter, Main, & Roy, 2000; Vorauer & Kumhyr, 2001;
Vorauer, Main, & O’Connell, 1998).

As will be described below, these expectations of

stereotyping and prejudice then affect the minority group member’s behavior, often in ways that
may be construed by outside observers as nervous or anxious behavior. In the context of a police
interaction, the expectation that one is going to be treated like criminal based simply on one’s skin
color may set in motion a chain of events where, during the initial interaction with police, an
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innocent Black person’s demeanor inadvertently results in them being falsely being accused of a
crime.
Meta-perceptions. One plausible explanation for context-dependent racial differences in
nonverbal behavior is African-American concerns about stereotyping and racism in interracial
interactions (Dovidio, Hebl, Richeson, & Shelton, 2006). Research on meta-perceptions, people’s
beliefs about the stereotypes that out-group members hold about their in-group, shows that
minorities are both aware of the stereotypes that other races and ethnicities hold about their group
(Sigelman & Tuch, 1997), and concerned that the majority group will use these stereotypes to
evaluate them during interracial interactions (Shelton, Richeson, & Vorauer, 2006). Specifically,
ethnic minorities in the United States expect Whites to stereotype them negatively.

Some

examples of these stereotypes include, but are not limited to: unintelligent, violent, immoral, and
abusers of drugs and alcohol (Sigelman & Tuch, 1997). This expectation that they will be
stereotyped and possibly discriminated against during interracial interactions has been shown to
increase minorities’ self-reported anxiety and stress levels during these interactions (Plant &
Devine, 2003; Finchilescu, 2010; Plant, 2004; Stephan & Stephan, 1985). In turn, this increase in
anxiety can affect nonverbal communication. For example, Shelton (2003) found that AfricanAmericans who were lead to believe that their conversational partners might be prejudiced
fidgeted more than those who knew nothing of their interactants’ views (Shelton, 2003). Both
employment interviews and police-citizen interactions are contexts where African-Americans are
likely to be concerned with meta-perceptions, which may explain the previously discussed
context-dependent racial differences in nonverbal behavior. Specifically, within the context of
police-citizen interactions Black suspects may be concerned about being stereotyped as a criminal
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which may lead to an increase in anxiety and an increase in the stereotypical deceptive nonverbal
behaviors.
Stereotype Threat and Anxiety. Another argument for what may be driving contextdependent racial differences in nonverbal behavior is that they are the result of stereotype threat.
Stereotype threat is the fear of confirming a negative cultural stereotype about one’s group;
consequently performance in that situation suffers (Steele & Aronson, 1995). A great deal of
research over the last twenty years has focused on how members of stereotyped groups perform
under conditions of stereotype threat (see Inzlicht & Schmader, 2012; Nguyen & Ryan, 2008 for
reviews). Effects have been found for a wide variety of stereotyped groups in a number of settings
(Nguyen et al., 2008), including African-Americans and intelligence tests (Steele & Aronson,
1995; Steele, 1997), women and math, and Caucasian men and math, when compared to Asian
men (Steele, Spencer, & Aaronson, 2002). Yet, the research has largely ignored how minorities
react and perform under the possibility of being stereotyped as a criminal. Thus, this discussion
will explore how the causes and consequences of stereotype threat might impact a Black suspect’s
behavior in a police interview and interrogation setting.
Schmader, Johns, and Forbes (2008) argue that stereotype threat is triggered by situations
that pose a significant threat to self-integrity via stereotypes that suggest poor performance. Selfintegrity is primarily operationalized as identifying with the domain in question, such as women
who care about being good math or of African-Americans who care about being intelligent.
Although not all people identify with the domain that they are stereotyped to be poor at, most
people will likely identify with not being a criminal. Thus, being accused of a crime, especially
when innocent, should trigger a threat to one’s self-integrity. However, a threat to self-integrity is
not enough to trigger stereotype threat. People must perceive that it is both possible and probable
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that they well be negatively stereotyped for stereotype threat to occur (Wout, Shih, Jackson, &
Sellers, 2009). Stereotyping is considered possible when targets are aware that the negative
stereotype can be applied to them in the present social setting, and is considered probable when
there is a high likelihood of stereotypes being used in their present social setting (Wout et al.,
2009). As described above, the stereotype of African-Americans as criminals is robust, and
African-Americans are aware that others stereotype them as criminals. Thus, in a police-citizen
interaction, African-Americans will feel that it is both possible and probable that they will be
stereotyped as a criminal, triggering stereotype threat. Consequently, this threat to self-integrity,
trigged by being suspected of a crime, sets in motion a series of physiological, cognitive, and
affective responses to help cope with the threat (Major & O’Brien, 2005; Schmader et al., 2008).
Physiological, cognitive, and affective reactions combine to play a key role in how
stereotype threat impacts behavior (Schmader et al., 2008). This discussion, however, will focus
only on the physiological and affective components of stereotype threat, as they are the current
focus of police when making veracity judgments and are thus likely to be the reactions linked to
the behaviors that put individuals at risk for unfavorable veracity assessments and for being the
target of guilt-presumptive and coercive interrogation techniques. Early studies examining the
affective components of stereotype threat showed mixed results, with the role of anxiety in
stereotype threat being the most controversial (Bosson, Haymovitz, & Pinel, 2004). For example,
some studies have found no link between anxiety and performance under stereotype threat
conditions (e.g. Schmader, 2002; Oswald & Harvey, 2000; Steele & Aronson, 1995). Yet, other
studies have shown a partial link between anxiety and performance for stereotype threatened
individuals (e.g. Abdou et al., 2014; ; Lee et al., 2011; Osborne, 2007; Spencer et al., 1999). The
reason for these conflicting results appears to stem from the use of self-report to measure levels of
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anxiety. First, some stereotyped individuals may be concerned about self-presentation, leading
them to report lower levels of anxiety on self-report measures (Bosson et al., 2004). Second,
many of the processes at work during stereotype threat may be non-conscious, making them
impossible to tap with self-report measures (Oswald & Harvey, 2000). Finally, measuring arousal
and anxiety throughout the study without altering how participants experience the situation is
difficult with self-report measures, thus many researchers chose only to assess them at one or two
time periods during the study (e.g. Osborne, 2007; Steele & Aronson, 1995). In sum, using direct,
self-report measures to assess anxiety during stereotype threat situations provides limited, and
often conflicting, data which likely accounts for the disparate results.
Studies using indirect measures of arousal and anxiety, however, have shown more
consistent results than studies using self-report measures, suggesting that stereotype threat does
increase arousal and anxiety levels. For example, stereotype threatened participants perform better
on easy tasks and worse on hard tasks than non-stereotyped threatened participants (Ben-Zeev,
Fein, Inzlicht, 2005; O’Brien & Crandall, 2003), a pattern consistent with previous research on the
effects of arousal (an indirect measure of anxiety) on performance (Zajonc, 1965). Moreover,
when stereotype threatened participants are able to misattribute their arousal to an external source,
such as an alleged subliminal noise generator, they do not experience the same performance
decreases that traditional stereotyped participants do (Ben-Zeev et al., 2005; Johns, Schmader, &
Martens, 2005). Finally, stereotype threatened participants display more nonverbal indicators of
anxiety, such as fidgeting, gaze aversion, and nervous smiling than non-stereotype threatened
participants, even when they did not self-report feeling anxious during the task. These findings
suggest that traditional self-report methods of measuring anxiety may not be adequately capturing
the anxiety of being stereotype threatened (Bosson et al., 2004).
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The use of physiological measures has provided another way to measure participants’
anxiety levels during stereotype threat conditions by measuring arousal. Physiological measures
also provided the added benefit of being able to assess arousal throughout the entire stereotype
threat situation, and not merely before and after as is often the case in may of the self-report
measures.

A variety of physiological measures have shown increased levels of arousal in

stereotype threatened participants compared to non-stereotyped threatened participants.
Specifically, the blood pressure of stereotype threatened participants rose faster and remained
higher than that of the non-threatened participants (Blasovich, Spencer, Quinn, & Steele, 2001).
Similar effects have been found on heart rate (Croizet et al., 2004) and skin conductance (Murphy,
Steele, & Gross, 2007; Osborne, 2007), which are common physiological measures used to assess
anxiety indirectly (Boson et al., 2004). Taken together, the convergence of findings for indirect
behavioral and physiological measures of anxiety provide strong evidence that stereotype
threatened individuals experience stress-induced physiological arousal (Schmader et al., 2008).
Within a police interview, this increased arousal and anxiety may be inappropriately identified as
sign that the suspect is lying, placing Black suspects at greater risk of being classified as lying
than White suspects.
Although the stereotype of the African-American as a criminal is pervasive, and the
interrogation room is a setting where African-Americans have to worry about being stereotyped,
there has been little research on how suspect race affects police interviewing and interrogation,
and none of the research has examined these interactions within the context of stereotype threat.
In police-citizen interrogation situations, innocent Black suspects may be concerned about being
stereotyped as a criminal. Similar to previous stereotype threat research, innocent Black suspects
should fear confirming this stereotype, leading to increases in anxiety and stress levels. As noted
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earlier, because police often use behaviors that are indicative of anxiety as cues to deception, it is
plausible that a Black suspect will be at risk of being judged as deceptive as a function of the
increased anxiety brought on by stereotype threat.
Racial Differences in Trust in Police
In addition to stereotype threat and meta-perceptions, a lack of trust in police by Blacks
may increase the odds of an incorrect veracity assessment during a police interview. As a result of
both personal and vicarious experiences with the police, compared to Whites, Blacks tend to
considerably be less trusting and more suspicious of the police and the criminal justice system
(Fratello, Rengifo, Trone, Velazquez, 2013; Hurwitz & Peffley, 2001; Hurwitz & Peffley, 2005;
Warren 2010). A recent study showed that 81% of Black participants perceived the police to be
racially biased, compared to only 33% of whites (Warren, 2010). Furthermore, 30% of Black
respondents report being treated unfairly by police because of their race, compared to 13% of
White respondents (Hurwitz et al., 2001). Moreover, Blacks are more likely than Whites to view
the police as rude and physically and verbally abusive, as well as more likely to fear harassment
by the police (Schuck & Rosenbaum, 2005; Schuck, Rosenbaum, & Hawkins, 2008).
Additionally, perceptions of the criminal justice system as a whole show similar patterns of
distrust: 74% of Blacks felt that the justice system treated people unfairly, compared to only 44%
of Whites, and 61% of Blacks did not trust the courts to give a fair trial, compared to only 26% of
Whites (Hurwitz et al., 2005).

Importantly, these perceptions about police fairness have been

shown to influence African-American’s interpretations of police-citizen interactions. Black
participants report being more suspicious of police-citizen interactions when the citizen is Black
than when the citizen is White, while White participants report low levels of suspicion regardless
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of citizen race. Moreover, the more unfair Black respondents rated the criminal justice system to
be, the more suspicious they were of police interactions with Black citizens (Hurwitz et al., 2005).
This distrust in police and the criminal justice system is in contrast not only with the way
White citizens think about the criminal justice system, but to the way most people think about the
way the world functions. People in general hold a Belief in a Just World (BJW), meaning that the
world is fair, that good things happen to good people and bad things to bad people (Lerner, 1980).
This motivated belief helps people avoid anxious thoughts about one’s own well being by
believing that because they are good people, bad things will not happen to them (Hafer & Bègue,
2005). Racial and ethnic differences have been observed with regards to the Belief in a Just
World, however, with Blacks generally scoring lower than Whites on instruments measuring this
belief (Hunt, 2000; Kennard & Kassin, 2011; Smith & Green, 1984).
In the criminal justice system, BJW often manifests itself as the belief in the power of
one’s innocence to prevail. This belief often leads innocent suspects to behave in predictable ways
during police investigations. Indeed, laboratory research, conducted primarily with White
participants, suggests that innocent suspects tend to be more forthcoming, are more likely to waive
their Miranda rights, and are more likely to believe that their innocence will be apparent to
observers (Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Kronkvist, 2006; Kassin, 2005).

Paradoxically,

although these behaviors are intended to demonstrate innocence, police still often misclassify
suspects demonstrating these behaviors due to poor interrogation techniques (Kassin, 2012), and
incorrect beliefs about deceptive behaviors (Strömwall et al., 2004).
Not surprisingly, racial differences have been found in suspects’ willingness to waive their
rights to silence and trust in police to honor these rights. White participants are significantly more
likely than Black participants to expect police to comply with a suspect’s request to retain his

23

rights, showing a greater trust in police from White than Black participants (Johnson, Citron,
Raghavan, 2007; Kennard & Kassin, 2011). Additionally, innocent Black participants are less
likely to waive their rights to silence than innocent White participants, while there is no difference
in waiver rates between guilty Black and White suspects (Kennard & Kassin, 20011). As detailed
above, police have preconceived notions about how innocent suspects should behave; for example
police believe that innocent suspects are more likely to waive their Miranda rights and talk with
the police than guilty suspects (Inbau et al., 2013; Kassin et al., 2007).

Thus, a suspect who

retains his rights to silence may be viewed as not cooperating with the investigation, and
consequently at risk of being classified as guilty. In sum, a less pronounced Belief in a Just World
may have the self-fulfilling effect of eliciting guilt judgments. Because Black suspects are likely
to have a lower BJW and less trust in the police, they may engage in more self-protective
behaviors than White suspects, which in turn may be misinterpreted by police officers as
indicative of guilt.
Researchers have examined the different strategies that innocent and guilty suspects use
during police interviews.

Results support the phenomenology of innocence (Kassin, 2005)

framework, which suggests that innocent suspects believe in the power of their innocence to
exculpate them, (Kassin, 2005). When innocent suspects report a strategy, it is to tell the truth as
it happened (Strömwall et al., 2006) because they believe that their innocence will be clear to the
interviewer and protect them from harm (Kassin, 2005; Kassin et al., 2004). Guilty suspects,
however, try tell concise stories (Hartwig et al., 2007; Strömwall et al., 2006) and avoid disclosing
incriminating information (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). In sum, guilty suspects report planning to
withhold more information than innocent suspects.

Analysis of verbal content of suspects’

statements shows that guilty suspects are, in fact, significantly less forthcoming with information
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than innocent suspects (Luke et al., 2014). For Black suspects, expectations about how one will
be treated, and meta-perceptions about how one will be judged may lead them to adopt different
strategies during a police interview than White suspects. Specifically, this lack of trust may lead
Black suspects to adopt a more withholding strategy as to be completely forthcoming requires one
to have faith that the end result will be a positive one. By being more withholding, however,
Black suspects may be seen as more evasive or less cooperative with the investigation by police.
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS
A considerable number of wrongful convictions have their origin in the interrogation room.
Moreover, a considerable number of those who have been wrongfully convicted are minorities.
Yet, there has been very little research on how a suspect’s race impacts police interviews and
interrogations. The eyewitness identification literature shows that a suspect’s race can impact
decision making through social-cognitive mechanisms unrelated to explicit racism, suggesting that
the overrepresentation of minorities among the DNA exonerees may be partially due to socialperception errors and not solely socio-economic factors. An examination of both the police
interviewing and interrogation literature and the interracial interaction literature lends further
support to this argument.
The literature reviewed above shows that police officers are trained to look for invalid cues
to deception and guilt that have been shown to be cues to anxiety rather than deception. There are
many possible reasons why a suspect may be anxious when being questioned by police, including
race. Importantly, a review of the interracial interaction literature shows that the process of being
questioned by the police may be more anxiety provoking for Black Americans than White
Americans. Thus, in a police-citizen interaction, Blacks may be more likely than Whites to
display anxious behavior and less likely to cooperate with the investigation by waiving their rights
to silence. Since the overlap between cues to anxiety and stereotypical cues to deception is well
established in the empirical literature, we argue that to police officers, innocent Black suspects
may appear more deceptive than innocent White suspects. Because police do not rely solely on
nonverbal cues to determine whether a suspect is innocent or guilty, but also rely on cues such as a
suspect’s willingness to cooperate with the investigation, this lack of trust in police may

26

compound the problem, putting innocent Black suspects at further risk of being misclassified as
guilty when interviewed by the police.
More research is needed examining the intersection of the interviewing and interrogation
literature and the interracial interaction literature to further understand the over representation of
racial-ethnic minorities among the wrongfully convicted. Much research has shown that the
reliance on anxiety as a to deception and guilt leads police officers to be poor lie detectors, overall
increasing the risk of innocents being wrongfully accused and wrongfully convicted.

An

important question is whether this strategy disproportionately puts Black suspects at risk of being
wrongfully accused and convicted. Are police interviews more anxiety provoking for Blacks than
they are for Whites? Does this increased anxiety affect police officers’ ability to detect deception
in police interviews involving Black suspects? Although much research suggests this may indeed
be the case, this premise has never been directly tested experimentally.
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CHAPTER 5: OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT RESEARCH
Racial differences in non-verbal behavior, willingness to cooperate with the investigation,
and suspect strategies during the interview will be evaluated to determine if police strategies to
detect deception disproportionately put Black Americans at risk of being classified as deceptive in
a pre-interrogation interview. The purpose of these studies will be to expand the literature on
investigative interviews with suspects, in particular with regard to the role of race and race-related
risks for misclassifications of guilt, as well as the role of stereotype threat within the context of the
police interview setting. We will investigate the likely pattern that (1) compared to innocent
White suspects, innocent Black suspects will be more nervous and thus more likely to display
nonverbal behaviors that perceivers tend to associate with deception; (2) compared to innocent
White suspects, innocent Black suspects will less trusting and thus more guarded when interacting
with the police, leading them to be less likely to cooperate with the investigation and more
withholding of information during their interview; (3) police officers will rely on these
stereotypical indicators of deception and guilt and thus make more misjudgments when assessing
innocent Black suspects than innocent White suspects.
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CHAPTER 6: STUDY 1: EXAMINING RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN SUSPECTS’
EXPERIENCES OF MOCK POLICE INTERROGATIONS
The purpose of Study 1 was to examine potential racial differences in verbal and nonverbal
behaviors, and the self reported experiences of being questioned – in a confrontational way, as is
commonly the case in the United States – about a stereotypically Black crime. First, racial
differences in non-verbal behavior and willingness to cooperate with the investigation were
evaluated, as those are two of the main characteristics of overall behavior that police officers are
trained to use to detect deception during police interviews. Participants also provided self-reports
about how they felt during their assigned task (half were randomly assigned to commit a mock
crime), after being accused of theft but before being interviewed, and how they felt during the
interview. In addition, we also gathered data about participants’ planning and strategies going into
the interviews. As described earlier, research shows that innocent suspects are less likely to plan
their verbal behavior and less likely to use a specific strategy in interviews than guilty suspects;
when innocent suspects do report a strategy it is often to report the truth as it happened (Hartwig,
et al., 2007; Strömwall, et al., 2006). This research, however, has yet to examine the difference
between the strategies that Black and White suspects use when interacting with the police. It is
possible that, due to reduced trust in the police, innocent Black suspects may report different
strategies than innocent White suspects. Study 1 also served to create the stimulus materials for
Study 2.

All of the interviews from Study 1 were videotaped, and, with the participants’

permission, we showed the videotapes to lie-catchers (law enforcement officers) in Study 2.
Hypotheses
H1 Anxiety: We predict a main effect for suspect race on both self-reported and behavioral
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measures of anxiety as shown in stereotype threat studies (e.g. Johns et al., 2008; Bosson et
al., 2004). Specifically we predict that Black suspects will be more anxious than White
suspects on both self-report and behavioral measures of anxiety. We also predict a race by
culpability interaction on self-report and behavioral measures of anxiety. We predict that
innocent Black suspects will be more anxious and display more nonverbal behaviors
subjectively associated with deception (e.g. Vrij, 1991; Vrij, et al., 1988; Vrij et al., 1990,
1991), and engage in fewer cooperative behaviors (e.g. Kennard & Kassin, 2011)
subjectively associated with innocence (Inbau et al., 2013) than innocent White suspects.
We predict that guilty Black and White suspects, however, will show no differences in
anxiety or cooperation.
H2 Meta-Perceptions: Because Black Americans are aware of the stereotypes about them
(Sigelman & Tuch, 1997) and expect to be evaluated according to these stereotypes during
interracial interactions (Shelton et al., 2006), we predict that that Black suspects will
expect to be viewed more negatively than White suspects by both the interviewer and
outside observers.
H3 Cooperation: Given the research on Black Americans’ general distrust of police (Fratello, et
al., 2013; Hurwitz & Peffley, 2005; Warren 2010), we predict a race by culpability
interaction on suspects’ willingness to cooperate with the investigation. Specifically, we
predict that innocent Black suspects will engage in fewer cooperative behaviors (e.g.
Kennard & Kassin, 2011) subjectively associated with innocence (Inbau et al., 2013) than
innocent White suspects. We predict that guilty Black and White suspects, however, will
show no differences in willingness to cooperate
H4 Suspects’ Strategies: Finally, we predict that Black and White suspects will have different
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strategies when approaching a police interview. In Jordan et al. (2012), 10% of innocent
suspects lied during their interview. The Jordan et al. (2012) sample was more racially and
ethnically diverse than previous studies on suspect strategies (e.g. Hartwig et al., 2007;
Strömwall et al., 2006).

Based on this research, and prior research showing Black

Americans are more suspicious of police (Fratello, et al., 2013; Hurwitz et al., 2005;
Warren 2010), we predict that Black suspects will employ more withholding strategies
than White suspects during the interview due to a lack of trust in police.
Method
Participants
Participants (N = 97) were recruited to participate in a study on legal decision-making1 via
advertising placed on craigslist.com (Appendix A) in a large urban Northeastern City. Care was
taken to ensure none of the participants had participated in any previous deception detection or
interrogation studies at the college. Participants were pre-screened for ethnicity and citizenship
prior to enrolling in the study through a generic seven question demographics and screening
questionnaire asking the potential participants’ name, age, job, race/ethnicity, gender, country of
citizenship, and prior studies completed at the college (this information was also cross-checked
with sign up sheets for ongoing and recent studies to reduce the chance of repeat participants).
Even after screening, two participants were removed from analysis for indicating their race was
“Other” rather than Black or White; five participants were removed from analysis for failing to
follow the experimenter’s instructions or directions; two participants asked to stop the study early;
and the mock detective misspoke during one interview (see further details below). Thus, the final
number of participants for analysis is 87.
1

The study was advertised as a legal decision making study instead of a deception detection
study to reduce response bias by potential subjects on craigslist.
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About half of the participants were female (51.7%) and half were male (48.3%)2. As a result
of pre-screening, all (100%) of the participants were United States Citizens. As desired, nearly
half of the participants were White (47.1%, n = 41) and half were Black (52.9%, n = 46). The
ages of the participants ranged from 18 to 60 (M = 33.83 years, SD = 10.61). Finally, a sizeable
portion of the participants indicated that they had at least some college education (40.2%), while
another sizeable portion of the participants indicated that they had a bachelor’s degree (40.2%)
and 12.6% indicated they had a graduate or professional degree; only 4.6% had not obtained any
college education at all.
Participants were told that the study would take about thirty to forty-five minutes and were
paid ten dollars for their time. In addition, participants were incentivized to maintain innocence
by being informed that they had a chance to be entered in a lottery to win $100 if they convinced
the interviewer of their innocence. In reality, because the interviewer did not actually make any
veracity judgments, every participant was entered into the lottery.
Design.
The study employed a 2 (Culpability: Innocent v. Guilty) x 2 (Race: Black v. White) between
subjects quasi-experimental design.
Independent Variables
Culpability. Participants were randomly assigned to commit a mock crime (to steal a wallet
they are told contains $100 from a briefcase) or an innocent act (looking for a specific book) in
line with a paradigm adopted from previous research studies (e.g. Hartwig et al., 2006; Hartwig et
al., 2007).

2

Exploratory analyses testing for gender differences were conducted, as Black men tend to be
more strongly associated with crime and criminality than Black women. No differences in selfreport data or behavioral measures were found between Black men and women in Study 1.
32

This mock crime plus interrogation paradigm was introduced by Kassin & Fong (1999) and
has subsequently been used in many studies since it’s inception. Results show that this paradigm
induces sufficient feelings of discomfort and anxiety in participants, yet does not go as far as to be
unethical (Hartwig et al., 2006; Hartwig et al., 2007; Kassin, 2008, Kassin & Fong, 1999). Pilot
testing of this specific procedure with student participants revealed similar results, producing
sufficient, ethical, levels of task nervousness (M = 4.10, on a 10-point scale) and discomfort (M =
5.40 on a 10-point scale). All previous studies have been subjected to and approved by ethical
review boards and there has never been an instance reported to our knowledge in which a
participant became overly upset. Moreover, there is evidence that this paradigm has some external
validity. Previous studies have found self-reported motivation to be believed as innocent to be
quite high (Ms > 8 on 10-point scale) (e.g. Hartwig et al., 2004; Hartwig, et al., 2005; Hartwig et
al., 2006). Again, pilot testing revealed similar results with the student participants reporting
being highly motivated to be believed with a mean motivation rating of 7.70 on a 10-point scale.
Race. Race of suspect, assessed by participants’ self-reports was a quasi-experimental variable
of key focus of our analyses.
Procedure
Upon arriving at the laboratory, participants were greeted by the experimenter and given a
consent form (Appendix B) to read and sign. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of
two culpability conditions (innocent or guilty). Participants were then given typed instructions
(Appendix C) to read regarding their task. After reading the instructions they were given a chance
to ask the experimenter any questions they had. The experimenter then gave each participant
verbal directions as well as a map to the room in which the participant was to carry out their task.
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To manipulate innocence and guilt (and consequently truthfulness and deceptiveness during
the interview), participants were asked to commit either a mock crime or similar but innocent act.
For the guilty condition, the mock crime consisted of participants stealing a wallet from a briefcase
from the psychology department mailroom.

They were told the wallet contained $100 (in

actuality, the money was not in the wallet, only an envelope with a number of papers that could
have been concealing the $100). Participants were then instructed to hide the wallet on their
person during the interview. In the innocent condition, the innocent act consisted of participants
looking for a specific book in a crate containing books on the same table in the mailroom as the
briefcase containing the wallet. They were told that the book may or may not be present and that
if they could not find it after a few minutes they were to return to the laboratory. The specific
book was never there, so all innocent participants returned empty handed.
Upon their return from the mailroom, a mock detective, blind to condition and hypotheses,
approached all suspects in the hallway. The mock detective informed the participant that there had
been a theft, that they were the main suspect in the theft, and escorted the participant to the mock
interrogation room for questioning. The mock detective was a White male Master’s student with
previous experience of conducting mock interrogations for research purposes.
After being intercepted by the mock detective, participants were led to a mock
interrogation room. The mock detective instructed participants to be seated and wait. On the table
in the interrogation room were instructions for the interview portion of the experiment (Appendix
D).

The instructions indicated that the main task for all participants was to convince the

interviewer of their innocence. Guilty participants were instructed to deny having taken the
wallet, while innocent participants were instructed to tell the truth about not having taken the
wallet. In other words, half of the participants provided deceptive denials (guilty condition) while
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the other half provided truthful denials (innocent condition). In addition to the task instructions, a
short questionnaire with five items to assess participants’ pre-interview anxiety levels was left on
the table (Appendix E).
After five minutes or when the participant finished the questionnaires, whichever took
longer, the detective returned and asserted that the participant was suspected of stealing a wallet
from the psychology department mailroom. The detective, blind to participants’ guilt, questioned
each participant about the missing wallet in accordance with a predefined script (Appendix F).
The script was meant to be adversarial and confrontational, similar to typical police interrogations
in the United States. At the beginning of the interview, the mock detective made it clear that the
participant was suspected of stealing a wallet from the psychology department mailroom. He also
told the suspect that he had two pieces of evidence against the suspect: that there was security
footage of him/her near the mailroom, and that an eyewitness had seen a White or Black
male/female (in accordance with the race and gender of the participant) in the mailroom around
the time the theft occurred. The suspect’s race was used as a piece of evidence against him/her via
eyewitness identification to make race a salient factor in the investigation for the suspects.
Suspects were then asked directly if they took the wallet, accused of lying when they said
no, and then told to describe - in as much detail as possible - where they were and what they did
in the previous fifteen minutes. Whether or not participants mentioned being in the mailroom in
their free response, they were asked directly if they were in the mailroom (where the theft
occurred), if anyone could back up their story, and why they should be believed. Participants who
denied being in the mailroom were also asked how they explained the evidence that showed they
were in the mailroom. Finally, the interviewer asked participants if there was “anything else they
would like to add” until they were done talking. The interviewer was allowed to go slightly off
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script occasionally, so long as the above questions were asked. The interviews were videotaped
and reviewed by the experimenter. Only one interview was deemed problematic; this occurred
when the interviewer misspoke and told a White female participant that a Black woman was seen
at the crime scene. This participant was removed from analysis. Trained observers then coded the
videotaped interviews for differences in nonverbal behavior between the four quasi-experimental
groups (see Nonverbal Behavior measures below). The interviews ranged in length from 3:07 to
10:19, (M = 5:21, SD = 1:34).
After the interview was over, all participants filled out a questionnaire (see self-report
measures below) to assess their perceptions of the interview (Appendix G). After completing this
questionnaire, the experimenter (fictitiously) told participants that the detective thought they were
lying and that further investigation was needed. The experimenter then gave them a five-item
questionnaire asking them what they would like their next course of action to be and why (see
Willingness to Cooperate measures below) (Appendix H). When this questionnaire was complete
the experimenter returned and told participants that there would not be further investigation and
that the interview part of the experiment was over. Participants were then asked to fill out one last
packet of questionnaires containing the 13-item Belief in a Just World Scale (Dalbert, 1999)
(Appendix I), the 8-item Shortened Multidimensional Inventory of Black Identity (Wout, Martin,
Nguyen, Gonzalez, & Sellers, unpublished data) (Appendix J), and brief demographics
questionnaire (Appendix K).

After completing all of the questionnaires, the experimenter

explained that the interview with the participant had been videotaped and that the intention was to
show the videos to police officers who would know that participants were participating in a mock
crime experiment (Appendix L). Four participants declined to allow us to use their videotapes in
Study 2, but allowed us to use their self-report data in Study 1. The experimenter then debriefed
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participants about the purpose of the study and provided them with the contact information for the
experimenter, the principal investigator, and the IRB should they feel any lasting discomfort
(Appendix M). The experimenter also explained that all participants would be entered into the
lottery.

Finally, the experimenter made sure that each participant left the study feeling

comfortable with the procedure. A majority of the participants indicated interest in the subject
matter and expressed that they had gained valuable knowledge by participating in the study.
Measures
Self-report measures. Before the interview, participants were given a five-item questionnaire
to assess their pre-interview anxiety. Anxiety was measured using ratings of how agitated,
anxious, nervous, uneasy, and worried respondents felt on a 10-point scale (1 = not at all, 10 =
very much) (Appendix D). This method has been used in previous stereotype threat studies to
measure state anxiety (α = .86) (Johns et al., 2008).
After the interview, participants answered a 15-item questionnaire. (Appendix G). The first
three questions served as manipulation checks.

First, participants rated how truthful their

statement during the interview was on a scale of 1-10 (1 = totally deceptive, 10 = totally truthful)
as a manipulation check. The next two questions asked participants to rate – in separate questions
- how nervous and how uncomfortable they felt while completing their task on a scale of 1-10 (1 =
not at all, 10 = very much). After the manipulation checks, participants answered four questions
assessing their experiences during the interview. These questions asked participants to rate, on a 1
to 10 scale (1 = not at all, 10 = very much) how nervous and how uncomfortable they felt during
the interview, how difficult it was to be interviewed, and how motivated they were to be believed.
Participants were then given a free response question asking what they felt during the interview.
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Next, participants were asked about their strategies going into the interview. Participants were
asked to what extent they planned the verbal content of their statement and their body language, (1
= not at all, 10 = very much). They were then asked if they had a strategy prior to the interview
(no or yes). Participants who reported having a strategy were then asked to elaborate on what their
strategy was. Participants who reported not having a strategy were asked to explain why they did
not have a strategy.
Finally, participants were asked about their meta-perceptions of the detective and potential
outside observers. Participants were asked to indicate: (a) “Do you think the person interviewing
you thought you were innocent or guilty (innocent or guilty)? Why?”; (b) “Do you think the
person who interviewed you thought you were anxious? (no or yes) Why?”; (c) “Do you think the
person who interviewed you is biased against you in some way (no or yes)? How so?”; and (d)
“Do you think that a person who will watch the videotaped interview with you will think that you
were lying or telling the truth? (lying or telling the truth) Why?” Trained coders coded free
response data for questions that yielded significant results with high interrater reliability. Results
are presented below.
Participants also completed the Belief in a Just World Scale (Dalbert, 1999) (Appendix I).
This is a 13-item scale assessing the degree to which one believes the world to be a just, or fair,
place. This scale was included, as researchers have proposed that Belief in a Just World (BJW)
drives innocent suspects’ behavior during police-citizen interactions, specifically because they are
innocent they trust that have nothing to fear (Kassin, 2005). Black Americans, however, generally
score lower on the BJW scale than Whites (Hunt, 2000; Kennard & Kassin, 2011; Smith & Green,
1984). Thus, we wanted to measure BJW to see if it was related to suspect behavior, verbal
responses, and choices on specific questionnaire items such as predictions about what others will
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think of them, and willingness to cooperate measures. On the BJW scale participants rate their
agreement on items assessing how just they believe world is to them, e.g., “I believe that most of
the things that happen in my life are fair,” and, generally, how just they believe the world is
overall, e.g., “I believe that, by and large, people get what they deserve.” Participants rated their
agreement on a 6-point likert scale (1 = strongly agree, 6 = strongly disagree). Scores are then
reverse coded so that higher scores indicate a higher belief in a just world.
Although we made race salient in the moment to our participants by using their race as a piece
of evidence against them (that a Black/White male/female was seen in the room at the time of the
crime), the role that race played in our participants’ lives likely varied. Thus, it is possible that
suspects for whom being Black does not play a central role in their lives, stereotyping concerns
may not have been as strong, creating variability in the effectiveness of our race prime. To
measure the importance our participants’ racial identity played in their lives participants
completed eight items from the 27-item shortened version of the Multidimensional Inventory of
Black Identity (MIBI-S) scale to assess racial identity (Wout et al., unpublished data) (Appendix
J). These items were from the Centrality Scale and the Public Regard subset of the Regard Scale.
The MIBI-S was completed last, so as not to reveal the hypotheses of our study.
The MIBI was originally developed to measure the three stable dimensions of the
Multidimensional Model of Racial Identity (MMRI). The MMRI examines the significance that
African-Americans place on race and their interpretations of what it means to be Black via four
dimensions: the salience of identity, the centrality of the identity, the regard in which the person
holds African Americans, and the ideology associated with the identity (Sellers, Shelton, Cooke,
Chavous, Rowley & Smith, 1998; Sellers, Smith, Shelton, Rowley, & Chavous, 1998).
Psychometric validation studies showed that Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) yielded a poor
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fit for the longer 56-item MIBI but an adequate fit for the shortened 27-item MIBI-S (Wout et. al.,
unpublished). Thus, we opted to use the shortened scales from this measure. Only two of the
subscales were included in our study: centrality and public regard. Centrality is the extent to
which a person normatively defines his/herself by race; whether or not it is a core part of the
person’s self-concept. Public regard is the extent to which a person feels others view African
Americans positively or negatively (Sellers et al., 1997).
Because our study included both Black and White participants, questions were modified
slightly to be race neutral, (e.g., “In general, others respect people of my same race”). As
previously mentioned, participants answered eight items from the MIBI-S: four items from the
centrality scale, e.g., “I have a strong sense of belonging to my race,”; and four items from the
public regard subscale, e.g., “In general, others respect people of my same race.” Participants
rated their agreement on a 7-point likert scale (1 = strongly agree, 7 = strongly disagree). Scores
were then reverse coded so that higher scores meant more agreement.
On the demographics questionnaire (Appendix K), presented at the end of the study,
participants were asked whether they had ever been questioned by police (no or yes). This
question was included because experiences with the police have been shown to predict Miranda
waiver rates (Leo, 1996) and disclosure strategies during interviews (Granhag, Clemens, &
Strömwall, 2009). During debriefings the experimenter learned that many suspects misunderstood
the question, answering yes if they had ever answered any questions proffered by a police officer.
Thus this variable was not included in analyses.
Willingness to cooperate.

After completing the first set of self-report measures, the

experimenter told participants that the detective thought they were lying and that there would be
further investigation. The purpose of this deception was to assess participants’ willingness to
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cooperate with further investigation in to the theft. The experimenter asked participants to fill out
a 5-item questionnaire to determine what they would like their next course of action to be
(Appendix H). In order to assess willingness to cooperate, participants were asked if they would
(1) like advice from a defense attorney; (2) like a defense attorney present during questioning; (3)
be willing to take a polygraph test; (4) like to invoke their right to silence; and (5) like to speak to
a different detective. All questions used a dichotomous yes or no metric, after which participants
were asked to elaborate on why they did or did not choose that option.
Nonverbal behavior. All interviews were videotaped. Of the 87 participants, 4 participants
declined consent for use of their videotaped interview; the video camera failed during 2 sessions,
and 1 suspect “invoked” his Miranda rights after every question rendering the videotape useless (n
= 20 per cell). The suspects’ behavior was coded minutely by analyzing the duration and
frequency of a number of cues, and on the basis of global impressions. These are the two most
commonly employed approaches to coding nonverbal behavior (DePaulo et al., 2003). For the
minute coding, two independent raters, blind to the hypotheses and conditions, coded the
behaviors of the mock suspects. These codings were based on both commonly held views of
deceptive behavior ascertained by previous research (Global Deception Research Team, 2006) and
nonverbal indications of deception taught by John Reid and Associates.

These behaviors

encompassed stereotypical indicators of deception such as: gaze aversion, laughter, smiling,
speech disturbances, speech errors, leg shaking/tapping, hand tapping, fidgeting with objects, and
self-grooming/touching. Operational definitions for each of the nonverbal behaviors can be found
in Appendix N. Two independent coders were trained by the first author and then coded a random
20% of the interviews together to establish interrater reliability. Disagreements were resolved by
discussion with the author. Once satisfactory interrater reliability had been reach, the coders each
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coded half of the remaining 80% of the interviews. Interrater reliability for the nonverbal behavior
coding can be found in Table 1.
Table 1. Interrater Reliability for Coding of Nonverbal Behaviors

Variable

Chronbach’s alpha

r-value

Speech Rate

N/A

N/A

Speech Disturbances

.98

.98

Gaze

.83

.81

Head Movements

.90

.92

Laughs

.95

.96

Smiles

.83

.71

Illustrators

.97

.96

Leg/Foot Movements

.98

.96

Fidgets

-.05*

-.05*

Self-Touching Behaviors

.38*

.57*

Trunk Movements
.85
.74
*Interrater reliability could not be reached on these two items after many attempts. They will not
be considered in further analyses.
For each of the 80 participants that agreed to use of their videotaped interview for research
purposes, two independent raters, blind to condition and hypotheses, provided global impressions
of the mock suspects on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, and 7 = very) for the following 9
dimensions: (1) uncomfortable; (2) tense; (3) anxious; (4) motivated; (5) confident; (6)
cooperative; (7) unsure; (8) forthcoming; (9) thinking hard. Coders were given no instruction on
what the dimensions meant, and were simply asked to code in terms of what the concepts meant to
them.
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Two coders individually code all 80 interviews, however interrater reliability was low across
all dimensions. Interrater reliability for the global coding can be found in Table 2. Previous
research with this type of coding has shown high interrater reliability with short interviews
(DePaulo & Morris, 2004). The length of the statements, ranging from 3:07 -10:19, (M = 5:21, SD
= 1:34) may have made it difficult for raters to provide one single consistent number for a
dimension that sums up a suspect’s behavior for the entity of a lengthy interview; prior studies that
have used global impression ratings (e.g. Anderson, 1999, c.f., Granhag & Strömwall, 2004;
Anderson, DePaulo, and Ansfield, 2002) have used shorter segments that likely have less
variability in speaker behavior. Due to the low interrater reliability on these global ratings of the
participants, these measures will not be discussed further.
Table 2: Global Impressions of Suspects’ Behavior

Variable

Chronbach’s alpha

r-value

Uncomfortable

.67

.51

Tense

.69

.55

Anxious

.56

.41

Motivated

.56

.34

Confident

.70

.54

Cooperative

.57

.41

Unsure

.58

.41

Forthcoming

.53

.36

Think Hard

.48

.32
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Verbal Behavior. As mentioned previously, we were interested in suspects’ strategies
during the interview. Relying on suspects’ self-reports of strategies might provide limited
information as people often have limited insight into the reasons for their behavior (Nisbett &
Wilson, 1977). Thus, researchers have begun analysing the verbal content of suspect statements
for what they call critical disclosures - the number of specific salient details disclosed about the
event in question (Luke et al., 2013). In this method of verbal analysis, suspects offering a low
number of critical disclosures are considered to have adopted a withholding strategy, where as
suspects who volunteer a high number of critical disclosures are said to have adopted to a
forthcoming strategy. In line with this approach, all interviews were transcribed and then coded by
trained coders for disclosure of critical details. Two independent coders, blind to hypotheses and
condition, coded a random 20% of the transcripts for mentions of three key details in the scenario
(described below). Interrater agreement was 87.5%. One coder coded the remaining 80% of the
transcripts. The portion of the transcript where the interviewer mentioned the suspect’s race was
blacked out in each interview so as to keep coders blind, but in a comprehensive manner so as not
to arouse suspicion on part of the coders; no relevant details were blacked out. Coders coded for
the presence or absence of three pieces of information that we thought would be the most salient to
participants: (1) being in the building in which the experiment took place; (2) being in the
mailroom where they were to complete their mock crime or innocent act; and (3) seeing or
touching either the wallet/briefcase or the crate of books in the mailroom (each one encompassing
the tasks participants were supposed to do). Coders marked a “0” if the participant did not
mention the detail and marked a “1” if the participant did. This coding allowed us to analyse the
data in two ways: (1) how far in to the scenario the suspect place themselves – that is, what was
the most incriminating detail to which the suspect admitted; and (2) how many incriminating
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details the suspect admitted. Because innocent and guilty suspects both experienced the same
scenario with the one exception of guilt manipulation (stealing a wallet v. looking for a book), it is
important to note that the assessment of these critical disclosures only measures the amount of
potentially incriminating information the suspect volunteered and is thus a measure of
forthcomingness, not a measure of actual guilt.
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CHPATER 7: STUDY ONE RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
As noted in the methods section, 5 participants did not follow the experimenter’s
instructions. For the remaining participants, the experimenter questioned them at the conclusion
of the study, prior to debriefing, to ensure that they had indeed carried out their assigned task in
the mailroom. All the remaining guilty suspects were in possession of the wallet, indicating that
they had completed their task. For innocent suspects, knowledge the appearance of the crate of
books, or content of the crate of books involved in the innocent act served as a proxy for
completing their task.

As with guilty suspects, all innocent suspects were sufficiently

knowledgeable about the crate or its contents to ensure that they completed the task correctly;
none of the innocent suspects were in possession of the wallet.
At the beginning of the interview, the mock detective cited two pieces of evidence against
the suspect: (1) security footage of the suspect near the mailroom and (2) an eyewitness who saw
someone matching the suspect’s description - stated using the suspect’s race (Black or White) and
gender (male or female) - inside the mailroom at the time of the crime. We predicted that using a
description of the suspect based on their race as a piece of evidence would lead Black suspects, but
not White suspects, to feel that they were being targeted based on stereotypes about AfricanAmericans and crime. As an indirect manipulation check, we coded for references of race or
racial profiling in the suspects’ interviews. Though the difference was not significantly different,
40% of Black suspects referenced race (e.g. “Maybe a Black male that looks like me, but not
me.”) or racial profiling (e.g. “That’s racial profiling right now.”) compared to only 22.0% of
White suspects referencing race (e.g. “I know there are like a million White females here.”), χ2(1,
N = 80) = 2.85, p = .09.
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Jordan et al. (2012) reported that 10% of the innocent participants from a largely racialethnic minority sample gave deceptive statements, so in addition to ensuring that participants had
completed their assigned task, we also tested for differences in self-reported truthfulness.
Participants were asked to rate how truthful their statement was 10-point scale, (1 = completely
deceptive, 10 = very truthful). A 2 (culpability: innocent v. guilty) x 2 (race: White v. Black)
ANOVA revealed a main effect for culpability, F(1, 83) = 152.92, p < .001, ηp2 = .65. As
expected, innocent suspects reported giving more truthful statements (M = 9.11, SD = 1.92, 95%
CI [8.71, 9.51]) than guilty suspects (M = 3.07, SD = 2.59, 95% CI [2.53, 3.61]). There was no
main effect for suspect race, F(1, 83) = 1.10, p = .30; nor was there a culpability by suspect race
interaction, F(1, 83) = .12, p = .73. These ratings suggest that our innocent suspects followed
instructions to tell the truth during their interview and guilty suspects followed instructions to lie
about having the wallet. They also suggest that Black and White suspects lied and told the truth at
similar rates during the interviews.
Suspects were asked to rate both how nervous and how uncomfortable they felt while they
looked for the book/took the wallet on a scale from 1-10 (1 = not at all, 10 = very). The grand
mean for task nervousness was 3.97, (SD = 3.05, 95% CI [3.33, 4.61]). A 2 (culpability: innocent
v. guilty) x 2 (race: White v. Black) as ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for culpability.
Guilty suspects reported feeling significantly more nervous taking the wallet (M = 4.90, SD =
3.23, 95% CI [4.22, 5.58]) than innocent suspects reported looking for the book (M = 3.09, SD =
2.61, 95% CI [3.54, 2.64]) F(1, 83) = 8.02, p = .01, ηp2 = .09. There was no main effect for race
on task nervousness; White suspects (M = 3.80; SD = 2.93, 95% CI [3.18, 4.42]) and Black
suspects (M = 4.11, SD = 3.18, 95% CI [3.44, 4.78]); reported similar levels of tasks nervousness,
F(1, 83) = .28, p = .60, ηp2 = .001. There was not a significant culpability by race interaction for
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task nervousness F(1, 83) = .48, p = .49, ηp2 = .01. Similarly, the grand mean for task comfort was
4.38, (SD = 3.06 95% CI [3.74, 5.02]). A 2 (culpability: innocent v. guilty) x 2 (race: White v.
Black) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for culpability on task comfort. Guilty suspects
(M = 5.74, SD = 3.15, 95% CI [5.08, 6.40]) reported feeling significantly more uncomfortable
when taking the wallet than innocent suspects (M = 3.11, SD = 2.38, 95% CI [2.61, 3.61]) while
looking for the book, F(1, 83) = 18.81, p < .001 Ηηp = .19. There was not a significant main
effect for race on task comfort; White (M = 4.24, SD = 3.06 95% CI [3.60, 4.88]) and Black (M =
4.50, SD = 3.24 95% CI [3.81, 5.18]) suspects reported similar levels of comfort while completing
the task, F(1, 83) = .28, p = .60, ηp2 = .003. There was not a significant culpability by race
interaction, F(1, 83) 2.33, p = .13, ηp2 = .03.

These ratings suggest that our culpability

manipulation was effective and did not have differential effects on Black and White suspects.
Participants were also asked to what extent they were motivated to give a credible
impression during the interview on 10-point scale (1 = not at all, 10 = very). Overall participants
reported they were highly motivated to appear credible (M = 7.95, SD = 2.14, 95% CI [7.50,
8.40]). A 2 (culpability: innocent v. guilty) x 2 (race: White v. Black) ANOVA showed no main
effect for veracity on motivation. Innocent (M = 7.53, SD = 2.46, 95% CI [7.01, 8.05]) and guilty
suspects (M = 8.40, SD = 1.67, 95% CI [8.05, 8.75]) similarly motivated to be believed, F(1, 83) =
3.60, p = .06, ηp2 = .04. There was not a significant main effect for race on motivation to be
believed; Black (M = 7.65, SD = 2.28, 95% CI [7.17, 8.13]) and White (M = 8.29, SD = 1.95, 95%
CI [7.88, 8.70]) suspects showed similar levels of motivation to be believed, F(1, 83) = 1.93, p =
.17, ηp2 = .03. There was not a significant culpability by race interaction for motivation to be
believed, F (1, 83) = .02 p = .88, ηp2 < .001.
Attitude Scales
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Belief in a Just World. We predicted that White participants would have a higher Belief in
a Just World than Black participants. Participants completed the 13-item Belief in a Just World
(BJW) scale (Dalbert, 1990). Participants rated their agreement with the statements on a 1 to 6
Likert Scale where lower scores indicated more agreement and thus higher BJW scores. Scores
were then reverse coded so that higher scores indicated higher BJW. The responses were then
summed to create a total BJW score (scores can thus range from 13-78). The scale is intended to
be a trait measure and measure individual differences in suspects’ BJW. The grand mean for BJW
was 43.28 (SD = 10.06). As expected, a two way ANOVA with culpability (culpability: innocent
v. guilty) and race (race: White v. Black) as independent variables revealed no main effect for
culpability in BWJ; innocent (M = 42.37, SD = 10.70, 95% CI [40.08, 44.66]) and guilty (M =
44.17, SD = 9.25, 95% CI [42.19, 46.15]) participants scored similarly on the BJW scale, F(1, 79)
= .70, p = .41, ηp2 = .01. Contrary to prior research, we did not find a significant main effect for
race in BJW; White (M = 43.33, SD = 10.17, 95% CI [41.16, 47.50]) and Black (M = 43.17, SD =
9.96, 95% CI [41.04, 45.30]) suspects scored similarly on the BJW scale, F(1, 79) = .009, p = .95,
ηp2 < .001. There was not a significant culpability by race interaction, F(1, 79) = .02, p = .90, ηp2
< .001. Participants’ BJW scores did not moderate pre or post interview anxiety or willingness to
cooperate.
MIBI-S. Participants completed 8 items from the shortened Multi-Inventory Black Identity
Scale (MIBI-S). These items were chosen from the centrality and public regard subscales.
Participants rated their agreement on a 1 to 7 Likert Scale where lower scores indicated more
agreement (scores could thus range from 8-56). Scores were then reverse coded so that higher
scores indicated: (1) centrality subscale: more likely to define self by race, (2) public regard
subscale: feeling others view their race more favorably. Scores on the two scales were not
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significantly correlated, r(85) = -.14, p = .20. Additionally, in the context of this study centrality
and public regard measure two different concepts for Black and White suspects. Thus, results for
each of the subscales will be presented independently. For centrality, a two way ANOVA, did not
reveal a main effect for culpability, F(1, 81) = .77, p = .38, ηp2 = .01. There was, however, a
significant main effect for race, such that Black participants (M = 4.97, SD = 1.47, 95% CI [4.66,
5.28]) were significantly more likely to define themselves by their race than White participants (M
= 3.94, SD = 1.28, 95% CI [3.67, 4.21]), F(1, 81) = 11.67, p = .001, ηp2 = .13. There was not a
significant culpability by race interaction F(1, 81) = .51, p = .48, ηp2 = .01. For public regard,
there was not a significant main effect for culpability, F(1, 81) = 1.02, p = .32, ηp2 = .01. There
was a significant main effect for race, such that White participants (M = 4.89, SD = 1.12, 95% CI
[4.65, 5.13]) felt others viewed their race more favorably than Black participants (M = 2.88, SD =
1.30, 95% CI [2.60, 3.16]), F(1, 81) = 57.17, p < .001, ηp2 = .41. MIBI-S scores only significantly
predicted participant’s pre-interview anxiety, and thus will only be discussed for that dependent
variable.
Hypothesis 1: Suspects’ Anxiety
We predicted that for both self-report and behavioral measures of anxiety Black suspects
would be more anxious than White suspects. We also predicted that among innocent suspects,
Black suspects would be more anxious than White suspects, while guilty Black and White
suspects would be similarly anxious.
Self-Reported Pre-interview anxiety. To assess anxiety prior to the interview participants
(N = 80) completed a five-item questionnaire; participants rated how agitated, uneasy, nervous,
worried, and anxious they were on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 = not at all, 10 = very). Participants’ scores
were combined to create a five-item “pre-interview concern” score. Answers were averaged
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across the five items so that participants’ scores were still reflected on a scale of 1-7, where the
closer to one the participant’s score was the less concern about the upcoming interview the
participant was reporting.
The grand mean for pre-interview concern was 3.29, (SD = 1.38, 95% CI [3.00, 3.58]). A
2 (culpability: innocent v. guilty) x 2 (race: White v. Black) ANOVA revealed a significant main
effect for culpability on pre-interview concern. Guilty suspects (M = 3.65, SD = 1.43, 95% CI
[3.34, 3.96]) were significantly more anxious than innocent suspects (M = 2.94, SD = 1.25, 95%
CI [2.67, 3.21]) about the upcoming interview, F(1, 76) = 5.73, p = .02, ηp2 = .07. Contrary to our
hypotheses, however, there was not a significant main effect for race on pre-interview concern;
White (M = 3.30, SD = 1.45, 95% CI [2.98, 3.62]) and Black (M = 3.27, SD = 1.33, 95% CI
[2.98, 3.56]) suspects were similarly concerned about the upcoming interview, F(1, 76) = .04, p =
.84, ηp2 < .001. Finally, there was not a significant culpability by race pre-interview concern
interaction, F(1, 76) = 2.54, p = .16, ηp2 = .03. Individual means for each of the five measures can
be found in Table 3.
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Table 3. Study 1: Participants’ Self-Reported Pre-Interview Anxiety

Suspect Culpability
Innocent

Guilty

Overall

White

Black

White

Black

White

Black

Measure

M (SD)
(n = 21)

M (SD)
(n = 21)

M (SD)
(n = 19)

M (SD)
(n = 20)

M (SD)
(n = 40)

M (SD)
(n= 41)

Agitated

2.62 (1.32)

3.30 (1.03)

3.79 (1.65)

3.15 (1.90)

3.18 (1.58)

3.23 (1.51)

Uneasy

3.00 (1.55)

3.14 (1.46)

4.11 (1.52)

3.50 (1.73)

3.49 (1.61)

3.32 (1.59)

Nervous

2.81 (1.33)

3.00 (1.30)

4.23 (1.32)

3.80 (1.61)

3.46 (1.50)

3.39 (1.50)

Worried

2.29 (1.27)

2.71 (1.68)

3.32 (1.49)

3.00 (1.89)

2.76 (1.45)

2.86 (1.77)

Anxious

2.95 (1.63)

3.29 (1.38)

4.16 (1.66)

3.50 (1.91)

3.49 (1.70)

3.39 (1.64)

3.83 (1.36)

3.39 (1.52)

3.27 (1.45)

3.27 (1.33)

Composite
2.73 (1.34)
3.15 (1.13)
Note. Values are on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very).
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Nonverbal Behaviors. Two independent observers coded the frequency with which suspects
exhibited eleven nonverbal anxiety cues commonly relied on to detect deception. Each of the
nonverbal behaviors was standardized to a per minute frequency (v. an overall frequency) so that
participants who engaged in longer interview times did not skew the results. For each of the
nonverbal behaviors we tested for outliers more than 3 standard deviations from the mean. For
only one behavior, speech rate, did the elimination of outliers affect the results; we made the
conservative decision not to remove any outliers.

Descriptive statistics for the nonverbal

behaviors can be found in Table 4.
Grouping the nonverbal behaviors into non-vocal nonverbal cues (gaze, head movement,
laughter, smiles, illustrators, leg/foot movement, trunk movements) and vocal nonverbal cues
(speech rate and speech disturbances), we conducted two between subjects MANOVAs. A 2
(culpability: innocent v. guilty) x 2 (race: White v. Black) ANOVA with culpability and race as
the between subjects factors and the non-vocal nonverbal cues as the dependent variables showed
no significant main effect for culpability, F(1, 74) = .62, p = .75, ηp2 = .07, or race, F(1, 74) =
.64, p = .74, ηp2 = .07 at the multivariate level. There was also not a significant culpability by
race interaction F(1, 74) = .63, p = .75, ηp2 = .07 at the multivariate level. We then conducted a
between subjects MANOVA with culpability and race as the between subjects factors and the
vocal nonverbal cues as the dependent variables. At the multivariate level, there was not a
significant main effect for culpability, F(1, 74) = 2.13, p = .13, ηp2 = .06, nor was there a
significant main effect for race on vocal nonverbal cues, F(1, 74) = 1.87, p = .16, ηp2 = .05.
There was not a significant culpability by race interaction for vocal nonverbal cues, F(1, 74) =
1.32, p = .27, ηp2 = .03.
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For the non-vocal nonverbal cues, a series of 2 (culpability: innocent v. guilty) x 2 (race:
White v. Black) ANOVAs revealed a similar pattern. There were no significant main effects for
suspect race or culpability, nor were there any significant race by culpability interactions for the
non-vocal cues. Results of these ANOVAs can be found in Table 5.
Examining the vocal cues, there was a significant main effect for culpability on speech
rate. Innocent suspects (M = 84.40, SD = 32.82, 95% CI [77.12, 91.68]) spoke significantly
faster than guilty suspects (M = 71.04, SD = 24.17, 95% CI [65.68, 76.40]), F(1, 75) = 4.14, p =
.05 Ηηp = .05. There was not a significant main effect for race on speech rate; White (M = 77.47,
SD = 28.33, 95% CI [71.18, 83.76] and Black (M = 77.81, SD = 30.75, 95% CI [70.96, 84.66])
F(1, 75) = .01, p = .95 ηp2 < .001. There was not a significant culpability by race interaction, F(1,
75) = .49 p = .49 ηp2 = .01. For speech disturbances, there was not a significant main effect of
culpability, F(1, 75) = .39, p = .53, ηp2 = .01. There was not a significant main effect of race on
speech disturbances, F(1, 74) = 3.71, p = .06 ηp2 = .05. There was not a significant culpability by
race interaction for speech disturbances, F(1, 74) = 2.39, p = .13 ηp2 < .13. Overall, there were no
differences between Black and White suspects in their nonverbal behaviors, regardless of their
culpability. In sum, on average, our participants behaved similarly during their interview.
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for Suspects’ Nonverbal Behaviors

Suspect Culpability
Innocent

Guilty

Overall

White

Black

White

Black

White

Black

Measure

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

Speech Rate

86.42 (30.99)

82.29 (35.37)

68.52 (22.78)

73.56 (25.83)

77.47 (28.33)

77.81 (30.75)

Speech Disturbances

1.46 (1.86)

0.56 (0.58)

0.90 (0.87)

0.80 (0.82)

1.02 (1.08)

0.68 (0.72)

Gaze

44.40 (12.89)

57.46 (34.97)

47.04 (11.24)

45.84 (11.04)

45.72 (12.01)

47.80 (11.95)

Head Movements

2.68 (1.38)

2.86 (1.25)

2.73 (1.55)

2.41 (1.70)

2.70 (1.45)

1.50 (1.28)

Laughs

0.30 (0.41)

0.26 (0.49)

0.32 (0.39)

0.20 (0.29)

0.28 (0.36)

0.19 (0.28)

Smiles

0.41 (0.41)

0.34 (0.68)

0.37 (0.39)

0.56 (1.08)

0.39 (0.39)

0.28 (0.48)

Illustrators

1.26 (1.31)

1.03 (0.98)

0.94 (0.80)

0.87 (1.22)

1.00 (0.90)

0.85 (0.91)

Leg/Foot Movements

6.39 (12.11)

4.41 (12.69)

3.91(5.88)

1.65(2.79)

3.44 (5.88)

1.55 (2.30)

0.45 (0.50)

0.46 (0.62)

0.43 (0.50)

0.42 (0.52)

Trunk Movements
0.40 (0.51)
0.46 (0.54)
Note: All values are computed on a per minute frequency.
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Table 5. ANOVA Results for Suspects’ Nonverbal Behaviors

Race

Culpability

Race x Culpability Interaction

Measure
Speech Rate

F(1, 75) = 0.01, p = .95, ηp2 < .001

F(1, 75) = 4.14, p = ., ηp2 = .05a

F(1, 75) = 0.49, p = .49, ηp2 = .01

Speech Disturbances

F(1, 75) = 3.71, p = .06, ηp2 = .05

F(1, 75) = 0.39, p = .53, ηp2 = .01

F(1, 75) = 2.39, p = .13, ηp2 = .13

Gaze

F(1, 75) = 2.52, p = .12, ηp2 = .03

F(1, 75) = 0.96, p = .32, ηp2 = .01

F(1, 75) = 2.52, p = .12, ηp2 = .03

Head Movements

F(1, 75) = 0.04, p = .84, ηp2 < .001

F(1, 75) = 0.36, p = .55, ηp2 = .01

F(1, 75) = 0.57, p = .46, ηp2 = .01

Laughs

F(1, 75) = 0.69, p = .41, ηp2 = .01

F(1, 75) = 0.69, p = .41, ηp2 = .01

F(1, 75) = 0.14, p = .41, ηp2 = .01

Smiles

F(1, 75) = 0.15, p = .70, ηp2 = .002

F(1, 75) = 0.93, p = .34, ηp2 = .01

F(1, 75) = 0.11, p = .74, ηp2 = .001

Illustrators

F(1, 75) = 0.34, p = .56, ηp2 < .001

F(1, 75) = 0.93, p = .34, ηp2 = .01

F(1, 75) = 0.11, p = .74, ηp2 = .001

Leg/Foot Movements

F(1, 75) = 0.31, p = .10, ηp2 = .01

F(1, 75) = 1.56, p = .22, ηp2 = .02

F(1, 75) = .004 , p = .95, ηp2 < .001

F(1, 75) = 0.04, p = .85, ηp2 < .001

F(1, 75) = 0.03, p = .86, ηp2 < .001

Trunk Movements
F(1, 75) = 0.07, p = .80, ηp2 = .01
a
Difference was significant at the .05 level
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A multiple linear regression was performed with pre-interview concern as the dependent
variable and culpability, suspect race, MIBI-S centrality score, MIBI-S public regard score, the
culpability by centrality interaction, culpability by public regard interaction, race by centrality
interaction, and race by public regard interaction as the predictor variables. The model was
significant, R2 = .30, F(8, 71) = 3.26, p = .003. Veracity significantly predicted pre-interview
concern, b = -.30 t(71) = -2.88, p = .01. The public regard by veracity interaction was also a
significant predictor of pre-interview concerns, b = -.45, t(71) = 3.03, p = .003. For guilty
suspects, as public regard increased, pre-interview concern increased. For innocent suspects,
however, as public regard increased, pre-interview concern decreased.
Self-Report Post Interview. After the interview, suspects were asked to rate both how
nervous and uncomfortable they felt during the interview on a 10-point scale (1 = not at all, 10 =
very). The grand mean for interview nervousness was 4.94, (SD = 2.81, 95% CI [4.35, 5.53]). A
2 (culpability: innocent v. guilty) x 2 (race: White v. Black) ANOVA revealed no significant main
effect for culpability on interview nervousness; innocent (M = 4.38, SD = 2.61, 95% CI [4.28,
5.38]) and guilty (M = 5.55, SD 2.91, 95% CI [4.94, 6.16]) suspects reported similar amounts of
nervousness during the interview, F(1, 83) = 3.64, p = .06, ηp2 = .04. There was no main effect for
race on interview nervousness. Black (M = 4.82, SD = 2.78, 95% CI [4.24, 5.40]) and White (M
= 5.07, SD = 2.84, 95% CI [4.47, 5.67]) suspects reported similar amounts of nervousness during
the interview, F(1, 83) = .14, p = .71, ηp2 < . 002. There was not a significant culpability by race
interaction on ratings of interview nervousness, F(1, 83) = .71, p = .40, ηp2 = .01.
The grand mean for interview comfort was 4.74, (SD = 2.93, 95% CI [4.12, 5.36]). A 2
(culpability: innocent v. guilty) x 2 (race: White v. Black) ANOVA revealed no significant main
effect for culpability on interview comfort. Innocent (M = 4.36, SD = 2.89, 95% CI [3.75, 4.97])
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and guilty (M = 5.14, SD = 2.99, 95% CI [4.51, 5.77]) suspects reported similar amounts of
discomfort during the interview, F(1, 83) = 1.52, p = .29, ηp2 = .02. There was not a significant
main effect for race on interview comfort. Black (M = 4.37, SD = 2.80, 95% CI [3.78, 2.80]) and
White (M = 5.15, SD = 3.05, 95% CI [4.51, 5.79]) suspects reported similar amounts of
discomfort during the interview, F(1, 83) = 1.48, p = .23, ηp2 = .02. There was not a significant
culpability by race interaction for interview comfort, F(1, 83) = .09, p = .89, ηp2 < .001.
Across all the anxiety measures, few differences emerged between our participants. Our
hypothesis that Black suspects would be more anxious than White suspects was not supported.
Our hypothesis that innocent suspects Black suspects would be more nervous than innocent White
suspects was not supported either.
Hypothesis 2: Suspects’ Meta-perceptions.
We predicted that Black participants would perceive the interviewer as believing them to
be more anxious and more guilty than White participants, as well as perceive the interviewer as
more biased against them. We also predicted that Black suspects would expect outside observers
to judge them as guilty more often than White suspects.
Suspects were asked if they thought the interviewer thought they were anxious (yes or no)
and then why or why not (n = 4 missing). A binary logistic regression was performed with
perceived anxiety as the dependent variable and culpability, suspect race, and culpability by
suspect race interaction term as the independent variables. The model was not significant -2LL =
111.35, χ2(3, N = 83) = 3.13, p = .37. Similar proportions of innocent (40.9%) and guilty (51.3%)
suspects thought the interviewer perceived them to be anxious. Likewise, similar proportions of
White (52.5%) and Black (39.5%) suspects thought the interviewer perceived them to be anxious.
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Suspects were asked if they thought the person who interviewed them was biased against
them in some way (yes or no). A binary logistic regression was performed with perceived
interviewer bias as the dependent variable and culpability, suspect race, and culpability by suspect
race interaction term as the independent variables. The model was not significant -2LL = 109.09,
χ2(3, N = 84) = 7.36, p = .06. Equal proportions of innocent (51.2%) and guilty (51.2%) suspects
felt the interviewer was biased against them in some way. Likewise, roughly equal proportions of
White (56.7%) and Black (46.5%) suspects felt that the interviewer was biased against them.
Suspects were asked if they thought the person who interviewed them thought they were
innocent or guilty (yes or no).

A binary logistic regression was performed with perceived

interviewer veracity judgment as the dependent variable and culpability, suspect race, and
culpability by suspect race interaction term as the independent variables. The model was not
significant -2LL = 85.81, χ2(3, N = 83) = .97, p = .81. Overall, 65 of 83 participants (78.3%)
thought the interviewer believed them to be guilty. An equal proportion of innocent (78.5%) and
guilty (78.4%) suspects thought the interviewer believed them to be guilty. Likewise, a similar
proportion of White (82.1%) and Black (75.0%) participants thought the interviewer believed
them to be guilty.
Suspects were asked to predict whether they thought a person watching the videotape of
their interview think that they were lying or telling the truth and then to elaborate on why (n = 6
missing). A binary logistic regression was performed with dichotomous observer veracity
prediction as the dependent variable and culpability, suspect race, and culpability by suspect race
interaction term as the independent variables. The full model was not significant -2LL = 97.00,
χ2(3, N = 81) = 6.11, p = .11.

Overall, 54 of 81 participants (66.7%) predicted that a person

viewing the videotape would think they were telling the truth – a stark contrast to their predictions

59

about the detective’s beliefs. Notably, 32 of the 41 (78.0%) innocent participants predicted that an
observer would say that they were being truthful, where as only 22 of 40 (53.7%) guilty
participants predicted that an observer would say they were being truthful. Given the direction of
the descriptive data, and the low power of our study, a forward stepwise binary logistic regression
was then performed with the same variables. The model was significant, -2LL = 98.21, χ2(1, N =
81) = 4.91, p = .03. Innocent suspects were significantly more likely to expect a future “truthful”
judgment from outside observers than guilty suspects, β = -1.07, SE = .49, Wald’s χ2(1, N = 81) =
4.69, p = .03, Ex(B) = .34.
Two independent coders, blind to hypotheses, condition, and participant race, coded a
random 20% of the open ended “why?” response following this question, α = .78. One coder
coded the remaining 80% of responses. Participants’ responses were coded into one of five
categories (1) verbal behavior, e.g. “I contradicted myself”; (2) nonverbal behavior, e.g. “I did not
fidget”; (3) visibility of internal state, e.g. “I was innocent and it was showing”; (4) race “The
witness said it was a Black woman”; (5) other. Overall, participants who expected to be judged as
telling the truth cited verbal cues most often - regardless of whether they were innocent (62.5%) or
guilty (63.5%). Participants who expected to be judged as lying, however, showed more variation
in their reasons cited. Specifically, innocent participants cited visibility of their internal state most
often (66.7%) where as guilty suspects cited their nonverbal behavior most often (61.1%). A
complete break down of the reasons participants cited for their predicted judgment by outside
viewers are listed in Table 6.
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Table 6. Study 1: Participants’ reasons for predicted observers judgments.

Suspect Culpability
Innocent

Guilty

Overall

Reason

Truthful

Lying

Truthful

Lying

Truthful

Lying

Verbal

62.5%

44.4%

63.5%

38.9%

63.00%

50.7%

Nonverbal

34.4%

22.2%

27.3%

61.1%

31.5%

48.1%

Internal State

46.9%

66.7%

31.8%

38.9%

40.7%

48.1%

Race

0.0%

11.1%

4.5%

0.0%

1.9%

3.7%

11.1%

27.3%

27.8%

18.5%

22.2%

Other
12.5%
Note. N = 82.

In sum, participants’ meta-perceptions regarding the interviewer were similar.

When

asked to predict the interviewers’ perceptions of anxiety, veracity, and bias towards them,
regardless of their race or culpability, participants provided similar ratings. Notably, the majority
of participants felt the interviewer would judge them as lying yet, when asked to predict how an
observer would judge them, they expected observers would judge them as truthful. Further,
innocent suspects were significantly more likely than guilty suspects to expect that observers
would judge them as truthful.
Hypothesis 3: Suspects’ Willingness to Cooperate
We predicted that White suspects would be more likely than Black suspects to endorse
cooperative behaviors. We also predicted that, among innocent suspects, White suspects would be
more cooperative with the investigation than Black suspects, with guilty suspects cooperating at
similar rates across race.
Attorney Advice. Participants were asked, “If it is possible, would you like advice from a
defense attorney?” Overall, 82.6% (n = 71) participants reported they would like advice from a
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defense attorney. A binary logistic regression was performed with dichotomous advice as the
dependent variable and culpability, suspect race, and culpability by suspect race interaction terms
as the independent variables. The model was not significant -2LL = 78.59, χ2(3, N = 86) = 1.01, p
= .80.
Attorney Present. Participants were asked, “If it is possible, would you like a defense
attorney present in the room during the interview?” Overall, 89.4% (n = 76) of participants
reported wanting an attorney present during the interview. A binary logistic regression was
performed with dichotomous attorney present as the dependent variable and culpability, suspect
race, and culpability by suspect race interaction term as the independent variables. The model was
not significant -2LL = 53.71, χ2(3, N = 85) = 3.72, p = .29.
Polygraph. Participants were asked, “If it is possible, would you be willing to take a
polygraph test?”

A binary logistic regression was performed with dichotomous polygraph

willingness as the dependent variable and culpability, suspect race, and culpability by suspect race
interaction term as the independent variables. The model was significant -2LL = 100.25, χ2(3 N =
85) = 14.16, p = .003. Culpability was a significant predictor of willingness to take a polygraph,
β = -2.08, SE = .77, Wald’s χ2(1, N = 85) = 7.16, p = .01, Ex(B) = .13. Overall, 51 (60%) out of
85 participants indicated they would be willing to take a polygraph, Innocent suspects were
significantly more willing to take a polygraph (79.1%) than guilty suspects (40.5%). Suspect race
was not a significant predictor of wiliness to take a polygraph. Similar proportions of white
(61.5%) and Black (58.7%) participants were willing to take polygraphs. The culpability by
suspect race interaction was not significant predictor of wiliness to take a polygraph.
Participants were asked to explain why they would or would not take a polygraph. Two
independent coders, blind to suspect race and condition, coded a random 20% of the responses (a
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= .89); disagreements we resolved by discussion. The remaining responses were split evenly and
coded individually by the two coders. Responses were initially coded into one of 10 categories:
(1) protection from self-incrimination, e.g. “I felt I might say something wrong”; (2) protection
from interrogator, e.g. “he seemed hungry to accuse me”; (3) mere principle, e.g. “I have my
rights”; (4) strategic self-presentation, e.g. “I was hoping to come off less guilty of the crime”; (5)
guilt, .e.g. “I do not have a good story to back up my crime”; (6) belief in the power of their
innocence, e.g. “Because I knew I wasn’t guilty”; (7) for added legal knowledge, e.g. “I need to
know the exact legal ramifications”; and (8) other. After initial coding, the protection from selfincrimination, protection from interrogator, and added legal knowledge categories were collapsed
into one single “protection” category, and the prove innocence category and was collapsed into the
strategic self presentation category – leaving 5 categories remaining.
For the 31 participants not willing to take a polygraph, the most common reason cited was
protection (38.7%, n = 12). For the 49 participants willing to take a polygraph, the most common
reason cited was strategic self-presentation (59.2%, n = 25). There was no effect for culpability on
reasons cited for polygraph decision, χ2(3, N = 80) = 17.39, p = .004, Cramer’s V = .47. Overall,
there was no effect for race on reasons cited for polygraph decision, χ2(3, N = 80) = .51, p = .92,
Cramer’s V = .08. A complete breakdown of the reasons participants cited for their decisions are
listed in Table 7.
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Table 7. Reasons Cited for Polygraph Decision

Suspect Culpability
Innocent

Guilty

Overall

Reason

Not Willing

Willing

Not Willing

Willing

Not Willing

Willing

Protection

50.0%

0.0%

34.7%

6.3%

38.7%

2.0%

Mere Principle 0.0%

0.0%

13.0%

0.0%

9.7%

0.0%

Strategy

0.0%

51.5%

0.0%

50.0%

0.0%

51.0%

Guilt

12.5%

0.0%

13.0%

0.0%

12.9%

0.0%

Innocence

0.0%

45.5%

4.3%

25.5%

3.1%

38.8%

3.0%

34.8%

18.8%

35.5%

8.2%

Other
37.5%
Note: N = 88.

Right to Silence. Participants were asked, “If it is possible, would you like to invoke your
right to silence?” A binary logistic regression was performed with dichotomous invoke silence as
the dependent variable and culpability, suspect race, and culpability by suspect race interaction
term as the independent variables. The model was not significant -2LL = 110.84, χ2(3, N = 84) =
5.18, p = .16.
New Detective. Participants were asked, “If it is possible, would you like to talk to a
different detective?” A binary logistic regression was performed with dichotomous different
detective as the dependent variable and culpability, suspect race, and culpability by suspect race
interaction term as the independent variables. The model was significant -2LL = 107.70, χ2(3 N =
85) = 9.84, p = .02. Culpability was a significant predictor of desire to speak to a new detective β
= -2.01, SE = .73, Wald’s χ2(1, N = 85) = 87.56, p = .01, Ex(B) = .14. Innocent suspects were
significantly more likely to wish to speak to a new detective. Of 44 innocent suspects, 54.5% (n
= 24) said they would like to speak to a different detective; of 41 guilty suspects only 39.0% (n =
64

16) said they would like to speak to a different detective. There was also a significant culpability
by race interaction, β = 2.46, SE = .95, Wald’s χ2(1, N = 85) = 6.76, p = .01, Ex(B) = 11.71. The
percentage of White participants that wanted to change detectives significantly differed as a
function of culpability χ2(1, N = 40) 8.29, p = .004. Innocent White suspects (65%) were more
likely than guilty White suspects (20%) to want to speak to a new detective. However, the
percentage of Black participants that wanted to change detectives did not significantly differ as a
function of culpability, χ2(1, N = 45) .57, p = .45. The model also showed a significant culpability
by race interaction for desire to speak to a new detective, where more innocent White suspects
(65%) than guilty White suspects (19%) wanted to change detectives, while innocent Black and
guilty Black suspects reported wanting to change detectives at equal rates, χ2(1, N = 45) .57, p =
.45.
Participants were also asked to explain why they would or would not like to speak to a new
detective. Two independent coders, blind to hypotheses, condition, and participant race, coded a
random 20% of the open ended “why?” response following this question, α = .74. One coder
coded the remaining 80% of responses. Participant’s responses were coded into one of six
categories: (1) belief in the power of innocence (e.g. “Because I know I’m innocent); (2)
perception of interrogator bias (e.g. “He just assumed I did it”); (3) strategy (e.g. “May have better
luck with a new detective”); (4) feeling of helplessness (e.g. “It wouldn’t make any difference.”);
and (5) other (anything that did not fit into the four previous categories). Out of 40 participants
who did wish to speak to a different detective, the most common response (40.0%, n = 16) for
wanting to change detectives was perceived bias by the current detective. Out of 43 participants
who did not want to speak to another detective, the most common response for not wanting to
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change was helplessness (25.6%, n = 11). A complete breakdown of the reasons participants
cited for wanting to speak to a new detective are listed in Table 8.
Table 8. Study 1: Reasons Cited for New Detective Decision

Suspect Culpability
Innocent

Guilty

Overall

Reason

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Helplessness

15.0%

0.0%

34.8%

0.0%

27.3%

0.0%

Innocence

30.0%

0.0%

8.7%

12.5%

18.2%

5.0%

Strategy

20.0%

33.3%

17.4%

43.8%

18.2%

37.5%

Interr. Bias

0.0%

50.0%

0.0%

25.5%

0.0%

40.0%

16.7%

39.1%

18.8%

36.4%

17.5%

Other
35.0%
Note: N = 82.

Participants desire to speak with an attorney, have an attorney present during questioning,
willingness to take a polygraph, desire to invoke their rights to silence, and desire to speak to a
new detective were used to assess willingness to cooperate with the investigation.

For the

majority of the measures, suspects responded similarly. Innocent and guilty participants requested
a lawyer’s advice, the presence of a lawyer, and invoked their right to silence at equal rates.
However, innocent suspects were more likely to agree to a polygraph and wish to speak to a new
detective. Contrary to our hypotheses, however, no race differences were found in willingness to
cooperate.
Hypothesis 4: Suspects’ Interview Strategies.
We predicted that guilty suspects would adopt more withholding strategies than innocent
suspects. We also predicted that among innocent suspects, Black suspects would adopt more
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withholding strategies than White suspects. Via two self-report measures and one behavioral
measure we assessed suspects’ strategies in during the interview.
Self-reported strategies. First, participants were asked to rate on a 10-point scale (1 = not
at all, 10 = very) to what extent they had planned the verbal content of their statement. Overall
suspects reported a low extent of planning their verbal statements (M = 2.94, SD = 2.13, 95% CI
[2.49, 3.39]). A 2 (culpability: innocent v. guilty) x 2 (race: White v. Black) ANOVA revealed no
main effect for culpability in planning of verbal statements; innocent (M = 2.80, SD = 2.03) and
guilty (M = 3.90, SD = 2.25) suspects reported similar degrees of planning their verbal statements
prior to the interview, F(1, 83) = .45, p = .50, ηp2 <.01. There was not a significant main effect
for race in planning of verbal statements; Black (M = 2.98, SD = 2.04) and White (M = 2.90, SD =
2.26) suspects reported similar extents of planning their verbal statements prior to the interview,
F(1, 83) = .02, p = .88, ηp2 < .001. There was not a significant culpability by race interaction for
planning verbal statements, F(1, 86) = .34, p = .56, ηp2 = .004.
Next, participants were asked whether or not they had a strategy before the interview (yes
or no), (n = 1 missing). A binary logistic regression was performed with dichotomous strategy as
the dependent variable and culpability, suspect race, and culpability by suspect race interaction
term as the independent variables. The model was not significant -2LL = 114.16, χ2(3, N = 86) =
4.87, p = .18. Of the 86 participants, 45 (52.3%) reported having a strategy before the interview.
Similar proportions of innocent (45.5%) and guilty (59.5%) suspects reported having a strategy
before the interview. Likewise, similar proportions of White (60.0%) and Black (45.7%) suspects
reported having a strategy before the interview.
Forthcomingness. Statements of suspects (n = 80) who consented to the use of their
videotaped interview for research purposes were transcribed and coded for presence of “critical
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disclosures” – that is the presence of potentially incriminating details in their verbal statement.
Recall that critical disclosures were measured in two different ways: (1) presence at crime scene how far into the scenario did the suspect admitted to going? and (2) critical details - how many
critical details did the suspect include in his/her story? For the first measure, presence at crime
scene, ratings of suspect forthcomingness could range from 0 (no admission to being in the
scenario and thus, not at all forthcoming) to 3 (admitting to the most incriminating detail –
touching items at the crime scene, i.e., the briefcase containing the wallet or crate containing the
books, and thus very forthcoming). For the second measure, critical details, number of details
included could range from 0 (no critical details) to 3 (all critical details).
On the measure of presence at crime scene, a 2 (culpability: innocent v. guilty) x 2 (race:
White v. Black) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for culpability. Innocent suspects were
significantly more forthcoming with the extent of their actions (M = 2.38, SD = .77, 95% CI [2.21,
2.55]) than guilty suspects, (M = 1.50, SD = 1.06, 95% CI [1.27, 1.73]), F(1, 76) = 19.16, p <
.001, ηp2 = .20. There was also a main effect for race, White suspects were significantly more
forthcoming with the extent of their actions (M = 2.23, SD = .83, 95% CI [2.05, 2.41]) than Black
suspects (M = 1.65, SD = 1.12, 95% CI, [1.40, 1.90]) F(1, 76) = 8.27, p = .01, ηp2 = .10. There
was not a significant culpability by race interaction F(1, 76) = .02, p = .90, ηp2 < .001.
On the measure of how many critical details of the scenario the suspects provided, a 2
(culpability: innocent v. guilty) by 2 (race: White v. Black) ANOVA revealed a significant main
effect for culpability; innocent suspects included significantly more details (M = 1.75, SD = .81,
95% CI [1.57, .19]) than guilty suspects, (M = 1.28, SD = .93, 95% CI [1.08, 1.48]), F(1, 78) =
7.50, p = .01, ηp2 = .09. There was also a main effect for race, White suspects included
significantly more details (M = 1.93, SD = .80, 95% CI [1.75, 2.11]) than Black suspects F(1, 78)
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(M = 1.10, SD =.81, 95% CI [.92, 1.28]) = 22.61, p = .01, ηp2 = .23. There was not a significant
culpability by race interaction F(1, 78) = .07, p = .80, ηp2 = .001.
In sum, there were no differences for innocent or guilty participants on self-reported
strategies, nor were there differences between Black or White participants on self-reported
strategy. A content analysis of the interviews, however, showed that suspects did adopt different
strategies. Innocent suspects admitted going further into the mock crime scenario and mentioned
more critical details than guilty suspects. Similarly, White suspects admitted going further into
the mock crime scenario, as well as mentioned more critical details than Black suspects.
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CHAPTER 8: STUDY ONE DISCUSSION
Despite the overrepresentation of racial-ethnic minorities among the roster of DNA
exonerated false confessors, there is little research examining Black and White suspects’
experiences and behaviors during police interviews in the U.S. Using a standard mock crime
paradigm, the goal of this study was to examine Black and White suspects’ experiences during
police interviews. Drawing on the social psychological and deception detection literatures, we
predicted that innocent Black suspects would be more nervous and display more nonverbal
behaviors subjectively associated with guilt than innocent White suspects due to the increased
anxiety caused by the probability and possibility that the interviewer would judge them guilty
simply because of their race. We also predicted that innocent Black suspects would be less likely
than innocent White suspects to cooperate with the investigation, further increasing the risk of an
erroneous guilty judgment by police. For guilty suspects, however, we predicted no differences in
anxiety or cooperation.
Anxiety
Suspect anxiety was assessed at three time points, in two different manners: (1) selfreports prior to the interview; (2) behavioral measures during the interview; and (3) self-reports
after the interview. Results of the pre-interview anxiety measure did not support our hypothesis.
Overall, guilty suspects reported being more nervous and uneasy than innocent suspects prior to
the interview, but there were no differences in our composite measure.

Importantly, our

hypothesis predicting that innocent Black suspects would be more nervous than innocent White
suspects was not supported. The lack of differences between Black and White suspects in anxiety
prior to the interview here may be due to the known shortcomings of self-report measures to
adequately assess participants’ internal states due to either a lack of ability to actually assess their
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own internal states or social desirability – in this case, suspects reporting they were less nervous
than they actually were. Another possible explanation, however, is that race was not salient for
suspects during the waiting period prior to the start of the interview. It was not until the beginning
of the interview that the interviewer revealed the evidence against the suspects, including the piece
of evidence that that someone matching the suspect’s description was seen near the crime scene.
Research on stereotype threat shows that when Black participants are asked to identify their race
on a demographics questionnaire prior to the task, they perform worse than participants asked to
complete the demographic questionnaire after the task (Steele & Aronson, 1995). That is, when
race is not primed – as it had not been in the pre-interrogation interview – participants do not yet
have the concern that they will confirm cultural stereotypes. Although we expected that the mere
act of being accused of a crime would be enough to trigger these concerns, it is possible that it was
not. Further research, particularly with different anxiety measures and different means of priming
the Black-crime stereotype, is needed before drawing any definitive conclusions regarding anxiety
differences between Black and White suspects during police interviews.
Examining the post interview anxiety measure, we observed that participants across all
conditions reported similar levels of anxiety suggesting that being question about a crime causes
anxiety, regardless of innocence or guilt. Recall that, prior to the interview, guilty suspects
reported being more nervous than innocent suspects, yet after the interview this difference
disappeared.

These findings further support prior research and theorizing about the

phenomenology of innocence. Kassin (2005) argues that innocence puts innocent suspects at risk,
and as this data suggests, innocent suspects – regardless of race – did not feel anxious prior to the
interview. This lack of pre-interview anxiety may explain why so many innocent suspects are
willing to waive their Miranda rights and speak to the police - they genuinely believe they have
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nothing to fear. Even after a short adversarial interview these differences in anxiety levels no
longer exist, providing more evidence that practitioners should not rely on cues to anxiety as cues
to deception.
Behavioral measures of anxiety were assessed in two ways: (1) coding of nonverbal
behaviors traditionally examined in deception detection research (Vrij, 2000a), and (2) global
impressions of observers on the anxiety dimensions in the self-report anxiety measure.
Comparing across the two vocal nonverbal behaviors and eight non-vocal nonverbal behaviors,
our hypotheses were not supported. There were no differences between Black and White
participants’ nonverbal behaviors. Similarly there were no culpability differences in participants’
nonverbal behaviors, nor was there a race by culpability interaction. These findings replicate
decades of deception detection research that consistently shows few differences in the behavior of
liars and truth tellers (see DePaulo et al., 2003 for a review). This study, however, is one of the
first US studies to examine racial differences in nonverbal behaviors during a deception detection
task.
It should be stressed, however, that the lack of significant differences in anxiety between
Black and White suspects should not be interpreted as a lack of anxiety on the part of Black
suspects.

Being questioned about a crime, regardless of one’s race, is inherently anxiety

provoking. The lack of race differences in anxiety suggests that, for all our suspects, innocent or
guilty, Black or White, the experience of being questioned in an accusatorial manner was equally
stressful. This is evident by the similar post interview anxiety scores across all groups in the
experiment. Further support for this can be found in examining suspects’ meta-perceptions of the
interviewer. Again, across all groups, an equal proportion of suspects felt the interviewer was
biased against them, thought they were anxious, and perceived them to be guilty. It is important to
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note that more Black suspects mentioned race or racial profiling (40%) than White suspects
(22.5%) in their interview – suggesting that race was salient for our Black suspects during the
interview, but possibly not before. Thus, it is possible that although the end results was the same
for our suspects – anxiety – the routes to this anxiety may have differed based on race. Our Black
suspects’ anxiety may have indeed been from being Black and being accused of a crime,
especially when race is a part of the evidence against them. For our White suspects, however, the
anxiety may have stemmed from the mere discomfort of being accused of a crime or fear of being
potentially mistakenly judged as guilty.

Future research designed to exploit these potential

different routes to anxiety is warranted to assess their effects. For example, although we used an
eyewitness identification that included the race of the suspects as a piece of evidence against our
suspects, we did not directly measure race salience or suspects’ perceptions of racial bias during
the interview. One suggestion is to manipulate race salience for Black and White suspects while
adding indirect measures such as word fragment completion tasks (e.g. Steele & Aronson, 1995)
in conjunction with other measures to address perceived racial bias from the suspects’ perspective.
In contrast to our study, a similar study conducted in the Netherlands found differences in
nonverbal behavior between Black and White suspects, with Black suspects making less eye
contact, smiling more often, and moving more overall than White suspects (Vrij et al., 1988; Vrij
et al., 1990, 1991). Although the two studies have similarities in their methods, there are many
cultural and historical differences regarding the settings in which the two studies were conducted
that may account for the discrepant findings. First, as noted earlier, Black Americans repeatedly
show low levels of trust in the police. The study was advertised as a study on “Legal Decision
Making” at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, thus it is possible that our Black sample suffered
from a volunteer bias. That is, only Black participants who were more trusting in police and the
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criminal justice system volunteered to participate in the study. There is some evidence of this
when comparing the Belief in a Just World Scale scores. Prior research shows minorities to have
a lower BJW than Whites (Hunt, 2000; Kennard et al., 2011; Smith et al., 1984). In our study,
however, there were no differences between Black and White participants’ BJW scores,
suggesting that our study may have attracted an atypical sample of Black participants
Due to the limitations of self-report measures to adequately assess participants’ internal
states, participants were also rated by outside observers on the same dimensions on which
participants rated themselves. Interrater reliability for observers’ global ratings of suspects on
these dimensions was low, however, thus objective measures could not be assessed, somewhat
limiting the conclusions we can draw about participants’ anxiety during the interview.
Cooperation.
Participants’ willingness to cooperate with the investigation was assessed via self-reports
by asking participants what they would like their next steps in the investigation to be after the
interview. Our hypotheses were not supported; there were no differences in Black and White
participants’ responses across all measures, regardless of culpability. We hypothesized that Black
participants would be less likely to cooperate due to a lack of trust in the police. All of our
cooperation measures were dichotomous yes or no, thus our measures may not have captured the
full range of responses. Future research on cooperation should consider including continuous
measures. It must be considered, however, that a lack of trust in the police may have the opposite
effect on Black suspects. Not trusting the police may actually increase cooperation, as Black
suspects may be wary of what might happen if they do not cooperate. A recent study on the
effects of New York City’s “Stop-and-Frisk” program (see Fratello et al., 2013 for a complete
review), a policing tactic that disproportionally affects minorities, found that found that 46% of
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respondents reported experiencing violence at the hands of a police officer (Fratello et al., 2013).
For Black Americans, perceptions of the police are formed not only through personal experiences,
but vicarious experiences of the Black community (Hurwitz et al., 2005; Warren, 2010). Thus,
even if a Black suspect has not had prior experience with the police, the fear of a police-citizen
interactions becoming physical may drive Black suspects to cooperate with police as a means of
self-protection. Although participants in a laboratory study do not have to fear the situation
becoming violent, if being vigilant in how one responds when accused of a crime is part of a
behavioral script, it may still influence participants’ reactions - even in a nonviolent laboratory
setting. Future research on what drives Black suspects decisions to cooperate with police at the
beginning of an investigation – where veracity decisions are made – is necessary given the
potential consequences of either decision.
For culpability, only one item showed significant differences. Consistent with previous
research (Jordan et al., 2012), only 38.7% of guilty suspects were willing to take a polygraph,
where as 79.1% of innocents suspects were willing to take a polygraph – most frequently citing
strategic self-presentation as their rational. There were no differences, however, in desire to speak
with an attorney, have an attorney present, or invoke rights to silence suggesting that these
commonly used proxies for assessing a suspect’s guilt are flawed strategies.
Suspect Strategies
We also assessed suspects’ use of strategies during the interview through both self-report
and behavioral measures. We predicted that Black suspects would be less forthcoming with
information than White suspects.

We also hypothesized that guilty suspects would be less

forthcoming than innocent suspects. When asked to what extent they planned their statement and
whether or not they had a strategy, Black and White suspects responded similarly. Analysis of the
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interviews, however, shows that Black suspects did withhold more information about their actions
from the interviewer than the White suspects. Furthermore, innocent suspects withheld more
information from the interviewer than guilty suspects. Thus, while participants did not report using
different strategies, there was evidence that both Blacks suspects and guilty suspects did employ
different strategies with regards to how much information to disclose to the interviewer.
Black suspects may decide to withhold evidence during a police interview for a few
reasons. First, it is possible that our Black suspects chose to withhold some of their activities from
the interviewer because they felt that admitting too much, even when innocent, would only serve
to confirm the interviewer’s assumptions that they must be guilty because they are Black.
Similarly, Black participants may withhold information about their activities because they do not
trust police to use the information properly (e.g. to prove innocence). Although innocent White
suspects know they are innocent and think they are offering up information that will clear them of
wrongdoing, Black suspects’ general suspicions regarding police may lead them to only tell the
police the minimum amount of information necessary. In sum, Black suspects may have adopted
a cooperative strategy for the more conspicuous behaviors as a manner of self-protection, yet
adopted a less cooperative strategy for the more discreet behaviors for similar reasons. Further
research is needed examining the intersection of suspect race and expectations and the role they
have in suspects’ interview strategies.
Suspects’ Meta-Perceptions and Predictions
Suspects were asked what they perceived the interviewer’s meta-perceptions to be. They
were asked whether or not they thought the interview was biased against them, thought they were
anxious, and whether the interviewer believe them to be innocent or guilty. We predicted that
Black suspects would expect the interviewer to judge them more negatively than White suspects.
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Across all three measures, suspects’ meta-perceptions of the interviewer did not vary based on
race.

Participants were also asked to predict how someone watching the videotape of the

interview would judge them. Again, Black and White suspects expected to be judge innocent at
similar rates. Notably, the majority of suspects predicted that the interviewer would judge them to
be lying; yet the majority of suspects expected the videotape viewer to judge them to be telling the
truth. Our interview was structured in a guilt presumptive way, thus it is understandable that
suspects would expect the interviewer to think they were lying. The use of this style of interview
may have restricted the range of responses on this measure by increasing the number of White
participants that felt the interviewer didn’t believe them compared to a more investigative
interview. Research using a more investigative interview approach (i.e. a less guilt presumptive
one) may allow for more variance in responses in testing participants’ meta-perceptions of the
interviewer.
Conclusions
Overall, these findings suggest that being accused of a crime is stressful for both Black and
White suspects, regardless of culpability.

These findings also suggest that willingness to

cooperate with the investigation may depend on many factors, and cannot be predicted by a
suspects’ race or culpability. Importantly, these results - for both races - replicate past findings
from deception detection and interrogations studies, adding more evidence that suspect demeanor
and willingness to cooperate are not diagnostic cues to deception or guilt.
These findings also suggest that Black suspects do adopt different strategies than White
suspects during questioning. Although the underlying reasons are still unclear, Black suspects,
like guilty suspects, withheld more information from the interviewer than White suspects. As
deception detection research focuses more on understanding, and exploiting, the strategies of liars
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(compared to truth tellers), it will be important to understand why Black suspects felt the need to
withhold information from the interviewer.
Given that Black and White suspects behaved similarly on the majority of our measures –
behaviors that police officers typically rely on to determine a suspect’s culpability - we still have
few answers regarding the role social-cognitive biases play in the overrepresentation of racialethnic minorities among the Innocence Project’s roster of false confessors. It is possible that our
anxiety and cooperation measures were not sensitive enough to measure the different challenges
facing Black and White suspects during police-citizen interactions. It is also possible that being
questioned about a crime is a stressful situation, and that Black and White suspects, in the end,
respond similarly to that stress situation. One important difference was found, that Black suspects
are less forthcoming than White suspects during questioning. Police may be exploiting this lack
of information when making lie judgments, but because this strategy is not a central focus of
police training manuals, further research is necessary before reaching any conclusions.
Future research should also look towards assessing suspects’ anxiety via physiological
measures. For example, Guyll et al. (2013) examined participants’ physiological indicators of
stress (e.g., blood pressure, heart rate, respiratory sinus arrhythmia) while being pressured to
confess to cheating (e.g. Russano et al. 2005; Perillo & Kassin, 2010).

Innocent suspects,

although stressed by the initial accusation of cheating, were significantly less stressed by the
accusation and interrogation than guilty suspects, suggesting that innocent suspects may misjudge
the possible consequences of cooperating during an interrogation (Guyll et al., 2013). The Guyll
et al. (2013) sample, however, was 85.6% White with only 6 (4.5%) Black participants. Would
innocent Black suspects behave the same way as innocent White suspects? As we saw when
examining suspects’ strategies and cooperation, on the more conspicuous measures – such as
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whether or not to take a polygraph - Black participants’ behavior did not differ from that of White
participants. Yet, on the more inconspicuous strategies – such as how much detail to include in
one’s story – Black participants did adopt a more withholding, possibly less cooperative strategy.
It is possible that these more sensitive physiological measures could detect differences in anxiety
and stress that our self-report and nonverbal measures were unable to detect. Specifically, it is
possible that innocent Black suspects may not outwardly exhibit more anxiety and stress than
innocent White suspects, yet, physiologically, their stress markets may match those of guilty
suspects.
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CHAPTER 9: STUDY 2: POLICE OFFICERS’ VERACITY JUDGMENTS OF
BLACK AND WHITE SUSPECTS
The purpose of Study 2 was to examine police officers evaluations of Black and White
mock crime suspects. We do not know of any U.S. study that has examined police officers’
veracity or culpability judgments as a function of race or ethnicity in a police interview or
interrogation setting. The current study seeks to extend the literature on police interviewing by
examining police officers’ culpability judgments and perceptions of Black suspects, compared to
White suspects, in a police interview setting. Given the overrepresentation of Blacks in among the
wrongfully convicted (www.innocenceproject.org), as well as the prison system as a whole (The
Sentencing Project, 1995) understanding how suspect race affects police officers’ judgment and
decision-making is essential.
Study 1 predicted that, due to cultural stereotypes and lack of trust in the police, innocent
Black suspects would exhibit more anxiety cues and be less cooperative with the investigation
than innocent White suspects, yet there would be no differences between Black and White guilty
suspects. We hypothesized that this would in turn cause police officers to make more errors when
judging the veracity of innocent Black and White mock crime suspects. Our hypotheses were not
supported; Black and White suspects behaved similarly on the majority of our measures. If Black
and White suspects exhibited similar behaviors during our interviews, would police officers’
culpability judgments be similar? Police officers are (incorrectly) trained to rely on suspects’
nonverbal behaviors and the extent to which they cooperate with the investigation as indicators of
guilt. Given that our Black and White participants behaved similarly in regards to our nonverbal
behaviors and willingness to cooperate, if police are using these cues to discern innocence and
guilt, there should be no differences in guilt judgments between our Black and White suspects.
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The stereotype of African-Americans as criminals is robust (Eberhardt, et al., 2004), and
can have pervasive effects: they can induce people to see criminality when it is not present
(Correll, et al., 2002), and can alter people’s memories for a criminal event to be consistent with
the stereotype (Allport & Postman, 1947, c.f., Eberhardt et. al., 2004). Importantly, the link
between Black and crime appears to be automatic and not directly related to explicit racial
attitudes (Payne, 2001). This stereotype can lead to implicit biases with serious consequences,
such those seen in the afore mentioned “shoot-don’t-shoot” studies where participants were more
likely to shoot unarmed Black targets than unarmed White targets (Correll, et al., 2002). Implicit
biases operate unintentionally and outside of conscious awareness, and police officers are not
immune to these biases. For example, Eberhardt et al. (2004) asked police officers to view a series
of photos of Black and White males and indicate whether or not the person “looked criminal.”
Police officers rated more Black faces as criminal than White faces, and the more stereotypically
Black the face was, the more likely it was to be judged criminal (Eberhardt et al., 2004). Thus,
despite the lack of differences in anxiety and cooperation between our Black and White
participants, we predict that, due to stereotypes regarding Black criminality, innocent Black
suspects will still be at greater risk than innocent White suspects of being erroneously judged
guilty. It is important to note that we do not expect this to be a result of conscious biases on the
part of the police officers.
Hypotheses
H1 Culpability: Given the strong and automatic association of Black with crime (Eberhardt et al.,
2004), we predict a main effect for culpability. We predict that police officers will judge
Black suspects to be more deceptive than White suspects, and classify Black suspects as
guilty more often than White suspects.
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H2 Accuracy: Building on the previous hypothesis, we predicted a suspect race by suspect
culpability interaction. We predict that police officers would misclassify more innocent
Blacks suspects than innocent White suspects as guilty, yet would show a similar error rate
when evaluating guilty suspects.
H3 Impressions We predict that police officers will evaluate Black suspects more negatively than
White suspects. We predict that police officers would judge Black suspects as more
anxious and more suspicious than White suspects. We also predict that they will rate
Black suspects as less cooperative and less forthcoming than White suspects.

82

CHAPTER 10: STUDY 2 METHODS
Participants
Participants were 80 police investigators recruited from four police precincts; two of the
precincts served suburban areas of large Southeastern United States city (N = 40), and two of the
precincts served rural areas of the same large Southeastern United States city (N = 40).
Participants were recruited during daily roll call at the rural precincts, and via word of mouth at
the suburban precincts. Participants were asked not to discuss the study with others and were
given a limited debriefing until the entire study was completed, upon which a full debriefing was
mailed to participants.
Participants, who were 93.8% male, ranged in age from 22 to 65 (M = 37.96, SD = 9.3),
and had an average of 12.18 years of experience, (SD = 9.05, range 7 months to 43 years). Across
precincts, 81.3% of participants were White (n = 65), 12.5% of participants were Black (n = 10),
one participant was Hispanic, two participants chose “other”, and two participants did not report
their racial/ethnic information. A total of 67.5% (n = 54) of participants had received formal
training in suspect interviewing and interrogations.
Design
The study employed a 2 (Suspect culpability: Innocent v. Guilty) x 2 (Suspect race: Black v.
White) between subjects factorial design (n = 20 per cell)
Stimulus Materials
Interviews. Participants were randomly assigned to watch one of the 80 suspect interviews
from Study 1. As described in Study 1, all interviews were conducted according to a predetermined script; the same mock detective conducted all interviews. Suspects recounted the 15
minutes prior to the interview, and then answered a series of accusatory, guilty presumptive
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questions. The video showed the suspect’s full body at a diagonal from the suspect’s right side;
the interviewer’s left side and back is visible in all interviews.
Suspect Profile. Prior to watching the videotape, police officers received a one-page
report, presented as a “Suspect Profile” (Appendix Q), containing information about what
cooperative behaviors the suspect endorsed (i.e. responses to the questions regarding taking a
polygraph, waiving right to silence, desire to speak to an attorney, willingness to speak to a new
detective) after the initial interview on the willingness to cooperate measure in Study 1. The
report opened with a suspect name held constant according to gender (Michelle or Michael Jones)
as well as the suspect’s actual age and self-reported gender. The report then included some
irrelevant biographical information held constant across all suspects to counter demand
characteristics regarding the cooperative behaviors. This information was labeled “Biographical
Information” and included four items held constant across all conditions: (1) “Suspect lives in
Brooklyn, NY”; (2) “Suspect moved from Washington DC to New York five years ago”; (3)
“Suspect waits tables at a nearby restaurant”; and (4) “Suspect has no children.”
Next, the report contained a section labeled “Additional Information”.

Although we

measured suspects’ cooperation in five ways, we only included four of the measures in the
additional information. Two of the five measures assessed suspects’ desires for counsel during the
proposed follow up interview: desire to get advice from a lawyer and desire to have a lawyer
present during the interview. Slightly more participants shown in the videos requested to have an
attorney present in the interview (90%) than requested advice from an attorney (83.8%). So as not
to have “attorney requests” overly influence officers’ decisions compared to the other cooperation
measures, only one of the two measures was reported on the Suspect Profile. There was more
variance in suspects’ responses to “desire to speak to an attorney,” thus it was selected.
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Consequently, the “Additional Information” section included one of the following four variants:
(1) “The suspect {wanted/did not want} to speak to a defense attorney”; (2) “The suspect
{was/was not} willing to take a polygraph”; (3) “The suspect {wanted/did not want} to invoke
their right to silence”; and (4) “The suspect {wanted/did not want} to speak to another detective.
Procedure
Sessions were conducted with a range of 1 to 4 participants per session. At three of the
four data collection sites participants sat at individual tables scattered around the available room at
each site; at the fourth site participants sat around a conference table in the available room. All
participants viewed their video on a laptop and listened to the interview with headphones.
After reading the consent form (Appendix O), participants received written instructions
about their task (Appendix P), including background information about the mock crime (Appendix
Q). Participants read that researchers previously conducted a study in which suspects were
instructed to steal a wallet or do something else not involving a theft, were interviewed about the
theft, all denied the theft, and that there was some evidence indicating that the interviewee
committed the theft, but that it does not necessarily exclude the suspect. Participants read that
there was evidence that the suspect entered the building on the day of the crime in question, that
there was video footage of the suspect near the room where the theft occurred, and that a person
matching the description of the suspect was seen near the room (the latter two being the two pieces
of evidence that are used against the suspect by the interviewer in the tape).
Participants were then instructed that their task was to determine if the suspect in the video
was lying or telling the truth – that is, whether the suspect had actually taken the wallet or not.
After reading the instructions, participants read the specific Suspect Profile corresponding with the
suspect in their video. The experimenter then started the video and told participants to signal
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when the video was over. After the video, participants completed a questionnaire assessing
perceptions of veracity, culpability, suspect anxiety, suspect cooperation, and verbal and nonverbal cues used in reaching their conclusion (Appendix R).

Participants also completed a

“Suspect Recall” questionnaire asking them to recall the four items listed under Additional
Information on the Suspect Profile and the gender and race of the suspect (Appendix S). They
then answered a demographics questionnaire (Appendix T) and were debriefed (Appendix U).
Participants were paid $30 for their time and, to motivate accuracy, told that if they were correct in
their lie judgment they would be entered into a lottery to receive $100. In reality, all participants
were entered into the lottery.
Measures
Guilt. For each suspect, officers rated the extent they believed the suspect was lying when
they denied guilt on a 10-point scale (1 = no, absolutely not, 10 = yes, absolutely). Participants
were then asked, “Which of the following is most likely to be true?”: “the person is guilty of the
theft” or “the person is innocent of the theft,” and to rate their confidence in that decision on a 10point scale (1 = not at all, 10 = very). Finally, participants were asked if they would like to
interrogate the suspect further for this crime (1 = no, absolutely not, 10 = yes, absolutely) and to
explain why or why not.
Cues to guilt judgments. Participants were asked to briefly describe the main reasons why
they though the interviewee was innocent or guilty. They were then asked to rate on a 10-point
scale (1 = not at all, 10 = completely) to what extent the suspect’s: (1) body language; (2) verbal
statement; and (3) post interview behavior (i.e. the cooperation behaviors) influenced their
decision.
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Impressions of Suspect. Participants assessed the suspect’s anxiety on the same five
measures the suspects answered immediately prior to the interrogation: agitated, uneasy, nervous,
worried, and anxious on the same 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very).
Participants answered seven questions about their global impression of the suspect.
Participants rated, all on a 10–point scale (1 = extremely low, 10 = extremely high), to what extent:
(1) did you feel suspicious during the interview? (2) did the person seem forthcoming with
information? (3) did the person seem to trust the interviewer; (4) did the person seem willing to
cooperate with the investigation? (5) did the person seem willing to talk with investigators? (6) did
the person seem willing to talk with investigators?
Finally, participants were asked if they had any special training on how to conduct
interviews and interrogations, what kind of training they had received, and how much they thought
it affected their lie judgments (1 = not at all, 10 = very). The majority of officers (65%) reported
have received some form of training, either in service or specialized training (e.g., Reid and
Associates). Prior training did not significantly affect officers’ veracity judgments and will not be
discussed further.
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CHAPTER 11: STUDY TWO RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
Participants were asked a series of multiple choice manipulation checks to ensure that they
had read the suspect profile and paid attention to the interview.

Beginning with our main

manipulation, 97.7% of officers who viewed White suspects correctly recalled that the suspect was
White. For officers who viewed Black suspects, 100% correctly recalled that the suspect was
Black, χ2(1, N = 80) = 75.10, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .98, suggesting that our suspect race
manipulation was effective. Regarding the cooperation measures reported in the suspect profile,
significantly more officers (78.21%) correctly recalled whether or not the suspect wanted to speak
to a defense attorney than did not (21.80%), χ2(2, N = 78) = 25.87, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .58.
Significantly more officers (91.03%) correctly recalled whether or not the suspect was willing to
take a polygraph than did not (8.97%), χ2(2, N = 78) = 53.19, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .83.
Significantly more officers (88.46%) correctly recalled whether the suspect wanted to invoke their
right to silence than did not (11.54%), χ2(2, N = 78) = 47.06, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .78.
Significantly more officers (91.03%) correctly recalled whether or not the suspect wanted to speak
to a new detective than did not (8.97%), χ2(2, N = 78) = 54.16, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .83,
suggesting that our suspect profile was effective at communicating the suspects’ cooperation
behaviors to the participants.
Hypothesis 1: Police Officers’ Culpability Judgments
We predicted a main effect for suspect race. Specifically, we predicted that police officers
would judge Black suspects to be more deceptive than White suspects. Similarly, we predicted
that police would judge Black suspects to be guilty more often than White suspects.
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Veracity Judgments. First, officers indicated on a 10-point scale (1 = no, absolutely not, 10
= yes, absolutely) whether they thought the interviewee was lying when s/he denied guilt. If
observers were making accurate judgments, we would expect a main effect for suspect culpability
such that officers judging guilty suspects would give higher scores. A 2 (suspect culpability:
innocent v. guilty) by 2 (suspect race: White v. Black) ANOVA showed no main effect for suspect
culpability on officers’ lie judgments F(1, 76) = .66, p = .42, ηp2 = .01. There was not a significant
main effect for suspect race, F(1, 76) = 2.73), p = .10, ηp2 = .04, nor was there a significant suspect
culpability by suspect race interaction, F(1, 76) = .56, p = .46, ηp2 = .01.
Guilt Judgments. After the veracity ratings, observers indicated whether they thought the
suspect was innocent or guilty of the theft. A binary logistic regression was conducted with
dichotomous observer accuracy as the dependent variable and suspect culpability, suspect race,
and the suspect culpability by suspect race interaction term as the independent variables. The
model was not significant, -2LL = 105.58, χ2(3, N = 80) = 5.32, p = .15. Officers judged Black
suspects to be guilty 60% (n = 24) of the time while judging White suspects to be guilty 40% (n =
16) of the time, χ2(1, N = 80) = 3.20, p = .07 Cramer’s V = .20. Binomial tests show that neither
of these accuracy rates are significantly different from chance, p = .27 and p = .27 respectively.
Although this main effect for suspect race on officers’ guilt judgments was not quite significant, it
is important to note that the lack of significance may be due to the small sample size and
consequently the lack of power to detect a significant effect for this contrast (1 - β = .57). A full
breakdown of officers’ guilt judgments can be seen in Table 8.
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Table 9. Police Officers’ Guilt Judgments by Suspect Race

Suspect Culpability
Innocent

Guilty

Overall

Officer Judgment

White
(n =20)

Black
(n =20)

White
(n =20)

Black
(n =20)

White
(n =40)

Black
(n =40)

Innocent

70%

35%

50%

55%

60%

40%

Guilty
Note. N = 80

30%

65%

50%

45%

40%

60%
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To examine the effects of suspects’ nonverbal behaviors on police officers’ culpability
judgment, each of the non-vocal and vocal nonverbal behaviors was entered into a binary logistic
regression along with the suspect race, suspect culpability, suspect culpability by suspect race
interaction term, and the appropriate nonverbal behavior by culpability and nonverbal by race
interaction terms. Overall, none of the models were significant: (a) gaze, -2LL = 99.74, χ2(7, N =
79) = 9.77, p = .16; (b) head movements, 2LL = 103.62, χ2(7, N = 79) = 5.89, p = .55; (c) laughs,
2LL = 102.97, χ2(7, N = 79) = 6.54, p = .48; (d) smiles, 2LL = 103.62, χ2(7, N = 79) = 6.54, p =
.48; (e) illustrators, 2LL = 104.39, χ2(7, N = 79) = 5.12, p = .65; (f) for leg/foot movements, 2LL =
99.62, χ2(7, N = 79) = 8.46, p = .29; (g) trunk movements, 2LL = 104.65, χ2(7, N = 79) = 4.86, p =
.56, (h) speech disturbances, 2LL = -99.24, χ2(7, N = 79) = 10.21, p = .18, and (i) speech rate, 2LL = 102.76, χ2(7, N = 79) = 6.74, p = .35.
To examine the effect of suspects’ cooperation with the investigation on officer’s
culpability judgment, each of the four cooperation measures included on the “suspect information”
sheet presented to detectives prior to viewing the interview (asking for advice from a defense
attorney, willingness to take a polygraph, invoking right to silence, and desire to speak to a new
detective) was entered into a binary logistic regression along with suspect race, suspect
culpability, the suspect race by suspect culpability interaction term, the cooperation by suspect
race, cooperation by suspect veracity, and three way interaction terms. None of the models were
significant. Because officers were provided with these items in the aggregate, the four items were
then combined to create a cooperation index ranging from 0 to 4 (0 = not at all cooperative, 4 =
fully cooperative). Again using officer accuracy as the dependent variable, this cooperation index
was entered into a binary logistic regression along with the suspect race, suspect veracity, suspect
race by suspect veracity interaction, the cooperation by suspect race, cooperation by suspect
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veracity, and three way interaction terms. The model was not significant -2LL = 103.43, χ2(6, N =
80) = 7.47, p = .28.
Hypothesis 2: Police Officers’ Accuracy Rates
We predicted a suspect race by suspect culpability interaction. Specifically, we predicted
that officers would make more errors when judging the culpability of innocent Black suspects
compared to innocent White suspects, yet officers would exhibit similar accuracy rates for guilty
Black and White suspects. We also predicted that officers would show high confidence in their
culpability judgments, regardless of their accuracy.
Examining officers’ decisions in terms of their lie detection accuracy, officers obtained a
53.8% accuracy rate; a binomial test reveals this was not significantly different than chance, p =
.58. A binary logistic regression was performed with dichotomous observer accuracy as the
dependent variable and suspect culpability, suspect race, and the suspect culpability by suspect
race interaction term as the independent variables. The model was not significant, 2LL = 105.58,
χ2(3, N = 80) = 5.12, p = .16. Officers’ accuracy rates were equal for both innocent (52.5%, n =
21) and guilty (52.5%, n = 21) suspects, χ2(1, N = 80) = 0.00, p = 1.00. Binomial tests revealed
that these accuracy rates were not significantly different from chance, p = .88 and p = .88
respectively. Observers were correct in their culpability judgments 60% of the time with White
suspects and 45% of the time with Black suspects. Binomial tests revealed that neither of these
accuracy rates are significantly different from chance, p = .27 and p = .64 respectively.

A full

breakdown of officers’ accuracy rates can be seen in Table 9.
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Table 10. Officers’ Accuracy Rates by Suspect Race

Suspect Culpability
Innocent

Guilty

Overall

Accuracy

White
(n =20)

Black
(n =20)

White
(n =20)

Black
(n =20)

White
(n =40)

Black
(n =40)

Incorrect

30.0%a

65.0%a

50.0%

45.0%

50%

45%

35.0%

50.0%

55.0%

50%

55%

Correct
70.0%
Note. N = 80
a
significant at the p < .05 level
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False Alarms. Accuracy rates do not tell the full story, however. When law enforcement
officials assess the culpability of a suspect, there are four possible outcomes: (1) a hit: correctly
judging a guilty suspect as guilty; (2) correct rejection: correctly judging an innocent suspect as
innocent; (3) a miss: incorrectly judging a guilty suspect as innocent; and (4) a false alarm:
incorrectly judging an innocent suspect as guilty. For the 40 guilty suspects (20 per racial group),
there was no significant difference in officers’ “hits” (correctly identifying the guilty suspect) for
Black suspects (55.0%) and White suspects (50.0%), χ2(1, N = 40) = .10, p = .75, Cramer’s V =
.05, odds ratio = 1.22. Thus, for guilty suspects, the odds of accurately being judged as guilty
were equal for both Black suspects and White suspects.
For the 40 innocent suspects, officers made significantly more false alarms (incorrectly
identifying a innocent suspect as guilty) when judging innocent Black suspects (65.0%) than when
judging White suspects (30.0%) χ2(1, N = 40) = 4.91, p = .03, Cramer’s V = .35, odds ratio = 4.33.
For innocent suspects, Black suspects were 4.33 times more likely to be erroneously judged guilty
than White suspects (See Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Officer’s Accuracy by Condition.
To examine the effect of suspects’ nonverbal behaviors on officers’ dichotomous accuracy,
each of the non-vocal and vocal nonverbal behaviors was entered into a binary logistic regression
along with the suspect race, suspect culpability, suspect culpability by suspect race interaction
term, and the appropriate nonverbal behavior by culpability and nonverbal by race interaction
terms. Overall, none of the models were significant: (a) gaze, -2LL = 99.74, χ2(7, N = 79) = 9.46,
p = .22; (b) head movements, 2LL = 103.62, χ2(7, N = 79) = 5.88, p = .59; (c) laughs, 2LL =
102.97, χ2(7, N = 79) = 6.24, p = .51; (d) smiles, 2LL = 102.97, χ2(7, N = 79) = 6.24, p = .51; (e)
illustrators, 2LL = 104.39, χ2(7, N = 79) = 4.81, p = .68; (f) leg/foot movements, 2LL = 99.62,
χ2(7, N = 79) = 8.01, p = .33; (g) trunk movements, 2LL = 103.69, χ2(7, N = 79) = 5.51, p = .60;
(h) speech disturbances, 2LL = -99.24, χ2(7, N = 79) = 9.91, p = .19; and (i) speech rate, -2LL =
102.87, χ2(7, N = 79) = 6.34, p = .39.
Using officers’ culpability judgments as the dependent variable, each of the four
cooperation measures included on the “suspect information” sheet presented to detectives prior to
viewing the interview (asking for advice from a defense attorney, willingness to take a polygraph,
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invoking right to silence, and desire to speak to a new detective) was entered into a binary logistic
regression along with suspect race, suspect culpability, the suspect race by suspect culpability
interaction term, the cooperation by suspect race, cooperation by suspect veracity, and three way
interaction terms. None of the models were significant. Because officers were provided with
these items in the aggregate (i.e. all four items at once), the four items were combined to create a
cooperative index ranging from 0 to 4 (0 = not at all cooperative, 4 = fully cooperative). This
cooperation index was entered into a binary logistic regression along with the suspect race, suspect
veracity, suspect race by suspect veracity interaction, the cooperation by suspect race, cooperation
by suspect veracity, and three way interaction terms, again using officer accuracy as the dependent
variable. The model was not significant -2LL = 103.43, χ2(6, N = 80) = 7.26, p = .30. The
cooperation items will not be discussed further.
Confidence Ratings. Observers rated their confidence in their culpability judgments on a
10-point scale (1 = not at all confident, 10 = very confident). Overall, participants’ confidence in
their veracity judgments was high, (M = 8.31, SD = 1.41). A 2 (suspect culpability: innocent v.
guilty) x 2 (suspect race: White v. Black) ANOVA revealed no significant main effects for suspect
culpability on decision confidence F(1, 76) = .75, p = .39, ηp2 = .01, or suspect race F(1, 76) = .75,
p = .39, ηp2 = .01. The suspect culpability by suspect race interaction was not significant, F (1, 76)
= .50, p = .48, ηp2 = .01.
Further Questioning. If police believe a suspect is lying or is guilty of the crime in
question, they may want to question the suspect further – past the pre-interrogation interview.
Thus, after watching the videotape and answering the above questions about statement veracity
and culpability, officers were asked if they would like to question the suspect further about the
crime in question (n = 8 missing). Observers indicated on a scale of 1 to 10, (1 = absolutely not,
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10 = absolutely) if they would like to interrogate the suspect further for this crime. A 2 (suspect
culpability: innocent v. guilty) x 2 (suspect race: White v. Black) ANOVA revealed no significant
main effects for suspect culpability on desire to question the suspect further F(1, 68) = .30, p =
.58, ηp2 = .004, or suspect race F(1, 68) = 2.18, p = .15, ηp2 = .03. The suspect culpability by
suspect race interaction was also not significant, F(1, 68) = .69, p = .41, ηp2 = .01.
Accuracy of suspects’ predictions. As a group, 78.0% (n = 32) of innocent suspects
believed an observer of the videotape would judge them as innocent; yet only 52.5% (n = 21) of
innocent suspects were correct in this belief (not necessarily the same 52.5% of innocent suspects).
As a group, 55.5% (n = 22) of guilty suspects believed an observer of the videotape would judge
them as innocent; 47.5% (n = 19) were correct in this belief (again, not necessarily the same
47.5%). On a group level, innocent suspects expected to be judged innocent more often than they
actually were, whereas guilty suspects’ expectations, as a group, were somewhat accurate.
Examining the accuracy of suspects’ predictions by race, 84.2% (n = 16) of innocent
White suspects predicted they would be judged innocent; 70% (n = 14) of innocent White suspects
were judged innocent (not necessarily the same White suspects). In contrast, 72.7% (n = 16) of
innocent Black suspects predicted they would be judged innocent, yet only 35% (n = 7) of
innocent Black suspects were judged innocent.

On a group level, innocent White suspects

expected to be judged innocent and, for the most part, were judged innocent. Innocent Black
suspects as a group showed the same belief in the power of their innocence as innocent White
suspects, yet their expectations of a favorable outcome were not met.
As for guilty suspects, 60.0% (n = 12) of guilty White suspects predicted they would be
judged innocent and 50.0% (n = 10) were judged guilty (not necessarily the same 10). Similarly,
50.0% (n = 10) of guilty Black suspects predicted they would be judged innocent and 45.0% (n =
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9) were judged innocent (again not necessarily the same 9). Guilty suspects of both races, as a
group accurately estimated their likelihood of being judged guilty.

In sum, innocent Black

suspects in our sample were the only group that misjudged their likelihood of being deemed
truthful. A full break down of suspects’ predictions by race and culpability can be seen in Table
10.
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Table 11. Percentage of suspects expecting to be judged innocent v. percentage of suspects actually judged innocent

Suspect Culpability
Innocent

Guilty

Overall

Judgment

White

Black

White

Black

White

Black

Suspects’ Predicted

84.2%

72.7%

60.0%

50.0%

71.8%

61.9%

Officers’ Actual

70.0%

35.0%

50.0%

45.0%

60.0%

40.0%
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Self-Reported Cues. Observers were asked to rate on a 10-point scale (1 = not at all, 10 =
completely) to what extent the interviewee’s body language (nonverbal behavior), verbal
statement, and post interview behavior (i.e. willingness to cooperate measures reported from Study
1) influenced their judgments. A 2 (suspect culpability: innocent v. guilty) x 2 (suspect race:
White v. Black) ANOVA revealed no significant main effect for suspect culpability for nonverbal
behavior as a self-reported cue; officers reported using nonverbal behavior to a similar degree for
innocent (M = 7.53, SD = 1.59, 95% CI [7.18, 7.88]) and guilty (M = 7.33, SD = 1.85, 95% CI
[6.92, 7.74] suspects, F(1, 76) = .26, p = .61, ηp2 = .003. There was also no significant main effect
for suspect race on nonverbal behavior as a self-reported cue; officers reported using nonverbal
behavior to a similar degree for White (M = 7.43, SD = 1.71, 95% CI [7.06, 7.80]) and Black (M =
7.43, SD = 1.74, 95% CI [7.05, 7.81] suspects, F(1, 76) = .00, p = 1.00, ηp2 < .001. The
culpability by race interaction was also not significant, F(1, 76) = .15, p = .70, ηp2 = .002.
A 2 (suspect culpability: innocent v. guilty) x 2 (suspect race: White v. Black) ANOVA
revealed no significant main effect for suspect culpability for verbal statement as a self-reported
cue; officers reported using verbal behavior to a similar degree for innocent (M = 7.48, SD = 1.83,
95% CI [7.08, 7.88]) and guilty (M = 7.38, SD = 1.71, 95% CI [7.01, 7.55]) suspects, F(1, 76) =
.06, p = .80, ηp2 = .001. There was also no significant main effect for suspect race on verbal
behavior; officers reported using verbal behavior to a similar degree for White (M = 7.30, SD =
1.67, 95% CI [6.93, 7.67]) and Black (M = 7.55, SD = 1.85, 95% CI [7.14, 7.96]) suspects, F(1,
76) = .39, p = .53, ηp2 < .05. The suspect culpability by suspect race interaction was also not
significant, F(1, 76) = .25, p = .62, ηp2 = .003.
A 2 (suspect culpability: innocent v. guilty) x 2 (suspect race: White v. Black) ANOVA
revealed no significant main effect for suspect culpability for post interview behavior as a self-
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reported cue; officers reported using post interview behavior to a similar degree for innocent (M =
5.25, SD = 2.62, 95% CI [4.68, 5.82]) and guilty (M = 4.35, SD = 2.88, 95% CI [3.72, 4.88])
suspects, F(1, 76) = 2.09, p = .15, ηp2 = .03. There was no significant main effect for suspect race
on post-interview behavior; officers reported using post interview behavior to a similar degree for
White (M = 4.60, SD = 2.80, 95% CI [3.99, 5.21]) and Black (M = 5.00, SD = 2.77, 95% CI [4.39,
5.61]) suspects, F(1, 76) = .41, p = .52, ηp2 = .01. The suspect culpability by suspect race
interaction was also not significant, F(1, 76) = .03, p = .87, ηp2 = .02.
Observers were also asked to describe the main reasons why they thought the interviewee
was guilty or innocent. Officers cited between 1 and 4 reasons for their culpability judgment and
the mean number of reasons cited was 2.3 (SD = .92); all reasons were included in analysis.
Officer’s answers were initially coded into one of 8 categories: (1) suspect’s gaze, (2) suspect’s
body movements, (3) suspect’s statement, (4) suspect’s overall demeanor; (5) suspects’ credibility;
(6) cooperation of suspect; (7) suspect race; and (8) other. Of the officers who believed the
suspect innocent, the most common response cited (35%) was the suspect’s body movements. Of
the officers who believed the suspect guilty, the most common response cited (27.5%) was the
suspect’s statement. A full breakdown of officers’ cited cues can be seen in Table 11.

101

Table 12. Officers’ Cited Reasons for Culpability Judgments

Culpability Judgment
Innocent

Guilty

Cue Cited
Body

White
(n = 24)
22.3%

Black
(n = 16)
36.5%

White
(n = 16)
25.0%

Black
(n = 24)
25.0%

Overall
(N = 80)
30.0%

Statement

25.0%

25.0%

25.0%

33.0%

30.0%

Gaze

12.5%

43.8%

25.0%

12.5%

21.3%

Nervousness

16.7%

12.5%

6.4%

12.5%

12.5%

Credibility

12.5%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

3.8%

Cooperation

0.0%

6.3%

6.3%

4.2%

3.8%

Race

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

37.2%

23.8%

Other
20.8%
12.5%
18.8%
Note. Officers cited between 1-4 reasons; (M = 2.3, SD = .92).

Given the documented difficulties with introspection (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) and relying
on self-reported cue usage (Hartwig & Bond, 2011) we computed Pearson product-moment
correlations between the nonverbal behaviors coded for in Study 1 and police officers’ culpability
judgments, as well as suspects’ scores on the forthcoming measures (crime scene and critical
details) and officers’ culpability judgments. This method allowed us to examine what behaviors
the police officers were actually relying on to detect deception. None of the correlations between
the nonverbal cues and officers’ judgments were significant (utilization coefficients presented in
Table 12). This suggests that officers did not objectively rely on suspects’ nonverbal behavior
when detecting deception. Similarly, neither of the correlations between the forthcoming measures
and officers’ judgments were significant. Further, we broke these analyses down by each of the
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four conditions in the study, such that the effect of each cue on officers’ judgments could be
assessed based on suspect race and culpability. Only one correlation was significant, presence at
crime scene in the innocent White suspects condition, r(18), = -.48 p = .02. Paradoxically, this
suggests that officers used innocent White suspects’ forthcomingness against them when judging
their veracity. That is, the more forthcoming innocent White suspects were, the more likely they
were to be judged guilty.

Table 13. Officers’ utilization of potential cues to deception

Observer Judgment
Innocent

Guilty

Cue
Speech Rate

White
r
-.10

Black
r
-.09

White
r
-.15

Black
r
-.14

Overall
r
-.06

Speech Disturbances

.05

-.29

.38

-.14

.01

Gaze

.26

-.14

-.04

-.35

.19

Head Movements

.08

.19

-.10

.05

.04

Laughs

.16

.02

.24

.05

.12

Smiles

.13

.12

.26

.29

.20

Illustrators

.04

.04

-.07

-.08

-.01

Leg/Foot Shaking

.41

-.20

.03

.04

-.14

Trunk Movements

.21

.02

-.03

-.04

.02

Crime Scene

-.48*

-.20

.23

.12

.06

Critical Details
-.13
-.18
.32
-.01
.13
Note: Positive correlations indicate innocence, negative correlations indicate guilt. *Indicates p <
.05.
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Hypothesis 3: Officers’ Impressions of Suspects.
We predicted that the police officers would rate Black suspects more negatively than
White suspects overall. Specifically, we predicted that police officers would rate Black suspects
as more anxious and more suspicious than White suspects. We predicted that they would rate
Black suspects to be less cooperative and less forthcoming than White suspects.

We also

predicted a suspect race by suspect culpability interaction. Specifically we predicted that officers
would rate innocent Black suspects to be more anxious, more suspicious, less cooperative, and less
forthcoming than innocent White suspects, while there would be no differences in officers’ ratings
of guilty Black and White suspects.
Anxiety. Observers provided ratings of the mock suspects’ anxiety levels on the same five
items that were used in the “pre-interview concern” questionnaire in Study 1. This questionnaire
asked observers to rate how: agitated, uneasy, nervous, worried, and anxious the suspects were on
a scale of 1 to 7 (1 = not at all, 7 = very). The five items were combined into an overall five-item
“suspect anxiety scale.” We summed observers’ ratings and divided by five so that ratings were
still reflected on a scale of 1-7, where the closer to one the observer’s rating was - the less anxiety
the participant appeared to have and the closer to seven the participant’s score was - the more
anxiety the participant appeared to have. The grand mean for observers’ anxiety ratings was 3.53
(SD = 1.12, 95% CI [3.28, 3.78]). A 2 (suspect culpability: innocent v. guilty) x 2 (suspect race:
White v. Black) ANOVA revealed no significant main effect for culpability on observers ratings
of anxiety, F(1, 75) = .14, p = .71, ηp2 = .002. There was not a significant main effect for suspect
race on observers ratings of anxiety, F(1, 75) = .36, p = .55, ηp2 = .005. The suspect culpability by
suspect race interaction was also not significant for observer ratings of anxiety, F(1, 75) = .13, p =
.72, ηp2 = .002.
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Like the pre-interview concern scale, given the lack of significant results on the anxiety
scale, each individual item on the scale was analyzed in case our compilation was overlooking
specific concepts that may be integral to understanding the unique experiences and perceptions of
Black and White suspects in police interrogations. None of the five items individually showed
any significant main effects or interactions, and thus will not be discussed further.
Suspicion. Observers were also asked to rate, on a 10-point scale (1 = extremely low
extent, 10 = extremely high extent), to what extend they felt suspicious during the interview. A 2
(suspect culpability: innocent v. guilty) x 2 (suspect race: White v. Black) ANOVA revealed no
significant main effect for culpability for observer suspicion, F(1, 76) = .01, p = .94, ηp2 = < .001.
There was, however, a significant main effect for suspect race on observer suspicion; observers of
Black suspects (M = 6.28, SD = 2.66, 95% CI [5.70, 6.86]) were significantly more suspicious
than observers of White suspects (M = 5.08, SD = 2.78, 95% CI [4.47, 5.69]), F(1, 76) = 3.91, p =
.05, ηp2 = .05.

The suspect culpability by suspect race interaction was not significant for

observers’ suspicion ratings, F(1, 76) = 2.20, p = .14, ηp2 = .03.
Cooperation.

Observers were then asked to provide their global impressions of the

suspects on a 10-point scale (1 = extremely low extent, 10 = extremely high extent) to what extent:
(1) did the person seem forthcoming with information? (2) did the person seem to trust the
interviewer? (3) did the person seem willing to cooperate with the investigation? and (4) did the
person seem willing to talk with investigators?
A 2 (suspect culpability: innocent v. guilty) x 2 (suspect race: White v. Black) ANOVA
revealed no significant main effect for culpability for the extent the suspect seemed forthcoming
with information, F(1, 76) = 1.73, p = .19, ηp2 = .02. There was no significant main effect for
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suspect race for forthcomingness, F(1, 76) = .74, p = .39, ηp2 = .01. The suspect culpability by
suspect race interaction was also not significant, F(1, 76) = 3.13, p = .08, ηp2 = .04.
A 2 (suspect culpability: innocent v. guilty) x 2 (suspect race: White v. Black) ANOVA
revealed no significant main effect for culpability for the extent the suspect seemed to trust the
interviewer, F(1, 76) = .11, p = .74, ηp2 = .001. There was no significant main effect for suspect
race for trust of interviewer, F(1, 76) = .51, p = .48, ηp2 = .01. There was, however, a significant
suspect culpability by suspect race interaction for trust of interviewer, F(1, 76) = 5.42, p = .02,
Ηηp = .07. Contrary to our hypotheses, pairwise comparisons indicate that officers rated guilty
White suspects (M = 3.60, SD = 2.35), as significantly less trusting of the interviewer than guilty
Black suspects, (M = 5.20, SD = 2.29), F(1, 76) = 4.62, p = .04, 95% CI [.12, 3.08]. For innocent
suspects, however, there was no significant difference in observers’ ratings of trust for Black (M =
4.15, SD = 2.35) and White (M = 5.00 SD = 2.43) suspects, F (1, 76) = 1.31, p = .26, 95% CI [-.63,
2.33].
A 2 (suspect culpability: innocent v. guilty) x 2 (suspect race: White v. Black) ANOVA
revealed no significant main effect for culpability for the extent the suspect seemed willing to
cooperate, F(1, 76) = 2.73, p = .10, ηp2 = .04. There was no significant main effect for suspect
race for cooperation, F(1, 76) = .50, p = .48, ηp2 = .01. There was, however, a significant suspect
culpability by suspect race interaction for cooperation, F(1, 76) = 5.42, p = .02, ηp2 = .07. As
predicted, pairwise comparisons indicate that, for innocent suspects, observers rated White
suspects (M = 7.60, SD = 1.67) as more cooperative with the investigation than Black suspects (M
= 5.90, SD = 2.58), F(1, 76) = 5.15, p = .03, 95% CI [.21, 3.19]. For guilty suspects, however,
there was no significant difference in observers’ ratings of cooperation for White (M = 5.35, SD =
2.54) and Black (M = 6.3 SD = 2.56) suspects, F(1, 76) = 1.61, p = .21, 95% CI [-.54, 2.44].
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A two-way ANOVA with suspect culpability (innocent v. guilty) and suspect race (White
v. Black) as independent variables revealed no significant main effect for culpability for the extent
the suspect seemed to willing to talk with investigators, F(1, 76) = .93, p = .34, ηp2 = .01. There
was no significant main effect for suspect race for willingness to talk, F (1, 76) = 1.39, p = .24, ηp2
= .02. There was, however, a significant suspect culpability by suspect race interaction for
willingness to talk, F (1, 76) = 5.54, p = .02, ηp2 = .07. As predicted, pairwise comparisons
indicate that, for innocent suspects, observers rated White suspects (M = 7.90, SD = 1.48) as more
willing to talk to investigators than Black suspects (M = 6.25, SD = 2.45), F (1, 76) = 6.23, p =
.02, 95% CI [.33, 2.97]. For guilty suspects, however, there was no significant difference in
observers’ ratings of cooperation for White (M = 6.90, SD = 2.17) and Black (M = 6.35 SD = 2.13)
suspects, F (1, 76) = .69, p = .41, 95% CI [-.76, 1.87].
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CHAPTER 12: STUDY TWO DISCUSSION
This goal of this study was to examine police officers’ abilities to judge the guilt and
innocence of Black and White suspects during a police interview.

Using the videotaped

interviews from Study 1, where both Black and White suspects committed either a mock crime or
an innocent act, we tested the hypotheses that (1) officers would judge Black suspects to be guilty
more often that White suspects; and (2) that they would make more mistakes when judging the
culpability of innocent Black suspects than innocent White suspects, while showing similar
accuracy rates guilty Black and White suspects. This is only the second known series of studies to
test this hypothesis (Vrij, 1991; Vrij, et al., 1988; Vrij et al., 1990, 1991) and, to our knowledge,
the first conducted in the US.
Overall, police officers showed poor accuracy when assessing the culpability of our mock
suspects, displaying mere chance levels of accuracy (53.8%). Despite their chance levels of
accuracy, officers were very confident in their judgments. This pairing of poor accuracy and high
confidence is consistent with past findings using police officers as participants in deception
detection research (e.g., Kassin, Meissner, & Norwick, 2005; Meissner & Kassin, 2002).
Examining officers’ decisions by suspect race, our hypotheses were partially supported. Our
police participants incorrectly judged innocent Black suspects guilty 65% of the time, compared to
only 30% of the time when judging innocent White suspects. Stated differently, for innocent
Black suspects the odds of being mistakenly judged as guilty were four times higher than that of
innocent White suspects. When judging guilty suspects, however, police officers showed similar
accuracy rates, correctly judging 55% of Black suspects guilty and 50% of White suspects guilty.
Given that there were no differences in nonverbal behavior between Black and White suspects on
our measures in Study 1, however, our hypothesis for why police officers made more errors with
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innocent suspects was not supported.
After rendering culpability judgments, officers rated suspects on a number of global
dimensions. Officers who viewed Black suspects reported feeling more suspicious than officers
who viewed White suspects. Officers also rated innocent Black suspects as both less willing to
speak with the interviewer and less cooperative than innocent White suspects. In Study 1, we
were unable to achieve an adequate level of interrater reliability for observers’ ratings of the
impressionistic cues, thus we do not know if these ratings by police are a results of stereotyping
and implicit prejudice or if our Black suspects were, in fact, being less cooperative and less
forthcoming. Willingness to speak with the interviewer and overall cooperation are behaviors that
require trust in the interviewer and the criminal justice system, to which it has been document
Black Americans have little (Fratello et al., 2013; Hurwitz & Peffley, 2005). Importantly, recall
that police believe liars are less likely to cooperate than truth tellers (Vrij et al., 2006) and that the
Reid Technique teaches that truthful suspects are more cooperative with the investigation than
guilty suspects (Inbau et al., 2013). Thus, these impressions of the suspects may in fact be
moderating police officers’ culpability judgments for innocent Black suspects. Research using a
more standardized, controlled, stimulus – such as using Black and White actors to portray
cooperative, forthcoming suspects v. uncooperative, withholding suspects – to control for
prejudice - is needed.
When describing what cues they relied to on make their decisions, 43.75% of officers who
judged Black suspects to be innocent cited the suspect’s gaze while only 12.5% of officers who
judged White suspects to be innocent cited suspect’s gaze. Conversely, officers who judged Black
suspects to be guilty only cited gaze 12.5% of the time (compared to 25% for guilty White
suspects), with “other” reasons being the most cited category at 37.5% of officers. Although the
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conclusions we can glean from self-reported data are limited, the differences here are notable for
two reasons. First, it raises the question of whether officers seek out different cues for innocence
and guilt when judging suspects of different races and ethnicities. It is possible that Black
suspects “Blackness” and, thus, automatic triggering of the stereotype of criminal, forces officers
to seek out more “cues to innocence” compared to White suspects. Because White suspects do not
start the interview at an automatic disadvantage by being stereotyped as a criminal, it is possible
that officers seek out cues to deception in White suspects but seek out cues to veracity with Black
suspects. It is important to note, however, that our analyses of objectively measured nonverbal
cues to deception showed no relationship between the suspects’ behaviors and the officers’
judgments for either Black or White suspects. Thus, it appears that the cues that officers report
using are not the cues they are actually using. This perspective is supported by a recent metaanalysis showing that the behaviors people self-report using as cues to deception are not the same
as those they actually used when making judgments of veracity (Hartwig & Bond, 2011). The
possibility that officers rely on different cues, or perceive cues differently, depending on the race
or ethnicity of the suspect when making veracity judgments warrants further investigation.
The second reason officers’ self-reported cues are interesting is the near double mentions
of cues that fall into the “other” category for Black suspects that were judged to be guilty (37.2%)
compared to White suspects judged to be guilty (18.8%). Anything that did not fit into gaze, body
movement, nervousness, statement, credibility, or cooperation was coded as other. For each of the
three other possible judgment outcomes: innocent White, guilty White, innocent Black, these six
categories combined were able to account for approximately 80-90% of the cues to deception.
When officers judged Black suspects to be guilty, however, there was a sizeable increase in the
mention of “other” cues. It is possible that this increase in cues that did not fit into the main
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categories was a by-product of stereotyping. Stereotypes are activated automatically and often
without our knowledge, and these stereotypes can affect our interpretations of ambiguous behavior
(Devine, 1989). When evaluating Black suspects, the pervasive cultural stereotype of Blacks as
criminals may have lead officers to see ambiguous behaviors by Black suspects as indicators of
guilt more often than they did for White suspects. As a result these cues were reported as
indicators of guilt for Black suspects, but not White suspects. It is important to note, however,
that we did not measure or control for prejudice in this study, thus we are merely speculating on
possible reasons for the difference cues cited. Again, more research examining how suspect race
or ethnicity affects lie catchers’ strategies is important. Similarly, the role of stereotyping during
police interviews warrants continued investigation, as we know that there is a strong and
automatic stereotype of African-Americans as criminals in the U.S. today.
Conclusions
The results of this study extend the police interviewing and interrogation literature by
comparing police officers’ culpability judgments of Black and White suspects.

Using an

experimental mock crime paradigm we were able to manipulate veracity and standardize the
interview in a manner that allowed us to compare officers’ decisions across both Black and White
and innocent and guilty suspects. As expected, officers judged innocent Black suspects to be
guilty at a significantly higher rate than innocent White suspects, while judging guilty Black and
White guilty suspects at similar rates. Whether the unintended consequence of poor deception
detection skills combined with Blacks suspects’ concerns about being stereotyped as criminals, or
the consequences of stereotyping and implicit biases on the part of police officers, these results
show that innocent Black suspects are, indeed, at a greater risk than innocent White suspects of
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being deemed guilty during a pre-interrogation interview, increasing the innocent Black suspect’s
risk of wrongful prosecution.
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CHAPTER 13: GENERAL DISCUSSION
We examined the effects of suspect race on police officers’ veracity assessments.
Although false confessions are a contributing factor in approximately 25-30% of DNA
exonerations, and approximately 69% of DNA exonerated false confessors are racial-ethnic
minorities (www.innocenceproject.org), there is little research on the role of suspect race in police
interviewing and interrogations. An interrogation is a guilt-presumptive process; those who are
being interrogated have been deemed liars in either a formal or informal pre-interrogation
interview. Thus, a false confession is the result of an inaccurate veracity judgment during the preinterrogation interview (Kassin, 2008). This raises the question: Is there some aspect of the preinterrogation interview that increases the risk of an incorrect lie judgment to Black suspects? To
test this we conducted two studies. First we examined Black and White suspects’ experiences and
behaviors in a police interview. Next we showed the videotaped interviews to police officers for
veracity judgments.
Our mock suspects, regardless of race or culpability, reported feeling equally nervous
during the interview, exhibited similar rates of nonverbal cues commonly associated with
deception, and cooperated with the investigation at similar rates. As noted previously this may be
due to a biased, more trusting of police, sample of Black participants. This is a limitation of our
study, and replicating and extending this research with a more representative sample is
recommended (but see Freimuth et al., 2001 on the difficulties of obtaining African-American
research participants). This limitation, however, suggests we may be underestimating the scope of
the problem. There were no differences between our suspects on precisely the measures police
officers are trained to look for to discern guilty, yet innocent Black suspects were mistakenly
judged guilty significantly more often than innocent White suspects. Would a more representative
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Black sample also have behaved similarly to the White sample? It is possible that a more
representative Black sample in regards to trust in law enforcement would have behaved in
accordance of our hypotheses from Study 1. Yet if police officers are, in fact, relying on the Reid
cues, it would almost certainly increase the error rate for innocent Black suspects.
Given the similarities of our suspects in Study 1 in regards to anxiety and cooperation, it
appears that officers’ erroneous judgments in Study 2 were a result of some other factor. Because
of the strong and automatic stereotype of Black Americans as criminals, we must consider the
possibility that racial biases had an effect on officers’ culpability judgments. This is not to say
that these judgments were intentionally biased, as biases can be implicit. That is, biases often
occur outside of conscious awareness. Because we did not assess officers’ biases in anyway, we
cannot say with certainty what role bias played in officers’ decisions, and what role other
unmeasured cues played in their decisions. However, none of our measured variables predicted or
explained officers’ (mis)judgments of innocent Black suspects.

As described earlier, police

officers are not immune to implicit biases against African-Americans (Eberhardt et al., 2004).
Thus, research examining the role of implicit biases during police interviews and interrogations is
needed.
An area requiring further research is interrogators’ strategies when questioning Black
suspects. The current study was limited in that police officers’ made culpability judgments after
watching a short video interview instead of being able to question the suspects themselves.
Although research shows that accuracy rates do not necessarily improve when investigators are
allowed to question suspects in a manner of their own choosing, (Hartwig et al., 2004; Luke et al.,
2014), we do not know of any research to date on police officers’ interrogation strategies where
suspect race was a variable. In Study 2, officers described relying on different behaviors as
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indicators of innocence and guilt as a function of the suspects’ race. Did suspect race affect what
strategy the officer used to detect deception? The strong and automatic association of Black and
crime may prime officers to use different strategies or look for different cues making veracity
judgments for Black suspects compared to White suspects.

In a study on the effects of

interrogator bias, Kassin et al., (2003) found that mock student interrogators led to believe the
suspect they were questioning was guilty asked more guilt presumptive questions and used more
interrogation tactics than officers primed to believe their suspect was innocent. Moreover, this
approach made suspects questioned by guilty primed interrogators appear more guilty than the
suspects questioned by innocent primed interrogators. Do officers questioning Black suspects
exhibit a similar pattern of behavior? The stereotype of African-Americans as criminals may
serve as a guilt prime, changing both the interrogators’ strategies and subsequent interpretations of
the suspects’ behavior. Future research should examine how the priming of suspect race and the
priming of criminal stereotypes affect interrogation strategies and the possibility that suspect race
may create behavioral confirmation in investigators.
Similarly, future research should examine the efficacy of investigative, non-adversarial
interviewing and interrogation techniques in increasing accuracy rates in judging veracity in Black
suspects. In comparison to the adversarial, guilt-presumptive interrogation model used in the
United States, where the main goal is eliciting a confession, the PEACE model used in the United
Kingdom is focused on fact finding and interviewers are encouraged to be fair and open-minded
(see Williamson, 2006). Would Black suspects questioned with an investigative approach be
evaluated differently than those questioned with an adversarial approach? As noted above, via
behavioral confirmation, guilt-presumptive interrogators tend to “produce” suspects that look
guilty (Kassin et al., 2003). That interrogations in the US are guilt-presumptive disadvantages all
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suspects, and the criminal stereotype may further disadvantage Black suspects. Removing the
presumption of guilt as sanctioned practice may begin to reduce the disadvantages that Black
suspects face in an interrogation. Because the investigative approach stresses being fair and open
minded, research on its ability to reduce implicit biases is recommended.
Currently, research on deception detection and investigative interviewing has moved away
from nonverbal cues and turned toward examining alternatives to the adversarial, guiltpresumptive approach. Researchers have begun testing a variety of non-accusatorial approaches,
including increasing cognitive load (Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2006; Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Fisher,
2010), asking unanticipated questions (Vrij et al., 2009), and strategic use of evidence (Hartwig et
al., 2005). As these methods are tested, an eye should be kept towards potential racial biases in
evaluating suspects when using these newer techniques. For example, in the current study Black
suspects were less forthcoming with information about their activities than White suspects –
regardless of their culpability. Techniques that rely on innocent suspects being more forthcoming
than guilty suspects should keep this in mind, and possibly research how race/ethnicity affect
respondents’ answers and consequently observers’ ability to detect deceit.
Finally, it is important to note that the lack of any differences in self-reported or behavioral
measures of anxiety in this research between Black and White suspects does not mean that Black
and White suspects have the same experiences when being questioned by the police. We interpret
these finding to mean that, in the end, being questioned was anxiety provoking regardless of one’s
race, but it is possible that our measures were not able to capture the specific stresses experienced
by our Black suspects. Given the high number of racial-ethnic minorities that come in contact
with the U.S. criminal justice system each year, researchers should continue to examine ways in
which racial-ethnic minorities experience interviews and interrogations. Similarly, researchers
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should continue examining police officers’ interviewing and interrogation strategies with
racial/ethnic minorities, as well as ways to reduce bias, in the continuing efforts towards criminal
justice reform.
Implications
The current research suggests that innocent Black suspects are at considerable risk of being
erroneously judged as guilty during a police interview. Recall that the pre-interrogation interview
is the step in which investigators make veracity assessments before proceeding to a preinterrogation interview

(Inbau et al., 2013). Thus, these misjudgments consequently place

innocent Black suspects at a significant risk of being interrogated about crimes they did not
commit. This is the first U.S. study that we know of to compare police officers’ perceptions and
culpability judgments of Black and White suspects, thus more research is needed to identify the
specific causes for these misjudgments and as well as potential remedies for these misjudgments.
It should be noted here, however, that it was difficult to recruit Black community member
participants as well as police officer participants, which may be one reason why there is a dearth
of research on this topic. Similarly, a few of our findings were trending towards significance, but
due to the above-mentioned difficulties in recruiting participants, our sample size may not have
been large enough to detect an effect, which may also be contributing to the dearth of published
research. In regards to future research examining the intersection of suspect race and police
interviewing, these difficulties should be kept in mind, and adjusted for when possible.
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Appendix A
Seeking participants for a study on Legal Decision Making. The study is being conducted at John
Jay College at 59th St. and 10th Ave in Midtown.
The study takes about 30 minutes to complete and you will be paid $10 for your time with a
chance to earn more!
If you are interested in participating, please take the survey below to determine your eligibility.
http://www.psychsurveys.org/sappleby/legaldecisionmaking
If you are eligible we will contact you shortly to set up a time to participate.
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Appendix B
Legal Decision Making Informed Consent (for interviewee participants)
You are invited to participate in a study of interview techniques. We plan to enroll 100 research
participants for this study.
If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked to carry out the task of getting an item from
adjacent room. You will be interviewed about your actions in that room; the questions you will be
asked concern only the task you carried out during the study. Before the interview, you will get
instructions about how to act during the interview. You may be asked to provide false information
about your actions. After the interview, you will be asked to complete a questionnaire about the
experience. This interview might be videotaped, and shown to other research participants. You
will receive further information about this, and be fully debriefed at the end of the experiment. The
total time required to complete the experiment should be about 30 minutes. If you feel
uncomfortable, you can leave the experiment at any time. For participating in this experiment, you
will receive $10.
Participation in this study will provide you with an opportunity to learn more about research
methods in psychology. There is minimal risk to participating in this study, though some
participants may find it somewhat stressful to be interviewed.
Any information collected in this study will be strictly confidential. It will not be possible to
identify any one participant in written reports; only aggregate data will be presented. All data will
be stored in locked files, to which only the researchers have access.
Your decision on whether or not to participate will in no way affect your future relations with John
Jay College of Criminal Justice or any of the researchers involved. You can choose not to answer
any questions asked of you. If you decide to participate, you are free to discontinue at any time
without any consequences. You may ask the experimenter any questions you have now. If you
have questions later, please contact the project director, Dr. Maria Hartwig at 212 237 8059. If
you have concerns or questions about the rights of a research participant or the ethics of this study,
please contact the Institutional Review Board Chair at John Jay College of Criminal Justice,
Thomas Kucharski (jj-irb@jjay.cuny.edu), at 212-237-8961.
At your request, you will be given a copy of this form to keep. You are making a decision on
whether or not to participate. Your signature indicates that you have read the information in this
form and have agreed to participate. Should you want to, you can withdraw whenever you want
even after signing this form.
______________________
Participant’s Printed Name
_______________________
Experimenter’s Printed Name

_____________________________________________
Signature
Date
_____________________________________________
Signature
Date
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Appendix C
Task instructions
(Innocent Suspects)
Your task is to go to the Psychology Department Mailroom (Room 2100A), and look for a book. The
experimenter will give you directions to the Mailroom. There is a box of books on the table in that room –
look through the box for a book called “Moral Minds”. If you find the book, take it with you and return to
this room. If you don’t find it in the box, return to this room for further instructions.
Please note that you are not committing any theft by taking the book with you, if you find it. All the books
in the box belong to the experimenter.
Task Instructions
(Guilty Suspects)
Your task is to go to the graduate Psychology Department Mailroom (Room 2100A). The experimenter
will give you directions to the Mailroom. Once you are in the Mailroom look for a briefcase. The briefcase
can be found on the table in that room. There is a wallet in the briefcase containing $100– take it and put it
in your pockets. Make sure no one sees you taking the wallet. After having done this, return to this room.
There will be further instructions when you return.
Please note that you are not committing a real crime by taking this wallet. Both the briefcase and the wallet
belong to the experimenter.
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Appendix D
Instructions before interview
(Innocent Suspects)
Earlier today, a wallet disappeared from a room in the North Hall. There is an investigation about the theft,
and therefore, you will be interviewed. Those involved in investigating the theft have indications that you
could be the one who took it.
Regardless of how the interviewer acts, your task is to tell the truth and deny that you took the wallet.
Your task is to convince the interviewer that you are innocent!
Please note that everyone involved in this study is aware that you are participating in an experiment. We
would appreciate, however, if you help us make this study as realistic as possible. Don’t tell the interviewer
that you participated in an experiment. Try as hard as you can to make him believe that you are innocent. If
you are able to convince him that you are telling the truth, and that you didn’t take the wallet, you
will be entered into a lottery to win $100.
Of course, you are free to leave the experiment at any time, without any consequences.
Instructions before interview
(Guilty Suspects)
Earlier today, a wallet disappeared from a room in the North Hall. There is an investigation about the theft,
and therefore, you will be interviewed. Those involved in investigating the theft have indications that you
could be the one who took it.
Regardless of how the interviewer acts, your task is to deny that you took the wallet.
Your task is to convince the interviewer that you are innocent!
Please note that everyone involved in this study is aware that you are participating in an experiment. We
would appreciate, however, if you help us make this study as realistic as possible. Don’t tell the interviewer
that you participated in an experiment. Try as hard as you can to make him believe that you are innocent. If
you are able to convince him that you didn’t take the wallet, you will be entered into a lottery to win
$100.
Of course, you are free to leave the experiment at any time, without any consequences.
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Appendix E
Please rate how you feel right now, as best as you can, on each of the following dimensions:
1.

1
Not at all
Agitated

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very
Agitated

2.

1
Not at all
Uneasy

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very
Uneasy

3.

1
Not at all
Nervous

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very
Nervous

4.

1
Not at all
Worried

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very
Worried

5.

1
Not at all
Anxious

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very
Anxious

6. How difficult do you think it will be to be interviewed? (circle one)
Not at all
1

Extremely
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
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Appendix F
Interview Script
Do you know the charges against you?
The reason I’m talking to you here today is that a wallet has been stolen from the mailroom and I
think you did it. I have security footage of you near the mailroom and I have an eyewitness who
says she saw a {white/black} {male/female} in the mailroom around the same time that the wallet
was stolen.
1. Did you steal the wallet?
2. Do you have the wallet in your possession right now?
3. The way you’re reacting makes me think you’re lying. Are you lying to me?
4. Well, I don’t believe you so I’m going to need you to tell me in as much detail as possible, me
what you did over the past 15 minutes or so.
3. Is there anything you would like to add?
4. If the suspect denies having been in the mailroom or has not indicated that he or she was
there: Were you in the mailroom?
[If suspect denies being in the mailroom: Listen, you say you weren’t in the mailroom today,
but we have evidence that you were. How do you explain that?]
{If suspect admits to being in mailroom: So you admit to being in the mailroom where the
wallet was stolen?
Why were you there?}
Listen, you say you were in the mailroom today and a wallet just happened to go missing right
around the time you were there. That sounds like a pretty strange coincidence, don’t you think?
How do you explain that?}
5. Do you have anyone that can back this story? Did you talk to anyone? Did anyone see you?
6. Are you sure you’re telling me the truth?
7. Why should I believe you?
7. Is there anything you wish to add at this time?
All right, I’m going to step outside and talk to my colleagues. Please wait here.
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Appendix G
Post-interview questionnaire 1

The statement I gave during the interview was (circle one):
Completely deceptive
1

Completely truthful

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Circle the alternative that fits best.

The questions below concern the event when you {looked for the book/took the wallet}.

Did you feel nervous when you {looked for the book/took the wallet}? (circle one)

No, not at all

1

Yes, extremely

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Did you feel uncomfortable when you {looked for the book/took the wallet}? (circle one)

No, not at all

1

Yes, extremely

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
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The questions below concern when you were interviewed.

Did you feel nervous when you were interviewed? (circle one)

No, not at all

1

Yes, extremely

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Did you feel uncomfortable when you were interviewed? (circle one)
No, not at all

1

Yes, extremely

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Was it difficult to be interviewed? (circle one)
No, not at all

1

Yes, extremely

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
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What did you feel during the interview?
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________

To what extent had you planned the verbal content of your statement?

Very low extent
1

Very high extent
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

To what extent had you planned your body language (including facial expressions)?

Very low extent
1

Very high extent
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
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Did you have a strategy before the interview?
Yes, the following:
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
No, because:
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________

Do you think that the person who interviewed you thought that you were innocent or guilty?
Innocent
Guilty
Why?
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
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To what extent were you motivated to be believed during the interview?

Very low extent
1

Very high extent
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Do you think the person who interviewed you thought you were anxious?
Yes
No
Why? ______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________

Do you think the person who interviewed you was biased against you in some way?
Yes
No
Why? ______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________

Do you think that a person who will watch the videotaped interview with you will think that you were lying
or telling the truth?
Lying
Telling the truth
Why?
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
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Appendix H
Post-interview questionnaire 2
If it is possible, would you like advice from a defense lawyer?
Yes
No
If yes, why? If no, why not?
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________

If it was possible, would you like to have a defense lawyer present in the room during the interview?
Yes
No
If yes, why? If no, why not?
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________

If it is possible, would you be willing to take a polygraph (lie detector) test?
Yes
No
If yes, why? If no, why not?
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
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If it is possible, would you like to invoke your right to silence?
Yes
No
If yes, why? If no, why not?
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
If it is possible, would you like to talk to a different detective?
Yes
No
If yes, why? If no, why not?
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
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Appendix I
Please read each of the following statements and decide to what extent you personally agree or
disagree with it. Circle the number that corresponds to this judgment.
1. I believe that, by and large, I deserve what happens to me.
1
Strongly
Agree

2
Agree

3
Slightly
Agree

4
Slightly
Disagree

5
Disagree

6
Strongly
Disagree

3
Slightly
Agree

4
Slightly
Disagree

5
Disagree

6
Strongly
Disagree

4
Slightly
Disagree

5
Disagree

6
Strongly
Disagree

4
Slightly
Disagree

5
Disagree

6
Strongly
Disagree

5
Disagree

6
Strongly
Disagree

2. I am usually treated fairly.
1
Strongly
Agree

2
Agree

3. I believe that I usually get what I deserve.
1
Strongly
Agree

2
Agree

3
Slightly
Agree

4. Overall, events in my life are just.
1
Strongly
Agree

2
Agree

3
Slightly
Agree

5. In my life, injustice is the exception rather than the rule.
1
Strongly
Agree

2
Agree

3
Slightly
Agree

4
Slightly
Disagree

6. I believe that most of the things that happen in my life are fair.
1
Strongly
Agree

2
Agree

3
Slightly
Agree

4
Slightly
Disagree

5
Disagree

6
Strongly
Disagree

7. I think that important decisions that are made concerning me are usually just.
1
Strongly
Agree

2
Agree

3
Slightly
Agree

4
Slightly
Disagree

5
Disagree

6
Strongly
Disagree
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8. I think basically the world is a just place.
1
Strongly
Agree

2
Agree

3
Slightly
Agree

4
Slightly
Disagree

5
Disagree

6
Strongly
Disagree

5
Disagree

6
Strongly
Disagree

5
Disagree

6
Strongly
Disagree

9. I believe that, by and large, people get what they deserve.
1
Strongly
Agree

2
Agree

3
Slightly
Agree

4
Slightly
Disagree

10. I am confident that justice always prevails over injustice.
1
Strongly
Agree

2
Agree

3
Slightly
Agree

4
Slightly
Disagree

11. I believe that in the long run people will be compensated for injustices.
1
Strongly
Agree

2
Agree

3
Slightly
Agree

4
Slightly
Disagree

5
Disagree

6
Strongly
Disagree

12. I firmly believe that injustices in all areas of life (e.g. professional, family, politics) are the
exception rather than the rule.
1
Strongly
Agree

2
Agree

3
Slightly
Agree

4
Slightly
Disagree

5
Disagree

6
Strongly
Disagree

13. I think people try to be fair when making important decisions.
1
Strongly
Agree

2
Agree

3
Slightly
Agree

4
Slightly
Disagree

5
Disagree

6
Strongly
Disagree

132

Appendix J
Please read each of the following statements and decide to what extent you personally agree or
disagree with it. Circle the number that corresponds to this judgment.
1.

In general, my race is an important part of my self-image.
1
Strongly
Agree

2.

3
Slightly

4
Neither
Agree or Disagree

5
Slightly
Disagree

6
Disagree

5
Slightly
Disagree

6
Disagree

7
Strongly
Disagree

5
Slightly
Disagree

6
Disagree

7
Strongly
Disagree

5
Slightly
Disagree

6
Disagree

7
Strongly
Disagree

5
Slightly
Disagree

6
Disagree

7
Strongly
Disagree

7
Strongly
Disagree

2
Agree

3
Slightly
Agree

4
Neither
Agree or Disagree

2
Agree

3
Slightly
Agree

4
Neither
Agree or Disagree

2
Agree

3
Slightly
Agree

4
Neither
Agree or Disagree

2
Agree

3
Slightly
Agree

4
Neither
Agree or Disagree

In general, other groups view people of my same race in a positive manner.
1
Strongly
Agree

8.

2
Agree
Agree

In general, others respect people of my same race.
1
Strongly
Agree

7.

6
7
Disagree
Strongly
Disagree

Overall, people of my same race are considered good by others.
1
Strongly
Agree

6.

5
Slightly
Disagree

My race is an important reflection of who I am.
1
Strongly
Agree

5.

4
Neither
Agree or Disagree

I have a strong attachment to other people of my race.
1
Strongly
Agree

4.

3
Slightly
Agree

I have a strong sense of belonging to my race.
1
Strongly
Agree

3.

2
Agree

2
Agree

3
Slightly
Agree

4
Neither
Agree or Disagree

5
Slightly
Disagree

6
Disagree

7
Strongly
Disagree

5
Slightly
Disagree

6
Disagree

7
Strongly
Disagree

Society views people of my same race as an asset.
1
Strongly
Agree

2
Agree

3
Slightly
Agree

4
Neither
Agree or Disagree
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Appendix K
Demographics Questionnaire
1. Age

___________

2. Gender
MALE

FEMALE

3. Race:
WHITE (NOT-HISPANIC)

AFRICAN-AMERICAN

OTHER

4. Are you a U.S. Citizen?
YES

NO

5. Highest Level of Education obtained
a. Some High School
b. High School/GED Equivalent
c. Some college
d. Bachelor’s
e. Graduate or Professional Degree
6. What do you do for a living?

7. Have you ever been questioned by the police?
NO

YES
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Appendix L
Permission to Use Videotape Data
I understand that the interview session I participated in was videotaped. The experimenter has explained to
me why it was necessary to videotape the interview, and he or she has also explained to me that by signing
this form, I give permission for the researchers of this study to use my videotape for data analysis purposes
and for further research purposes. I have received the information that other research participants may view
the tape in order to provide their impression of whether I provided false or true statements. It has been
explained to me that these participants will be clearly informed about the conditions of my participation.
I understand that my videotape will be kept in a locked file cabinet and that only the primary researchers
will have access to that cabinet. I have been given an opportunity to view my tape, decline the use of my
tape, and erase my tape before anyone else has the opportunity to view it.
I have read the above statement and give my permission for the researchers to use my videotape data for the
research purposes outlined above.
__________________________________
Print Name

___________________
Date

__________________________________
Signature
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Appendix M
Debriefing Protocol
The study you participated in focuses on a suspect’s race may impact his/her behavior in a police
interrogation. Many police officers are trained to look for cues that the suspect is anxious when making
judgments about whether a suspect is lying or telling the truth. There are many reasons, however, why a
suspect may be nervous when talking to the police – including race. Many studies show that police officers
are often very poor lie detectors; specifically they are usually no better at judging whether a suspect is lying
than someone who is simply flipping a coin.
This research has the goal of determining whether or not these strategies police officer’s use to detect
deception disproportionately put Black suspects at risk of being judged as guilty due to the stereotype that
African-Americans are criminals. We simulated an investigation in which you were acting as the suspect.
To mimic real-life investigations, some participants acted as innocent (they did not take the wallet), while
others acted as guilty (they were instructed by us to take the wallet). We hypothesize that the increased
anxiety experienced by Black suspects (often erroneously relied on by police to detect deception) and
potential racial difference in willingness to cooperate with the police (another cue police officers often
erroneously rely on) may put Black suspects at risk of appearing like a prototypical guilty suspect, even
when s/he is innocent, putting more Black suspects at risk of being mistakenly accused of crime than white
suspects.
Please note that we did not use surveillance camera footage to establish that you had been in the room in
which the theft occurred nor did we have an eyewitness. This deception was necessary to ensure the
validity of the study.
This session was videotaped to allow for data analysis. Also, we plan to show these videotapes to other
research participants (both police officers and other community members like yourself), and ask them if
they think that you were telling the truth or not. All participants will be clearly informed that you
participated in a study, that the investigation was not real and that you were never suspected of anything. If
you are not comfortable with us using the videotape for these purposes, we will immediately destroy the
videotape before anyone sees it.
We understand that it may have caused you some discomfort to play the role of the suspect in this study.
However, studies such as these are important in order to improve the justice system, and we therefore
greatly appreciate your participation. If you have any questions, complaints or concerns about this research,
please contact the project director, sappleby@jjay.cuny.edu.
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Appendix N
Operational Definitions for Nonverbal Behaviors
1. Gaze:
• number of seconds looking at face of police officer
2. Head movement
• nodding (up and down) and shakes (side to side) of head; series of nods or shakes coded as
one
3. Laughter
• audible expulsion of air from the lungs
4. Smiles
• mouth movement pulled to the side of the face
5. Illustrators
• hand/arm movements used to demonstrate size, form, location of object or place
6. Leg/Foot Shaking/Tapping
• distinct shakes (back and forth, up and down) or taps (up and down) of foot or leg
7. Fidgeting With Objects
• number of seconds suspect spends fidgeting with objects
8. Self-Touching
• Scratching or touching parts of one’s body; gestures intended to improve a person
appearance
9. Trunk Movements
• visible movements of the trunk, forward, backward, sideways
10. Minutes Speaking
• total # of minutes that the participant spends speaking during the interviewer
11. Speech Rate
• # of words per minute spoken by suspect
12. Speech Disturbances
• # of ahs, ums, mmm
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Appendix O
Deception Detection Study Informed Consent
You are invited to participate in a study on deception detection. We plan to enroll 80 research participants
for this study. If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked to watch a videotaped interview with a
person who is providing either a true or a false statement. Your task will be to determine whether the
person is lying or telling the truth. The total time required to complete the experiment should be around
30minutes.
Participation in this study will provide you with an opportunity to learn more about research on deception
detection and will provide researchers with valuable information on how police officers detect deception.
You will also receive $30 for participating in this study. There is minimal risk to participating in this study.
Any information collected in this study will be strictly confidential. Participants will only be identified by
a number. It will not be possible to identify any one participant in written reports; only aggregate data will
be presented. All data will be stored in locked files, to which only the researchers have access.
Your decision on whether or not to participate will in no way affect your future relations with John Jay
College of Criminal Justice or any of the researchers involved. You can choose not to answer any
questions asked of you. If you decide to participate, you are free to discontinue at any time without any
consequences. You may ask the experimenter any questions you have now. If you have questions later,
please contact the project director, Sara Appleby at sappleby@jjay.cuny.edu. If you have concerns or
questions about the rights of a research participant or the ethics of this study, please contact the Institutional
Review Board Chair at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, Thomas Kucharski (jj-irb@jjay.cuny.edu), at
212-237-8961.
At your request, you will be given a copy of this form to keep. You are making a decision on whether or
not to participate. Your signature indicates that you have read the information in this form and have agreed
to participate. Should you want to, you can withdraw whenever you want even after signing this form.
_____________________________
Participant’s Printed Name

_____________________________________________
Signature
Date

_____________________________
Experimenter’s Printed Name

_____________________________________________
Signature
Date
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Appendix P
Instruction for observers
A while ago, we carried out a study in which a number of people participated. Some of these people were
instructed to carry out a mock theft of a wallet; others were instructed to do something else, not involving a
mock crime. All these participants were interviewed about the theft, and they all deny. However, some
actually did take the wallet, while others are actually innocent of the mock theft.
You are going to get some information about one of the suspects and then see a videotaped interview that
suspect. Your task is to decide whether the interviewee is lying or telling the truth – in other words
whether the person actually did take the wallet or not.
There are some indications that the interviewee committed the theft. First, the security department at John
Jay College could establish that the person entered the building on the day the theft occurred. Second,
surveillance camera footage shows the person was near the room from which the theft occurred. Third, a
person matching the interviewee’s description was seen in the room around the time the wallet was stolen.
This information does not exclude the possibility that the interviewee is innocent. Again, some of the
research participants did take the wallet, some did not take the wallet.
Please note that the wallet that was taken belongs to the experiment, and that there is no real suspicion
towards the interviewees.
Pay close attention during the interview, which will last approximately 10 minutes. After the interview,
you will be asked to fill out a questionnaire regarding your perception of the interviewee.
If you make a correct judgment of whether the interviewee is telling the truth or lying, you have the chance
of winning $100 in a lottery.
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Appendix Q

Suspect Profile
Demographics:
Name: Michael/Michelle Jones
Age:
Biographical Information:
• Suspect lives in Brooklyn, NY.
• Suspect moved from Washington D.C. to New York 5 years ago.
• Suspect waits tables at a nearby restaurant.
• Suspect has no children.
Case Information:
• Suspect wanted/did not want to speak with a defense attorney.
• Suspect was/was not willing to take a polygraph.
• After the initial interview, suspect wanted/did not want to invoke their right to silence.
• After the initial interview, suspect wanted/did not want to speak to another detective.
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Appendix R
Observer Questionnaire 1
The questions concern the interview you just watched.
When the interviewee denied guilt, was s/he lying?
No,
absolutely not
1

2

Yes,
absolutely
3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

What was your impression of the interviewee?
Completely truthful
1

2

Completely deceptive
3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Of the information that the interviewee provided, how much do you think was truthful?
Everything was deceptive
1

2

3

4

Everything was truthful
5

6

7

8

9

10

Which of the following is most likely to be true?
The person was innocent of the theft
The person was guilty of the theft
How confident do you feel in this?
Not at all confident
(simply guessing)
1
2

Extremely confident
3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
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When did you decide whether the interviewee was guilty or innocent?
At the very beginning
of the interview
1
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

At the very end
of the interview
9
10

How difficult was it to judge whether the interviewee was guilty or innocent?
Extremely easy
1

2

Extremely difficult
3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Briefly describe the main reasons why you think the interviewee was innocent/guilty.

_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
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_______________________________________________________________________________
__________

If possible, would you interrogate this suspect further for this crime?
No, absolutely not
1

2

3

Yes, absolutely
4

5

6

7

8

9

10

If yes, why? If no, why not?
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
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Observer Questionnaire 2

To what extent did the interviewee’s body language (including facial expressions) influence your
impression of guilt/innocence?
Not at all
1

Completely
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

To what extent did the interviewee’s verbal statement influence your impression of guilt/innocence?
Not at all
1

Completely
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

To what extent did the interviewee’s biographical information influence your impression of
guilt/innocence?
Not at all
1

Completely
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

To what extent did the interviewee’s post interview behavior influence your impression of guilt/innocence?
Not at all
1

Completely
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
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Finally, take another moment to think about the interviewee you just saw, and the impressions you
formed.

To what extent did the person seem to think hard during the interview?
Extremely low extent
1

2

Extremely high extent
3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

To what extent did you feel suspicious during the interview?
Extremely low extent
1

2

Extremely high extent
3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

To what extent did the person seem forthcoming with information?
Extremely low extent
1

2

Extremely high extent
3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

To what extent did the person seem to trust the interviewer?
Extremely low extent
1

2

Extremely high extent
3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

To what extent did the person seem willing to cooperate with the investigation?
Extremely low extent
1

2

Extremely high extent
3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
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To what extent did the person seem willing to talk with investigators?
Extremely low extent
1

2

Extremely high extent
3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

To what extent did you feel like you obtained enough information?
Extremely low extent
1

2

Extremely high extent
3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Please rate your impressions of the suspect as best you can on each of the following dimensions:
1
Not at all
Agitated

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very
Agitated

1
Not at all
Uneasy

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very
Uneasy

1
Not at all
Nervous

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very
Nervous

1
Not at all
Worried

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very
Worried

1
Not at all
Anxious

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very
Anxious
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Please rate your impressions of the suspect as best you can on each of the following dimensions:
A.

1
immoral

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
moral

B.

1
respectable

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
not
respectable

C.

1
mistrustful

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
trusting

D.

1
intelligent

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
unintelligent

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
bad

F.

1
unlikable

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
likable

G.

1
trustworthy

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
untrustworthy

H.

1
unhelpful

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
helpful

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
insincere

E.
good

I.
sincere
J.

1
forthcoming

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
not
forthcoming

K.

1
convincing

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
unconvincing

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
uncertain

L.

1
certain

M.

1
not credible

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
credible

N.

1
2
not cooperative

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
cooperative

O.

1
defensive

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
not defensive

P.

1
not friendly

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
friendly
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8. Have you received any special training (seminars, workshops, etc) on who to conduct
suspect interviews and interrogations? Circle one.
a. NO
b. YES: (please describe)
__________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________

How much do you think your deception detection training affected your judgments in this case?
Not at all
1

2

A lot
3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
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Appendix S
Observer Questionnaire 3

Suspect Recall
Please think back to the information we presented you with before the interview and the interview
you just saw:
1. After the interview, did the suspect want to speak with a defense attorney?
a. NO

b. YES

2. After the interview, was the suspect willing to take a polygraph?
a. NO

b. YES

3. After the interview, did the suspect want to invoke their right to silence?
a. NO

b. YES

4. After the interview, did the suspect want to speak to another detective?
a. NO

b. YES

5. What was the gender of the suspect?
a. Male
b. Female
6. What was the race of the suspect?
a. White
b. Black
c. Hispanic
d. Asian
e. Middle Eastern
f. Other:_____________
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Appendix T
Demographics Questionnaire
9. Age

___________

10. Gender
MALE

FEMALE

11. City/Town:__________________
12. Race/Ethnicity:
a. White
b. Black
c. Hispanic
d. Asian
e. Middle Eastern
f. Other:_____________
13. How long have you been employed in law enforcement?
_________ years, _______ months

14. Over the course of your career, about how many interview and interrogations of suspects
have you conducted, alone or with other investigators? Pleas estimate as best you can.
__________
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Appendix U
Debriefing Protocol
The goal of this study was to examine how a suspect’s race affects their behavior in a police interview, and
how that subsequently affects observers’ ability to detect deception during a police interview.
Research has shown that ethnic minorities are concerned about being stereotyped during interracial
interactions. Moreover, stereotype concerns increase anxiety and stress, hinder inter-racial interactions,
and affect nonverbal communication by increasing behaviors associated with anxiety. Thus, we predict
that in a police-citizen interaction African-Americans may be more likely than Caucasians to display
anxious behavior. Police are often trained to look for signs of anxiety as cues to deception during an
interview, and, as a result of the stereotype concerns of minority suspects, we predict that police will
perceive innocent Black suspects to be more deceptive during a pre-interrogation interview compared to
innocent White suspects. We predict no differences in perceptions of deceptiveness for guilty suspects.
The intellectual merit of this research lies in its ability to further our understanding of what affects suspect
behavior in the police-citizen interactions, and our ability to determine if there are racial and ethnic
differences that the legal system should be sensitive to. Additionally, this research can help us develop and
research remedies to reduce any negative effects that may occur due to cultural differences. It is possible
that additions to police training programs could help increase awareness of the risks of misjudgments of
minority suspects in police interviews and interrogations.
We simulated an investigation in which some people acted as mock suspect. To mimic real-life
investigations, some participants acted as innocent (they did not take the wallet), while others acted as
guilty (they were instructed by us to take the wallet). They did not make the choice to take the wallet or
not, they were simply following our instructions. Please note that the accusation against the interviewee
was purely part of the experiment. There was never any real suspicion against them. We did not gather
information from the Security staff that the interviewee had been in the building, nor did we use
surveillance camera footage to establish that they had been near the room in which the mock theft occurred.
This deception was necessary to ensure the validity of the study.
Studies such as these are important in order to improve the justice system, and we therefore greatly
appreciate your participation. If you have any questions, complaints, or concerns about this research,
please contact the project director, Sara Appleby at sappleby@jjay.cuny.edu.
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